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I. INTRODUCTION
Public policy, or "ordre public" in continental jurisprudence, is
an elusive concept that seems to suffer from certain inherent weak-
nesses.' From its inception, public policy appears to have constantly
defied all attempts at precise definition. 2 It is vague, nebulous,
1. The concept of public policy appears in most treatises and casebooks dealing with
contracts and conflict of laws. See, e.g., B. CARnozo, THE GROWTH OF TIE LAW 67 (1924);
J. CHITTY, 1 CHITT ON CONTRACTS 546 (25th ed. 1983) [hereinafter CHImY ON CONTRACTS];
E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 330 (1982) [hereinafter FARNSWORTH]; G. CHEscHMn & P. NORTH,
CHESCHIRE & NORTH'S PRIvATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 (1987) [hereinafter CHEscHnB &
NORTH]; A. EHRENZWEIO, CONFLICT OF LAWS 131 (1959) [hereinafter EnlENzWEIo]; A. DicaY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1986) [hereinafter DIcEY]; R. CRAMTON, D. CuuE & H. KAY, CONFLICT
OF LAWS, CASES - COMMENTS - QUEsTIoNs (1987) [hereinafter CRAMTON, CURRIE & KAY]; R.
WENTRAUB, COm NTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 82 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter WEINTRAtm];
J. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612.1 (1935) [hereinafter BEA ]; H. RrAD, 2 RECOONION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE COMMON LAW UNITS OF THE BRITISH
CommONwrALTH 288 (1938); Husserl, Public Policy and Ordre Public, 25 VA. L. REv. 37
(1939) [hereinafter Husserl]; Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L.
REv. 173, 183-84 (1933); Kosters, Public Policy in Private International Law, 29 YALE L.J.
745, 746 (1920); Nutting, Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine, 19 MINN. L.
REv. 196 (1935); Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse. Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances
in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087 (1956).
2. Fewer concepts have evoked greater judicial and intellectual attention than public
policy in terms of meaning. A valuable historical review of the evaluation of the meaning of
public policy can be found in an article by Winfield. See Winfield, Public Policy in the English
Common Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 76 (1929) [hereinafter Winfield]. See also F. POLLOCK,
PRINCnILES OF ENGLISH LAw 379-441 (9th ed. 1921) [hereinafter POLLOCK]; W. HoLDsWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 377 (3d ed. 1923) [hereinafter HoLDswoRTH]; Knight, Public
Policy in English Law, 38 L.Q. REv. 207 (1922) [hereinafter Knight] (all discussing meaning
of public policy). The elusiveness of public policy in the United States can be found in another
valuable article by Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLum. L.
REv. 969, 972-80 (1956) [hereinafter Paulsen & Sovern].
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intractable, and lacks meaningful and consistent contours that can
guide its definition and application.3 Like a chameleon, it seems to
be seriously influenced by its environment, surrounding circum-
stances, and the purposes for its use.4 It, therefore, takes on an
incessant variety of colors depending on the situation at hand.
According to Judge Goodrich, it is like the ghost of Banquo which
slips in when least expected.5
3. The fluidity of the concept has been noted by almost anyone who has thought seriously
about it. According to Chitty it is open-textured, flexible, vague, unsatisfactory, and a
treacherous ground for decision. Carr ON CoTRnAcTs, supra note 1, at 546. Winfield also
discussed the various meanings of public policy under English common law. See Winfield,
supra note 2. See also Holdsworth, supra note 2; PoLLocK, supra note 2; and Knight, supra
note 2 (all discussing various meanings of public policy); and the landmark case of Mitchel v.
Reynolds, [1711] 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 348. In the Duke of Norfolk's Case, [1681] 22 Eng. Rep.
931, 960, 3 Ch. 1, 20, Lord Nottingham dealt with the ever changing nature of public policy
in the following statement: "Where will you stop, if you stop, if you do not stop here? ..
I will tell you where I will stop: I will stop wherever any visible inconvenience doth appear."
Id.
4. See, e.g., Winfield's discussion of the changing views of religious toleration, restraint
of trade and political morality. The following passage bears testimony to the variability of the
concept over time:
As to the variability of public policy with regard to the same branch of the law,
the illustrations are legion. The stock example is restraint of trade. In this field
many decisions barely fifty years old are now museums of fossil economic theories.
One hundred and thirty years ago current views on religion led to the condemnation
of Paine's Age of Reason as a blasphemous libel, because any attack on Christianity
was to be regarded as illegal. Sixty years ago the frustration of a ball and tea party
in memory of the author was compensated by one farthing damages. Ten years ago,
the House of Lords held that a denial of Christianity was not blasphemous, apart
from scurrility or profanity. Here public policy had broadened legal views in religious
toleration. Now take an example where it has narrowed them in political morality.
In James I's reign, a baronetcy might be purchased for $1095, subject to safeguards
which may or may not have been observed. Nowadays, an agreement with the
secretary of a charity by which he undertakes to procure a knighthood for the donor
of a large sum of money is so objectionable that the donor is not allowed to recover
his gift, even thought he is not knighted and is defrauded from the very first.
Another notable example is the sales of commissions in the army. Within living
memory such a transaction was perfectly lawful and a matter of common practice.
Winfield, supra note 2, at 94-95.
A good example of the current intolerable use of one's offices for pecuniary gain is in the
case of Lemenda Trading Co. Ltd. v. African Middle East Petroleum Co. Ltd., [1988] 1 Q.B.
448, 2. W.L.R. 735, where it was held that it was undesirable to charge for using one's
influence to obtain benefits from a person in a public position.
In the case of the United States, Stimson provides some interesting examples of older types
of transactions that were considered contrary to public policy but are no longer considered to
be offensive. E. STMsoN, Coznfict OF LAWS 59-69 (1963) [hereinafter STIMsoN]. See, e.g.,
State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9 (1872) (miscegenation); State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242 (1876) (polygamy,
prohibition of marriage after divorce).
5. See Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies, 25 VA. L. REV. 26, 32 (1938)
[hereinafter Goodrich]. The following passage is indicative of the problem:
The initial difficulty is that public policy is such a general term that one can get
from it almost anything he pleases. It is even broader than due process of law. In
one sense it is, as-courts have said, "The manifested will of the state." The sovereign
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The elusiveness of public policy has been the subject of continuing
controversy in the courts and among academicians. 6 Why is there
disagreement among the courts and intellectuals over the use of
public policy? Why might one of the parties resist its use? Generally,
the forum will refuse to apply a governing substantive foreign law
if it considers such law repugnant to its domestic public policy. Thus,
public policy is used to defeat the application of substantive foreign
rights or obligations in a particular dispute. When a transaction or
activity takes place in a foreign jurisdiction and the parties are
people of a state establish local public policy when they adopt a Constitution.
Id. at 30-31.
Legislators make a state's policy in passing regulatory statutes. Judges manifest their views of
public policy in the opinions they write. It is correct, in one sense of the term, to say that
"when we speak of the public policy of the state, we mean the law of the state, whether
found in the Constitution, the statutes, or judicial records." Id.
See also Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736,
747 (1924) [hereinafter Lorenzen] (public policy is "but a method whereby old rules are
modified and new rules established").
6. Academic debate over public policy was pitched even in the days of the First
Restatement. See BFAfE, supra note 1; W. CooK, Tim LooIcAL AND LEOAL BAsEs OF Tim
CoNnLcT OF LAWS (1947) [hereinafter CooK]; Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New
York, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1 (1963) [hereinafter Currie]; Lorenzen, supra note 5, at 736; Nussbaum,
Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws, 49 YALE L.J. 1027 (1940). For
judicial decisions and sometimes conflicting or contradictory views, see the discussion of
English cases in Winfield, supra note 2, at 87-89. See also Fletcher v. Sondes, [1926] 130 Eng.
Rep. 606; Richardson v. Mellish, [1824] 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 299-300; Kilberg v. Northeast
Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). Kilberg involved a wrongful
death action in New York for a death caused by a plane crash in Massachussets. The question
presented was whether limitations on damages imposed by Massachussets law, but prohibited
by the New York Constitution, could nevertheless be enforced by New York courts. The
plaintiff tried to characterize the dispute as one sounding in contract since decedents had
purchased a plane ticket in New York and, arguably, New York law would govern. This would
permit higher damages than would be available under Massachussets law. The court, contrary
to its earlier opinion in Dyke v. Erie Ry. Co., 45 N.Y. 113 (1871), held that the contract
characterization was not applicable. The court went further to explain that the limitations on
damages for wrongful death would be contrary to New York public policy. According to the
court, "New York's public policy prohibiting the imposition of limits on such damages is
strong, clear and old. Since the Constitution of 1894, our basic law has been that 'The right
of action now existing to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall never be
abrogated; and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitations.' "
Id. at 528. However, in the case of Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198
(1918), the question was whether a New York plaintiff could be allowed to recover more under
Massachussets exemplary damages law than the lower normal damages law of New York.
Holding that the New York plaintiff could recover, the court relied again on New York public
policy. This time, it concluded that New York had no public policy against the plaintiff
recovering exemplary damages. See also cases cited infra notes 126-32 (dealing with gambling
and public policy concerns); Intercontinental Hotel Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d, 203 N.E.2d
210, 754 N.Y.S.2d (1964) (legalizing parimutuel betting). Florida refused to take such a tolerant
view in Dorado Beach Hotel Corp. v. Jeruigan, 202 So. 2d 830 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987),
holding a Puerto Rican gambling debt unenforceable in Florida against a Florida resident.
Similarly, a Rhode Island agreement to share parimutuel winnings was held unenforceable in
Ciampittiello v. Campitello, 134 Conn. 51, 54 A.2d 669 (1947).
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subject to its laws, great injustice may be done to the parties and
their expectations if the forum, without legitimate reasons, applies
its public policy to defeat their legal rights and obligations.7 Such an
act on the part of the forum may even be unconstitutional as to the
rights of parties and the law of the sister state in which the contract
was entered into. 8 Some observers are also distressed by the notion
that one of the parties in a legal dispute should be allowed to rely
on public policy, as often happens, when the party cannot persuade
the court on any cogent legal theory. 9 Under such circumstances,
public policy may be an appeal to the subjective feelings of the
court, thereby discouraging the development of concrete legal rea-
soning. 0 There is further concern that public policy may be a
convenient instrument for courts to alter, rewrite, or even subvert,
the terms of the contract for the parties by refusing to apply the
governing foreign or proper law." However, public policy may be
hailed as necessary to ensure that basic and fundamental values of
society are not subverted by sharp dealings, manipulative litigants,
and by transactions contrary to the esprit de corps of the law.'
2
The controversy over the concept of public policy and the circum-
stances of its appropriate use seem magnified in interstate and
international conflict of laws problems. In the case of interstate
conflict of laws, when may a state legitimately reject an applicable
sister state law as being repugnant to its local public policy? Should
there be any restriction on the use of the concept by courts? There
7. See SimnsoN, supra note 4, at 56; Currie, supra note 6.
8. Constitutional questions that arise from this are significant. The United States Supreme
Court addressed the public policy and constitutional implications of choice of law in Hughes
v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951). More recent cases dealing with the question in general include
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. IRL Shutts,
472 U.S. 797 (1985); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988). For academic writings,
see Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CoR-EIX
L. R a. 94 (1976) [hereinafter Kirgis]; Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law,
61 CORN LL L. Rav. 185 (1976); Cavers, Symposium: Conflict-of-Laws Theory After Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HossmA L. Rv. 1 (1981); Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal
Scrutiny, 49 U. Cm. L. Ray. 440 (1982).
9. See Winfield, supra note 2, at 87.
10. See Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 2, at 970-80.
11. See sources cited supra notes 6-7.
12. The relationship between public policy and the spirit of the law was fully explored
by the House of Lords in the famous case of Egerton v. Browniow, [1853] 10 Eng. Rep. 359.
In his opinion, Mr. Justice Creswel discussed the terms in a will which would be against
public policy because they would be contrary to the spirit of the law, although not against
the law itself. Id. at 393-94. According to Lorenzen, public policy "has been used in a
comprehensive sense to include evasion of the law or fraud on the law." Lorenzen, supra note
5, at 747.
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are important reasons why certain restraints on the use of public
policy might be in order. According to Judge Beach:
It would be an intolerable affectation of superior virtue for the
courts of one state to pretend that the mere enforcement of a right
validly created by the laws of a sister state would be repugnant to
good morals, would lead to disturbance and disorganization of the
local municipal law, or would be of such evil example as to corrupt
the jury or the public.'3
Thus, the concept may be narrowly defined and applied in interstate
disputes. However, state courts may ignore this warning and define
public policy so broadly as to apply it to a wide variety of cases.
In the case of disputes having international elements, there is also
the question of how the concept may be used. What amount of
respect should be given to foreign country laws in the face of
conflicting laws or policies?' 4 The increased level of contemporary
interaction between people of different nations, cultural values, and
legal systems will likely augment the number of disputes before United
States courts that may be governed by foreign country laws. 5 If so,
to what extent may the concept of public policy be used to defeat
the application of governing foreign country laws? Is there a differ-
ence between the use of public policy in interstate and international
conflict of laws problems?
The purpose of this article is to develop some answers to these
questions as they apply to California. The choice of California for
this study is based on several considerations. California has a well-
established liberal tradition in legislation and judicial decisions. It is
seen as supportive of progressive views both socially and legally, with
a tolerance for novel legal concepts.' 6 California is also a significant
13. See Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights, 27 YALE L.J. 656, 662
(1918) [hereinafter Beach].
14. The decision of how much respect to give to foreign country laws is not as simple as
that of interstate cases. Professor Ehrenzweig discusses more directly in enforcement of
judgment cases where the original cause of action is contrary to the public policy of a foreign
nation. See EHRENZWEIG, supra note 1, at 199. See also an extensive discussion of the topic
in CEzsc=a & NORTH, supra note 1, at 130-40.
15. Yelpaala, Choice of Law and Foreign Clauses in International Transactions in Common
Law Jurisdictions, in DRAFTING AND ENFORCING CONTRACTS IN CIVm AND COMMON LAW
JUIusDIcToNs 212 (1986) [hereinafter Yelpaala].
16. California's liberal tradition is said to have started in the early days of the State. For
instance, the comparative impairment approach in choice of law calls for the application of
the law of the state whose interest would be most impaired in the case of a true conflict of
laws. Professor Horowitz has argued that the comparative impairment approach has its origins
in the 1858 California Supreme Court opinion in Ex Parte Archy, 9 Cal. 147 (1858). In this
case, the question was whether a runaway slave who had been hired out for labor in California
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economic unit in international trade and investment. 7 Assuming that
by his Mississippi owner should be returned to the latter. Slavery was declared illegal by the
California Constitution, but was legal in Mississippi. In trying to resolve this issue, the Court
balanced the interests of the respective states and that of the federal system. It refused, but
only prospectively, the return of the slave to his Mississippi owner. For an extensive discussion
of this case, see Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California-A Restatement, 21
UCLA L. REv. 719, 720-23, 748-49 (1974). Another example of California's lead in the
development and application of legal concepts can be found in the family law area. It is
claimed that California was the first state to adopt a liberal no-fault divorce law. See Weitzman,
Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1269 (1974).
One of the most celebrated California Supreme Court decisions in the family law area was
the case of Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). The
issue in this case was whether cohabitation could create rights in the property of a man for
his cohabiting female partner. Reversing the trial court ruling, the California Supreme Court
held that whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to a trial on the merits of her case was a
matter of contract. According to the Court:
The Courts should enforce express contracts between non-marital partners except to
the extent that the contract is explicitly founded on the consideration of meretricious
sexual services. In the absence of an express contract, the courts should inquire into
the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied
contract, agreement of partnerships or joint venture, or some other tacit understand-
ing between the parties. The courts may also employ the doctrine of quantum meruit,
or equitable remedies such as constructive or resulting trusts, when warranted by
the facts of the case.
Id. at 665. The court explained its conclusion by saying that adults who voluntarily cohabit
as sexual partners are nonetheless as competent as any other persons to enter into a contract
with respect to their earnings. Id. at 674.
The philosophy of the Court is best captured by the following statement:
In summary, we believe that the prevalence of nomnarital relationships in modern
society and the social acceptance of them, marks this as a time when our courts
should by no means apply the doctrine of the unlawfulness of the so-called mere-
tricious relationship to the instant case .... We conclude that the judicial barriers
that may stand in the way of policy based upon the fulfillment of the reasonable
expectations of the parties to a non-marital relationship should be removed.
Id. at 683-84.
The Marvin case has been the subject of much intellectual commentary. According to such
commentary, the Marvin opinion was not the first of its type in California, but simply the
one in which the Supreme Court of California resolved the conflict between the lower courts
on the issue. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862
(1973), where the Court boldly expanded the quasi-marital property doctrine to cohabiting
couples. See also Estate of Atherley, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1957), applying
the same doctrine. But see Beckman v. Mayhew, 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604
(1974) (rejecting the doctrine). For a thoughtful analysis of Marvin and its impact, see Kay &
Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin-Preserving the Options, 65 CALin. L. Rnv. 937, 956-62 (1977). A
student comment has described the opinion in Marvin as very liberal and calling for the setting
aside of moral considerations in dealing with cohabitors and their legal problems. See Comment,
Marvin v. Marvin: Five Years Later, 65 MARQ. L. Ray. 389, 390 (1982). It is reported that
some states have followed Marvin. See Blakesley, The Putative Marriage Doctrine, 60 Tmt.
L. REv. 1, 59 (1985). One thoughtful comment notes that Marvin was not a major departure
from existing practice, but that it nevertheless limited the discretionary power of courts to
reject enforcement of non-meretricious contractual relationships between cohabitors. See Com-
ment, Property Rights Upon Termination of Unmarried Cohabitation: Marvin v. Marvin, 90
HARv. L. Ra,. 1708, 1713-14 (1977). In the area of commercial arbitration, the U.S. Supreme
Court recently commented that California had taken the lead in providing a procedure which
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these perceptions are accurate, how do California courts use public
policy in resolving disputes? Would the fluidity in the concept of
public policy be further disturbed by the state's progressive views,
thereby making its use even more unpredictable? Furthermore, the
use of public policy in the choice of law area is generally associated
with the traditional or First Restatement approach to choice of law."5
In 1967, the California Supreme Court decision in Reich v. Purcell,19
abandoned the traditional approach to choice of law for governmental
interest analysis, and subsequently adopted the comparative impair-
ment approach. 20 However, the recent California Supreme Court
decision in Wong v. Tenneco2' may well be signaling a return to the
traditional approach to choice of law analysis. This trend does not
appear to be peculiar to California. 22 If, indeed, there is a return to
the traditional approach or some version of it, then more questions
must be answered as to the role of public policy in California conflict
of laws. If Wong was an aberration and California courts continue
to use the comparative impairment approach, it might be instructive
to determine whether public policy considerations ever influence the
use and results of comparative impairment analysis.
This article will, therefore, address the following topics and ques-
tions: (1) What is the general concept of public policy? (2) Assuming
the Federal Arbitration Act did not. See Volt Information Sciences Inc. v. Board of Trustees
of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 109 S. Ct. 1248, 1259 (1989).
17. See J. TURNER, FOREiGN DiRacr INVESTMENT N CALIFORNIA (California Department
of Commerce, Office of Economic Research 1987). This was a report to Governor George
Deukmejian which described California's position regarding inward foreign direct investment
in the United States. According to the report, California is one of the leading states in
attracting foreign direct investment across the board. See id. at 15-23 and accompanying
statistics.
18. Section 612 of the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws recognizes the public policy
exception in the following terms: "No action can be maintained upon a cause of action created
in another state the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong public policy of the
forum .... ." THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934).
19. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
20. Comparative impairment or the "California approach" was the brain child of Baxter
who tried to improve on interest analysis. See Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System,
16 STA. L. REV. 1 (1963) [hereinafter Baxter]. Another valuable contribution to the concept
was made Professor Horowitz. See Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California - A
Restatement, 21 UCLA L. REV. 719 (1974) [hereinafter Horowitz]. For cases in which
comparative impairment was used, see Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d
719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976); Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157,
583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
21. 39 Cal. 3d 126, 702 P.2d 570, 216 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1985).
22. A few state courts seem to be reviving the public policy exception even under modern
choice of law methods. See Boardman v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 470 So. 2d 1024 (Miss.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America Inc., 65 N.Y.2d
189, 480 N.E.2d 679, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985).
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some definition of public policy, is there a distinction between policy
and public policy? In other words, does every statute announce a
particular public policy? (3) What is the meaning of public policy in
California? Is there any distinction between policy and public policy
as used by California courts? Does public policy change depending
on whether it is used to resolve a purely local intrastate, inter-state,
or international conflict of laws disputes? (4) How is public policy
used by the courts of California in the following conflict of laws
settings: choice of law, choice of forum, and arbitration agreements?
(5) To what extent does public policy affect the enforcement of sister
state judgments, foreign country judgments, and arbitral awards in
general? These questions will be addressed sequentially in the follow-
ing sections.
II. PuBLIc PoLIcY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. What is Public Policy?
The meaning of public policy has always eluded even the most
astute judicial minds in various common law systems. Judges, jurists,
and academics continue to struggle with defining the contours of the
concept and its application in specific situations.23 One theme that
seems to underscore the struggle with the concept of public policy is
the view that public policy shares the distinction of vagueness and
intractability with fraud and other legal concepts notorious for their
elusiveness. The way public policy is viewed by the courts is best
exemplified by the following statement by Justice Shenk of the
California Supreme Court:
The term 'public policy' is inherently not subject to precise defini-
tion... The question, what is public policy in a given case, is as
broad as the question of what is fraud.... Public policy is a vague
expression, and few cases can arise in which its application may
not be disputed.24
Notwithstanding the vagueness in the concept, Justice Shenk adopted
the definition of public policy as provided by Justice Story, one of
the most outstanding conflict of laws scholars in the United States.
According to Story:
23. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
24. Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 567, 575, 261 P.2d 721, 726
(1953).
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public policy means anything which tends to undermine that sense
of security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty or
private property, which any citizen ought to feel is against public
policy.25
It is obvious that this definition does not tell us much since Story
seems to rely on public policy to define it. What is apparent in this
definition is that public policy is not linked to some entrenched global
community value system, but rather to individualism and individual
rights. Less apparent, however, is the fact that public policy is a
negative concept operating as a check on that which is offensive to
the public sense of good morals, equity, and justice.26 It operates,
or should operate, as a comprehensive phenomenon that fills in the
gaps in the law, 27 and ensures that the legal principles applied by the
courts reflect the basic moral values of society.
Notwithstanding these definition problems, several other attempts
have been made to define public policy. There are at least eight ways
in which public policy may be used by the courts. First, it may be
used in the ordinary sense. 28 One of the earliest cases in which the
ordinary meaning of public policy was addressed was the celebrated
English case of Egerton v. Brownlow. 29 In that case, the House of
Lords had to determine whether it was against public policy for a
25. Id. (citing and adopting the definition from Story's work).
26. See Lorenzen, supra note 5, at 747.
27. Winfield, supra note 2, at 77-79. However, Winfield argued that public policy was
routinely being checked by decided cases, thus reducing the need for its use. The following
passage is quite instructive on that point:
Instead of sprawling in vaporous fashion across the legal atmosphere like a genie of
the Arabian Nights, it is shrinking to certain departments of the law; but no one
had yet thought of imprisoning it in a jar, and indeed no one has ever been able
to do that. There were several agents at work in this shrinking process. Case law
and statutes between them were rapidly reducing to certainty what had been under
the vague control of reason, convenience, and policy. Every new decision that was
printed had a twofold effect. It covered some ground which had been unfenced till
then, and it formed an outpost for further exploration. The fuller the reports
became, the less need was there for appeal to the law of nature, the law of reason,
or the law of God.
Id. at 84.
28. The various meanings of public policy and the different circumstances under which
the concept might be used are so many that it will not be useful to catalogue all of them
here. According to Chitty, the scope of public policy falls into five groups: (1) objects illegal
at common law or by legislation; (2) objects injurious to good government, including domestic
and international affairs; (3) objects designed to interfere with the justice system; (4) those
that are injurious to marriage and morality; and (5) those against the economic interest of the
public. Cmrr= oN CoiqTRAcTs, supra note I, at 548. Farnsworth divides public policy into
two broad categories, each with several subcategories: (1) policies developed by the courts;
and (2) policies developed from legislation. FARtswoRTH, supra note 1, at 325-57.
29. [1853] 10 Eng. Rep. 359, 4. H.L. Cas. I.
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nobleman, one of their own, to make a testamentary grant of his
vast wealth to a branch of his family contingent upon the acquisition
of a peerage. There was neither statutory nor judicial opinion pro-
hibiting this conditional grant. To answer the question whether or
not the testamentary disposition was against public policy, the court
had to define public policy. After a thorough examination of the
concept, in which their Lordships sought wide counsel on the matter
from several judges, 0 Justice Baron Parke concluded that public
policy had an ordinary meaning." In the ordinary sense, public policy
meant political expediency or that which is good for the common
good of the community."
However, not even the ordinary meaning of public policy was free
from vagueness. According to Baron Parke, the ordinary meaning
of public policy would vary with the level of education, station in
life, or other sociological factors.3 3 If public policy takes its meaning
and shape from the type of person using it, it is not entirely clear
how the courts may use it. Must judges employ their own meaning
or discover the ordinary meaning by reference to some community
or reasonable person standard? If the courts decide to employ such
a standard, must it be teated as a jury question? From the discussion
of Baron Parke, one gets the impression that the issue of public
policy should not be a jury question. Judges must be presumed to
better understand the fundamental values enshrined in the legal
system. They must be viewed as knowing what is good for the
community. While it may be argued that a jury is better placed to
echo and decide on what is good for the community, the question
of public policy is invariably left to the court as a question of law.
In Egerton, the House of Lords was faced with a case of first
impression in which the role of public policy in the outcome was
significant. Their Lordships, therefore, took the opportunity to in-
vestigate and express different views on the meaning and scope of
public policy at common law. To some, there was a link between
illegality and public policy. Not only would illegal transactions be
void, but they would also be contrary to public policy. Justice
30. The case attracted a lot of judicial attention. According to Winfield, 16 judges fought
a pitched battle over the questions raised in Egerton. The reports of the case took 256 pages
of the law reports. The House of Lords summoned the judges to attend to give their views
on the question. Eleven judges attended. See Winfield, supra note 2, at 88.
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Crompton developed a test for such transactions which may be
characterized as the object and means test.14 That is, one must
examine the object of the transaction and the means by which it is
to be obtained. The object itself may be illegal, or, being legal, its
attainment may require some wicked or illegal means. If the object
is illegal, such as murder, theft, or some other crime, the transaction
is illegal. Even if the object of the transaction is legal, laudable, and
attainable by legal means, if a condition requires illegal means, it
would be illegal and void.35 Thus, it would undermine the foundations
of the legal system and the public good if such transactions were
enforced. As will be discussed later, Justice Crompton's object and
means test seems to have been applied by California courts in their
decisions dealing with public policy.
Another important contribution to the meaning of public in the
Egerton case was offered by the Lord Chief Baron. To him, public
policy is a protective concept designed to insulate society from the
negative impact of individual transactions or activities.3 6 Baron Parke
used the concept synonymously with public safety. According to him,
there is more than ample judicial and intellectual authority against
enforcing contracts or covenants solely on the broad ground of public
good. Where in a transaction one cannot find dolus malus, or in
Justice Crompton's terms some wicked or illegal motive as to other
persons, but the rest of mankind may nevertheless be concerned
about its negative impact, such a transaction would be caught by the
public policy exception.3 7 A review of the numerous cases in which
the concept is used leaves one with the distinct impression that several
courts follow the Lord Chief Baron's formulation. But as a protective
device, public policy again becomes an open-ended concept unless
confined by certain factors. For example, how would judges deter-
mine what is good for society? Is the protective policy invoked every
time judges disapprove of particular transactions or favor certain
social phenomena? These are relevant and important questions raised
by Justice Baron Parke. In response to these concerns, he argued
that reliance on public policy as a protective device might be con-
trolled if courts relied on the policy of the law. 38
34. Id at 389. In addition to the object and means test, Justice Crompton also argued
that the use of public policy must show some definite mischief to the public. Id.
35. Id.
36. Egerton, 10 Eng. Rep. at 417.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 420. The application of the policy of the law seems to have been one of the
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Public policy may be used in a comprehensive sense to mean jus
cogens or that body of compulsory and higher order of norms to
which every human behavior, transaction or activity must conform.
39
In this sense, public policy constitutes a set of peremptory norms
severely limiting party autonomy and the legal consequences of
individual conduct. It is, however, not entirely clear whether there
actually exists such norms and how they may be discovered by the
courts. Neither the courts nor academic writers give us much guidance
on this subject. 40 If public policy can be used as a body of compulsory
norms, however, mandating or conditioning the legal consequences
of individual conduct, the term is very similar in meaning to the use
of public policy as natural law.4 1 Its meaning could then be influenced
by theological considerations and the concept of a higher divine law
to which all law and conduct must conform. 42 All non-conforming
goals of modem choice of law theories in the United States. For instance, interest analysis
theory explicitly calls for taking into account the policy of the law. For a detailed analysis of
this approach, see the writings of Currie and the discussion in notes 133 and 145, infra. See
also RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 6 (1971). Section 6 deals with choice of
law principles. It requires the forum, in the appropriate case, to take into account the basic
policies underlying the particular field of law and the particular policies of the forum. Id.
39. Jus cogens is a concept often used in international law which may at times have
municipal use and implications. For its use in the international context, see J. SzTucri, Jus
COGENS AND THE VIENNA CoNvm'-NoN ON TiE LAW OF TEATIES: A CmrxicAL APPRmAL
(1974). In particular, see id. at 8-10 for a discussion of the relationship of jus cogens to public
policy. See also I. BROWNI.m, PRnICLES OF PUBuc INTERNATIONAL LAW 513 (3d ed. 1979)
[hereinafter BRowNLIE]; Husserl, supra note 1, at 38.
40. BROWNLIE, supra note 39, at 512 discusses the concept and its lack of success.
41. Natural law itself is another concept that means different things to different people.
See, e.g., Walkin, Cicero and the Law of Nature, in ORIGINs OF THE NATURAL LAW TRADTON
23 (A. Harding ed. 1954). Walkin quotes an often cited definition of natural law by Cicero:
There is in fact a true law-namely, right reason-which is in accordance with
nature, applies to all men, and is unchangeable and eternal. By its commands this
law summons men to the performance of their duties; by its prohibitions it restrains
them from doing wrong. Its commands and prohibitions always influence good men,
but are without effect upon the bad. To invalidate this law by human legislation is
never morally right, nor is it permissible ever to restrict its operation, and to annul
it wholly is impossible. Neither the senate nor the people can absolve us from our
obligation to obey this law, and it requires no Sextus Aelius to expound and interpret
it. It will not lay down one rule at Rome and another at Athens, nor wili it be one
rule today and another tomorrow. But there will be one law, eternal and unchange-
able, binding at all times upon all peoples; and there will be, as it were, one common
master and ruler of men, namely God, who is the author of this law, its interpreter,
and its sponsor. The man who will not obey it will abandon his better self, and, in
denying the true nature of a man, will thereby suffer the severest of penalties,
though he has escaped all the other consequences which men call punishment.
Id. at 23-24. See also City of London v. Wood, [1708] 188 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1592-1603, 12
Mod. 669, 670-88.
42. For a discussion of this aspect of natural law, see Davitt, St. Thomas Aquinas and
the Natural Law, in ORIGINs OF THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION 30 (A. Harding ed. 1954). The
author postulates that the concept is associated with some ordering by one in authority.
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laws must then be struck as contrary to public policy. On the other
hand, public policy could mean natural law in the more positivistic,
Aristotelian or Thomist sense. 43 In that sense, it could mean the rule
of reason against which no law, custom, or statute could prevail.
Whether used in the theological or more positivistic Aristotlean sense,
public policy as natural law *constitutes a higher order of norms,
inalienable or indelible in character, and from which there can be
no derogation." To that extent, public policy as natural law is similar
to its use as jus cogens. In either sense, public policy would be a
broad concept that could be used to affect the legal consequences of
virtually any transaction.
Public policy could, however, be used in a less all-embracing or
compelling sense. Indeed, it has often been used by some courts and
academicians to mean good morals, fundamental values of society,
or deeply-rooted values accepted as the basis of social ordering. This
meaning of public policy is perhaps best captured by the often-quoted
statement of Judge Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil.41 According
to Judge Cardozo,
courts are not free to refuse the enforcement of foreign rights at
the pleasure of the judges unless doing so would violate some
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good
morals, or some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.46
Public policy, according to this passage, cannot be invoked in trivial
matters or where the fundamental value system of society is neither
threatened nor violated. Thus, the use of public policy has been
limited to cases where foreign law is considered barbarous or mon-
strous. It has also been applied to transactions considered manifestly
unjust, outrageous to the forum's sense of justice, or offensive to
some moral, social, or economic principles considered by the forum
as sacrosanct. 47
Compared with the other uses, defining public policy as "good
morals" could severely restrict the circumstances under which it might
43. See B. BROWN, Ta NATURAL LAW READER 47 (1960), for a discussion of scholastic
natural law jurisprudence.
44. See supra notes 39-41.
45. 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
46. Idat 111.
47. CaFscman & NORTH, supra note 1, at 131. On the issue of barbarous laws, see
Cammell v. Sewell, [1860] 157 Eng. Rep. 1371. The question in Cammell was whether English
or Norwegian law should govern the sale of lumber in Norway after a shipwreck. Justice
Cromptom argued that applying Norwegian law would not be offensive to the United Kingdom.
He said, "It does not appear to us that there is anything so barbarous or monstrous in this
state of the law as that we can say that it should not be reorganized by us." Id. at 1377.
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be used. This is particularly true in interstate or international conflict
of laws problems. A court that is called upon to reject an otherwise
governing law on public policy grounds must find that applying that
law would be outrageous or revolting to deeply rooted values and
fundamental notions of justice. In a federal system, such as the
United States, where the states have similar cultural and historical
origins, few situations should arise where the laws of one state could
be offensive or intolerable to the good morals of another state.
48
Any "complacent attribution of moral superiority" by the courts of
any state could undermine the broader social goals of the federal
union. 49 Even though terms such as "good morals," "fundamental
values," and "deeply rooted conceptions of justice" suggest limita-
tions on courts, they are also inherently open-ended, requiring further
definition. Public policy, therefore, stands to be exploited or abused
even when used in this restricted sense.
There is yet another sense in which public policy may be used. It
has sometimes been used when referring to "natural justice, equity,
and good conscience." ' 50 This use of public policy is similar to some
aspects of its use as natural law and good morals. The expression
"natural justice, equity, and good conscience" refers to certain
procedural, substantive, and customarily accepted notions of justice
in society.-1 It is often used in a concrete rather than an abstract
sense. Like obscenity, you know it when you see or hear it.52 It is
better felt than described. Taken as a whole, the term "natural
justice, equity, and good conscience" also works in the negative.
When foreign procedural or substantive law is considered repugnant
to "natural justice, equity, and good conscience," the forum will
reject the application of such law or any legal rights created there-
under.
The preceding use of public policy was most prevalent in the
colonial process in Africa for pruning customary law considered
48. This was the concern and desired outcome suggested by, inter alia, Beach, supra note
13, and Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 2.
49. Justice Traynor adopted his own version of the often quoted language of Judge Beach
in Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal. 2d 108, 114, 109 P.2d 701 (1941).
50. See A. ALLorr, EssAYs IN AmucA LAw 197 (1960) [hereinafter ALoTr]; E. DAaILs,
THE CommoN LAW IN WEsT AFRICA (1964) [hereinafter DA-mLs]; Seidman, The Reception of
English Law in Colonial Africa Revisited, 2 E. AmuCA L. REv. 47 (1969) [hereinafter Seidman].
51. ALLoTr, supra note 50, at 198. Allott identifies at least five procedural matters
generally caught within the concept of natural justice: (1) No man can be a judge in his own
case; (2) no man is to be condemned unheard; (3) a man is entitled to know the particulars
of the charges against him; (4) decisions should be supported by reasons; and (5) punishment
and awards should not be excessive. Id.
52. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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repugnant to "natural justice, equity, and good conscience. '5 3 As
equity, public policy could be used as a waiver of technical rules
which would produce manifest and substantially unfair results.14 In
this context, public policy may be used to appeal to the community
sense of fairness and justice in the particular circumstance.55 Thus,
when the repugnancy concept is used to reject an otherwise applicable
foreign law, it is because such law would offend the forum's sense
of justice and fairness. Furthermore, public policy may also be used
as good conscience to prohibit the application of foreign law when
it is contrary to the forum's sense of what is right or wrong. In this
context, public policy includes morality.
B. Problems with Public Policy
It is apparent from the foregoing analysis that no matter how
public policy is defined, it remains elusive, open ended, and therefore,
subject to varying degrees of definition and application. To some,
public policy is the bte noire of judicial decision making. 56 It
constitutes a potentially treacherous tool for judges at times too eager
to reach subjective rather than legal conclusions. Thus, it is difficult
to predict when it may be used. The facts of a particular dispute
may not implicate a single policy of the forum; they may affect two
or more contradictory policies. Choosing the appropriate public
53. See DANmis, supra note 50; Seidman, supra note 50. The concept of "good con-
science" is similar to "conscionability" in contract law. A contract may be said to be
unconscionable and unenforceable or void because the terms are so grossly inadequate as "to
shock the conscience and common sense of all men. It may amount both at law and in equity
to proof of fraud, oppression and undue influence." State Fin. Co. v. Smith, 44 Cal. App.
2d 688, 691-92, 112 P.2d 901 (1941); see also Jacklich v. Baer, 37 Cal. App. 2d 684, 135 P.2d
179 (1943) (creditor provided in loan agreement that payment of five dollars would entitle him
to collect 10% of debtors income). The court in Jacklich refused to enforce the contract as
being unreasonable and unconscionable. Id. Unconscionability is also used in contracts where
the parties are generally of unequal bargaining power. For intellectual commentary, see generally
Hurd & Bush, Unconscionability: A Matter of Conscience for California Consumers, 25
HASTiNGS L.J. 1, 15 (1973); Comment, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CAn. L.
Rnv. 1151, 1152-60 (1976); Sybert, Adhesion Theory in California: A Suggested Redefinition
and its Application to Banking, 11 Loy. L. R-v. 301, 301-05 (1978); Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion: Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLtrM. L. Rv. 629 (1943). For
the most recent California Supreme Court decision on unconscionability, see Graham v.
Scissor-Tail Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 80, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1981), where the court
held an arbitration agreement unenforceable because it was unreasonable. See also discussion
of arbitration cases infra notes 377-81.
54. ALnoT, supra note 50, at 198.
55. See Knodel v. Knodel, 14 Cal. 3d 752, 537 P.2d 353, 122 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1975),
where it was held that comity principles would not be applied to modify foreign support
obligations if it would contravene California public policy because it was inequitable.
56. See Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 2, at 980-81.
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policy to be advanced, therefore, becomes the task of the forum. It
is not unusual for the forum to make a choice that most people
would consider unacceptable.
57
One concern with public policy is that a subjective tolerance or
intolerance for foreign repugnant laws based on public policy may
result in judicial inertia, thereby preventing concrete legal analysis
and conclusions. Public policy then becomes an inadequate substitute
for legal reasoning, offering little guidance to litigants and courts in
future disputes. Public policy may even become a disguise for the
advancement of ulterior motives or undeclared judicial agendae.5 8
Little wonder then that some judges have expressed serious concern
over the use of public policy except in limited and well-defined
situations. This view was most clearly articulated by Chief Justice
Best of the United Kingdom.5 9 According to him, the use of public
policy is only appropriate when the applicable policy is not in doubt.
The legislature is better equipped to settle doubtful questions of
policyA° In support of the position taken by Chief Justice Best,
57. For instance, the evils of slavery have been condemned by most societies in modern
times. Transactions involving slavery or slave trade were considered repugnant to the funda-
mental morals of most western societies. Yet, a Massachusetts court, in the case of Greenwood
v. Curtis, 6 Mass. 358 (1810), was willing to enforce a note for the sale and delivery of slaves
in Africa and South Carolina. Notwithstanding the fact that the state of Massachusetts had
outlawed slavery and slave trade, and in spite of the defendant's contention that slavery was
contrary to Massachusetts public policy as immoral and vicious, the court re-characterized the
claim as one for the recovery of a cash amount in the defendant's account. Similarly, a New
York court found that it was not against its public policy to allow a German anti-semitic and
racist statute to defeat a claim by a Jewish plaintiff for wrongful termination of an employment
contract in Germany. See Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14
N.E.2d 798 (1938). However, the California Supreme Court, in the case of Ex Parte Archy,
9 Cal. 147 (1858), relied on the public policy against slavery in the California Constitution to
refuse the prospective return of a slave to his Mississippi owner. See also Horowitz, supra
note 20, at 720 (extensive discussion of Archy).
58. See Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 2, at 988-89.
59. Richardson v. Mellish, [18241 130 Eng. Rep. 294.
60. Id. Chief Justice Best protested against frequent judicial resort to public policy in the
following terms:
We have heard much of this being a contravention of public policy, and that, on
that ground, it cannot be supported. I am not much disposed to yield to arguments
of public policy: I think the courts of Westminster-hall (speaking with deference as
an humble individual like myself ought to speak of the judgments of those who
have gone before me) have gone much further than they were warranted in going
in questions of policy: they have taken on themselves, sometimes, to decide doubtful
questions of policy; and they are always in danger of so doing, because courts of
law look only at the particular case, and have not the means of bringing before
them all those considerations which ought to enter into the judgment of those who
decide on questions of policy. I therefore say, it is not a doubtful matter of policy
that will decide this, or that will prevent the party from recovering:-if once you
bring it to that, the plaintiff is entitled to recover; and let that doubtful question
of policy be settled by that high tribunal, namely, the legislature, which has the
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Justice Burrough expressed his concerns in the same case in the
following terms:
I, for one, protest, as my Lord has done, against arguing too
strongly upon public policy; it is a very unruly horse, and when
once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you. It
may lead you from the sound law. It is never argued at all but
when other points fail.
6'
If public policy is used to defeat sound law, it may reflect the
forum's own inability to obtain desirable results within the context
of its existing choice of law rules. According to Lorenzen, as a
choice of law device, public policy is the outgrowth of a system of
a priori theories built on logical deductions not always supported by
reality.62 The existence and frequent use of public policy in conflict
of laws settings is accordingly viewed as an indictment of the rigidity
of the traditional approach to the choice of law process.
63
Finally, one of the problems facing the doctrine of public policy
is the sources of policy. That is, does every statute or legislative act
announce a public policy? Where can one find the public policy of
a state or a foreign country? According to the United States Supreme
Court, "the public policy of any state is to be found in its consti-
tution, acts of the legislature and decisions of its courts. Primarily,
it is for the lawmakers to determine the public policy of the state." 64
Interpreting this language, some courts have found a public policy
announcement in virtually every legislative act or judicial decision.
Differences in law may then signify conflicting public policies result-
ing in the use of the repugnancy doctrine. An example of this problem
is the decision of a New York court dealing with interspousal
means of bringing before it all the considerations that bear on the question, and
can settle it on its true and broad principles. I admit, that if it be clearly put upon
the contravention of public policy, the Plaintiff cannot succeed: but it must be
unquestionable,-there must be no doubt;-looking at all the facts of this case, I
can see no unquestioned principle of policy that stands in the way of the Plaintiff
to hinder him recovering in this action.
Id. at 242-43.
61. Id. at 252.
62. Lorenzen, supra note 5, at 746.
63. The use of escape devices including public policy has been explained as necessitated
by rigid rules which had become fossils or wooden outposts directing the law into dark alleys.
That attack on escape devices came to a head after the decision in Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive
Auto Renting Co., 18 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163, 164 (1928), where the court recharacterized a
tort claim as a contract claim in order to avoid the negative consequences of the lex loci
dilecti principle. See H. GoomucH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 280 (3d ed. 1949); see also Currie,
supra note 6, at 10-12; Lorenzen, supra note 5, at 746.
64. Building Serv. Employees Int'l Union Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537-38
(1950).
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immunity. In Mertz v. Mertz,65 a wife sued her husband in New
York for injuries sustained in Connecticut through the negligent
driving of the husband. While Connecticut would allow the suit, New
York's interspousal immunity doctrine at that time would not permit
the suit. Shutting the doors of the New York courts to the wife, the
court ruled that allowing Connecticut law to govern would offend
New York public policy as expressed in its common law rule of
interspousal immunity. The courts in California, however, have held
that a mere difference in laws does not justify the application of the
repugnancy doctrine. 6
It is unclear whether these decisions could be properly interpreted
to mean that not every law is an announcement of public policy.
The courts have not focused attention on the distinction between the
specific policy behind a particular statute or court decision, and the
public policy underlying a statute or a decision. If we rely on the
often-cited formulation of public policy by Judge Cardozo in Loucks
v. Standard Oil,6 7 a statute or a decision would announce a state
public policy only if it addresses some fundamental principle of
justice, deeply rooted traditions, or good morals. A statute or com-
mon law rule against enforcing contracts for prostitution or the sale
of public offices may well fall under Cardozo's classical formulation.
In an age of excessive legislation, a sound argument can be made
that not all statutes announce public policy, however defined, though
they may address some specific policies.
The California Supreme Court, in its employment-at-will cases, has
suggested a standard by which to judge the pronouncement of public
policy in a statute.6 8 According to the court, where a particular
65. 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
66. See, e.g., Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 367, 10 P.2d 63 (1932) (mere difference
in guest statutes did not constitute a violation of California public policy); Whitney v. Dodge,
105 Cal. 192, 200, 38 P. 636 (1894) (difference in law not sufficient to negate application of
foreign law on public policy grounds).
67. 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
68. See Dabbs v. Cardiopulmonary Management, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1437, 234 Cal. Rptr.
129 (1987), where it was held that an employee who was terminated for protesting against
working conditions could sue the employer on the grounds that the California labor code
expressed that state's public policy of protecting employees. In Petermann v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959), it was held that an
employer's right to discharge an at-will employee was subject to the public policy of the state.
This was followed by Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 330, 164
Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980), and Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 295-96, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 159 (1982), holding that the public policy of California protects an employee from
termination on the job for complaining about work conditions. The recent California Supreme
Court decision in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211 (1988), seems to have halted this trend in California. For an extensive discussion of
Foley, see Levine, Judicial Backpedaling: Putting the Brakes on California's Law of Wrongful
Termination, 20 PAc. L.J. 993, 1012-14 (1989).
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conduct is said to be violative of public policy, we must inquire
whether the prohibition of the conduct inures to the benefit of the
public at large rather than to a particular person. The court explained
this standard in the following terms:
many statutes simply regulate conduct between private individuals,
or impose requirements whose fulfillment does not implicate fun-
damental policy concerns.
69
Thus, statutes or regulations that affect the rights and liabilities of
individuals inter se may, indeed, not announce any public policy.
Whether any statute was intended to benefit individuals and not
society at large remains an actually debatable issue. In Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., the California Supreme Court held that where
an employee reports to the employer about investigations of his
supervisor for embezzlement by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
it was only the employer and not the public at large who benefitted.10
This interpretation of benefit, as pointed out by one of the dissenting
voices, may be too narrow since the punishment of a criminal
employee may advance the interest of both the public and the
employer.
71
The Foley case may be criticized for adopting a narrow interpre-
tation of public interest and, hence, public policy. It nevertheless
lends judicial support to the argument that there is a distinction
between specific policy and public policy. Whereas every statute may
announce some specific state policy on a particular subject, all
statutes do not announce a public policy. If the statute is to protect
some public interest at large, then it may be announcing a public
policy. The distinction between public policy and specific policy is
69. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 699.
70. Id. at 670-71.
71. The following passage is what dissenting Justice Mosk had to say about benefit and
public policy:
My colleagues insist that reporting the presence of an embezzler to an employer is
solely to the benefit of the employer. While undoubtedly it is to the employer's
benefit, it is not exclusively so. It is my opinion that such action-i.e., advising a
state-created corporation of the employ in a supervisorial position of a person
chargeable with a potential felony-is in the best interests of society as a whole,
and therefore covered by the public policy rule.
Under Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b), an employer is prohibited from
retaliating against an employee for disclosing information to a law enforcement
agency when there is reasonable cause to believe a violation of state or federal laws
has been committed. It seems incongruous to permit retaliation and discharge when
the employee chooses to go directly to his employer with the information, rather
than to circumvent the employer, go behind his back and directly to a public agency.
In either event, it seems clear to me that the law and public policy are implicated.
Id. at 724 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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similar to the one drawn between penal and non-penal statutes.
According to decided cases in California and other states, a statute
is penal if it awards a penalty to the state or to a member of the
public who sues in the interest of the community to remedy a public
wrong. 72 The purpose of such a statute must be the vindication of
some public justice. This distinction could be particularly helpful in
determining public policy in interstate and international conflict of
laws problems. It would impose limitations on the use of public
policy as a repugnancy instrument to strike down otherwise applicable
law.
C. Public Policy in California
There are at least two ways in which one can discuss the use of
public policy in California: (1) its use in purely domestic California
disputes, and (2) its use in interstate or international conflict of laws
problems. Though the use of public policy in purely California
disputes is not the focus of this article, it is nevertheless relevant to
a complete understanding of the general topic. A few brief comments
will be made here about the use of public policy in domestic cases.
California courts have struggled with the elusiveness of the public
policy concept for decades. 73 In search of concrete definitions, courts
have likened it to fraud,74 and one academic has argued that it is
broader than due process considerations under the United States
Constitution.7 5 The result of this accepted elusiveness of public policy
72. See Chavarria v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 1073, 115 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1974).
Most states rely on the United States Supreme Court definition of penal and non-penal in
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892). See also Loucks v. Standard Oil, 224 N.Y. 99,
120 N.E. 198 (1918) (Cardozo's formulation); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 611 comment a (1934) ("A penalty . .. is a sum of money exacted as punishment for a
civil wrong as distinguished from compensation for the loss suffered by the injured party.
Where the wrong makes the wrongdoer a statutory party to an already existing duty, the duty
is not a penalty, since the injured person obtains only payment of his claim"); Leflar, Extra-
state Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HAxv. L. Rsv. 193, 225 (1932).
73. The intractability of public policy has been commented on in several cases in California.
The following are only a few examples of judicial views on the subject. In Spence v. Harvey,
22 Cal. 336, 340 (1863), it was described as such a vague expression that few cases would
arise where its application would be disputed. In Smith v. San Francisco & N.P.R. Co., 115
Cal. 584, 600, 47 P. 582 (1897), it was described as vague and uncertain in meaning pertaining
to the law-making power. A sample of judicial expressions fall within the characterization of
public policy as vague, variable, uncertain, etc. See also Spangenberg v. Spangenberg, 19 Cal.
App. 439, 126 P. 379 (1912); Noble v. Palo Alto, 89 Cal. App. 47, 264 P. 529 (1928); County
of San Bernadino v. Gate City Creamery Co., 103 Cal. App. 367, 284 P. 457 (1930).
74. See Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks Int'l Assn., 41 Cal. 2d 567, 575, 261 P.2d 721
(1953).
75. Goodrich, supra note 5, at 31.
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has been its application to a multitude of sins in domestic California
disputes. Operating essentially as a negative edit, it has been used to
strike down otherwise enforceable rights in labor disputes, 76 contracts
involving public officers,77 employment relations, 78 the duties of pub-
lic officials, 79 the exercise of voting power by stockholders, 0 and the
traditional vitiating elements in contract. Until the Foley case, there
was a growing tendency in California for the courts to use public
policy to impose an affirmative duty or create a legal right that could
form the basis of a claim. In other words, the courts had taken the
position in certain employment-at-will cases that the termination of
an employee may be a violation of an express California public policy
for which the employer may be held liable. 81 Public policy is not
used here as a negative edit, but in a positive and affirmative sense.
The notion that public policy can be used not just in its negative
sense, but also as a positive instrument for the creation of legal
rights and affirmative duties, exposes foreign defendants to yet
another facet of this elusive concept. Indeed, it may confirm the
notion that public policy is an unruly horse, or, like Banquo's ghost,
that it appears when least expected. It is therefore a trap for the
unwary.
III. PUBLIC POLICY IN INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
OF LAWS
Whereas the concept of public policy may be allowed greater
latitude in its application to purely domestic disputes, there is concern
that allowing a similar latitude in its application to international and
interstate conflict of laws problems would be undesirable. For one,
there are questions whether it would not be an untenable affectation
of superior virtue for any state to strike down the laws of a sister
state as being repugnant to its public policy.82 A major interest in
federalism in the United States is to weld the otherwise independent
76. See supra notes 64-71; see also Rosenberg v. Raskin, 80 Cal. App. 2d 335, 181 P.2d
897 (1947).
77. Spense, 22 Cal. at 343; Gate City Creamery, 103 Cal. App. at 373.
78. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211 (1988); Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 396, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960).
79. See cases cited supra note 77.
80. Smith v. San Francisco & N.P.R. Co., 115 Cal. 584, 47 P. 582 (1897).
81. See supra notes 68-74.
82. See Beach, supra note 13; Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 109 P.2d 701
(1941).
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sovereign states into a coherent single nation. 3 Therefore, as a matter
of federal interest, the use of public policy in interstate conflict of
laws must of necessity be controlled. Similar checks may also be
imposed on the use of public policy in international conflict of laws
problems based on foreign policy considerations. Moreover, the
elusiveness of and vagueness in the concept could work to undermine
the first policy objective in the legal system if party expectations are
easily frustrated by judicial recourse to the repugnancy doctrine. On
the other hand, if the courts pay particular attention to these con-
siderations, the concept of public policy may become a manageable
doctrine serving a useful purpose. It is the purpose of the following
section to examine the extent to which judicial opinions in California
track or deviate from these concerns.
The use of public policy in interstate and international conflict of
laws has generally been in the following broad subject areas: (1)
choice of law, (2) choice of forum, (3) arbitration agreements, and
(4) enforcement of judgments. While there are interesting subcate-
gories of these subject areas, it appears useful to retain these general
categories as an analytical framework. The following discussion will,
therefore, focus on each general area.
A. Choice of Law and Public Policy in California
1. Traditional Choice of Law
Anyone vaguely familiar with the evolution of the choice of law
process in the United States is almost immediately reminded of the
constant battles among conflict scholars and the courts over the
appropriate theory and the circumstances of its application.8 4 Several
83. In an influential article on the history and role of the Full Faith and Credit clause
of the United States Constitution, Mr. Justice Jackson wrote that it was meant
to federalize the separate and independent state legal systems by the overriding
principle of reciprocal recognition of public acts, records, and judicial proceedings.
It was placed foremost among those measures which would guard the new political
and economic union against the disintegrating influence of provincialism in jurispru-
dence, but without aggrandizement of federal power at the expense of the states.
Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 CoLuM. L. REv.
1, 17 (1945); see also Kirgis, supra note 8.
84. The choice of law process in the United States has been described elsewhere as crowded
and clouded by competing theories that have tended to confound and confuse some courts.
See Yelpaala, supra note 15, at 255. It requires several pages to list and discuss all the choice
of law theories in the United States. The following is only a small sample of the writing in
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competing theories have emerged, encouraged by the lack of any
binding federal mandate on an appropriate choice of law approach.
Thus, theoretically, one could have fifty choice of law approaches
in the United States. This potential and multiplicity in approaches
by states is further complicated by the variations and persistent
evolution of theories and approaches within states.
Few states can actually boast of consistency in doctrine, and
California is not one of them. The courts in California have tradi-
tionally relied on the comity of nations theory for their choice of
law process. When the traditional comity theories were invoked, the
role of public policy in the choice of law was definite. However,
when the court adopted governmental interest analysis, the role of
public policy became doubtful. With the recent decision of the
the area:
Traditional Approach: See BEAL, supra note 1; Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the
Confliction of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924); Lorenzen, supra note 5.
Neo-Territorialist Approach, a version of the Traditional Approach: See D. CAVERS, TIE
CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS (1965); Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Cavers-
The Pennsylvania Method, 9 DUQ. L. REV. 373 (1971).
Interest Analysis: See Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Method, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 227 (1958) [hereinafter Currie, Married Women's Contracts]; D.
CURIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963); Weintraub, Interest Analysis in
the Conflict of Laws as an Application of Sound Legal Reasoning, 35 MERCER L. REV. 629
(1984); Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response
to the New Critics, 34 MERCER L. REv. 593 (1983); Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives in the
Conflict of Laws: A Challenge, 35 MERCER L. REv. 556 (1984); Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests
in Multistate Problems, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1314 (1981).
Comparative Impairment: See Baxter, supra note 20; Horowitz, supra note 20.
Second Restatement: See Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 679 (1963); Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited,
34 MERCER L. REV. 501 (1983); Westbrook, A Survey and Evaluation of Competing Choice-
of-Law Methodologies: The Case For Electicism, 40 Mo. L. REv. 407 (1975); Morris, Law
and Reason Triumphant or How Not to Review a Restatement, 21 Am. J. Comp. L. 322
(1973).
Choice influencing considerations: R. LEPLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (3d ed. 1977);
Robert, Conflicts of Law: More on Choice Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIl. L. Rnv.
1584 (1966).
Functional Analysis: See WEINTRAIrE, supra note 1; A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE
LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS (1965).
True Rules: EImENzWEIG, supra note 1; Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Form: A
"Restatement" of the "Lex Fori" Approach, 18 OKLA. L. REv. 340 (1965).
In an interesting article, Professor Kay has explained how some lower courts in California
have been confused about the concept of comparative impairment. See Kay, The Use of
Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California Experi-
ence, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 577 (1980) [hereinafter Kay, Comparative Impairment]. See also E.
SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1982) [hereinafter ScoL.s & HAY]; W. RCHmAN & W.
REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS (1984); CRAMTON, CuRIE & KAY, supra note
1; W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1984); J. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1984); Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REV.
521, 582 (1983).
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California Supreme Court in Wong v. Tenneco,8 the court returned
to comity and public policy. In view of these variations, no discussion
of public policy in the California choice of law process will be
complete without a historical review of the process. Such a review
should examine and explain the continuing vitality, if any, of public
policy in California choice of law disputes.
The role of public policy in the choice of law process in the United
States is generally believed to be linked to the traditional conceptual
apparatus for resolving conflict of laws problems. 86 At the hub of
the conceptual apparatus was the principle of territorial sovereignty.
According to the principles of territoriality, the jurisdiction of every
state was limited to its territory. Its legislative jurisdiction was
unlimited with respect to persons, things, activities, and events within
its territory. 87 Conversely, no state law could have extraterritorial
effect without contradicting these territorial principles.8 8 When a court
was seized of a dispute with foreign elements or a choice of law
question, it had to find a solution that was consistent with the
received territorial principles. One solution was to enforce only the
rights created under foreign law. This solution was advanced by
Professor Beale in his writings and as rapporteur for the First
Restatement of Conflict of Laws.8 9 According to Beale, the task of
a court faced with a choice of law problem was not to apply foreign
law, but merely to enforce the right created under the foreign law
in question. 90 The foreign law created both a right that vested in the
plaintiff and an obligation that attached to the defendant. Thus, the
forum was called upon to assist the plaintiff in finding that which
he owned-the vested right. 91 The enforcement of vested rights was
85. 19 Cal. 3d 126, 702 P.2d 570, 216 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1985).
86. One of the leading proponents of this theory was Lorenzen. See Lorenzen, supra note
5; Goodrich, supra note 5.
87. Territorialist principles were developed by jurists in both Europe and the United
States. The Dutch writer Ulric Huber influenced American thought on the subject. For a
discussion of Huber's views, see Lorenzen, Huber's De Conflictu Legum, 13 ILL. L. REv. 375
(1919); E. LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CoNFUCT OF LAWS 163-66 (1947). Another
territorialist was Justice Story, the United States jurist. See T. STORY, CoMMaNTRIES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 18, 20 (1841) [hereinafter STORY]; DICEY, supra note 1.
88. See authorities cited supra note 87.
89. The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws conceived of the choice of law problem
as the enforcement of foreign created rights. See BEALE, supra note 1, at 65; RESTATEMENT OF
Tm LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 47-49 (1934). See also Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A
Study in the Method of Case Law, 19 TurL. L. RFv. 4, 7 (1944) [hereinafter Rheinstein]
(discussing the creation of vested rights).
90. BEALE, supra note 1, at 64-65.
91. Rheinstein, supra note 89, at 7-9. See also Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co. v.
Carrol, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).
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then analytically consistent with the notion of territorial sovereignty
and co-equality of sovereigns.
Vested rights theoreticians then believed that certain a priori, self-
evident principles of rights embodied in the common law could lead
to the deduction of comprehensive rules applicable to every conceiv-
able situation in the choice of law process. The First Restatement
rules were designed to achieve precisely this objective. To determine
the applicable law, a court was required to simply determine the
jurisdiction within which an event or occurrence took place. If the
laws of that jurisdiction created a right, the forum was required to
enforce that right. If on the other hand no right was created, then
the plaintiff's claim would fail accordingly. 92
Even though Beale's system contained rules tightly drawn up and
compelled by the laws of logic, in the eyes of many, it failed to
measure up to the task assigned to it. It soon became apparent that
the First Restatement rules were not comprehensive enough to meet
the demands of all conceivable situations. Indeed, in a complex socio-
economic and political environment, the expectations of the First
Restatement were probably unrealistic. The ink on the First Restate-
ment was barely dry when it was assaulted by scholars of the
American Realistic movement.93 Professor Lorenzen, for one, argued
that public policy in the choice of law process was a necessary
consequence of the impercipience and rigidity of the First Restate-
ment.94 According to Lorenzen, "realizing that the logical deductions
from a priori theory could not be justified in all cases, theoretical
writers have allowed the ordinary rules, which cannot govern on
'principle,' to be set aside under certain circumstances by the rules
of public policy or public order." 95
Thus, public policy was to be, and has become, an inevitable and
powerful escape valve for the courts. Nevertheless, it is doubtful
whether Lorenzen's claim can be scientifically substantiated. Public
policy is such a complex and elusive concept that seems to have
92. See RESTATEMENT oF THE LAW OF CoNFIcT OF LAWS § 377 comment a (1934); BEALE,
supra note 1, at 1286-87.
93. One of the notorious attacks on the First Restatement was by Cook. See Cook, supra
note 6. See also Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading of
Professor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155 (1947); Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the
Applicable Law, 52 CoLum. L. Rsv. 959 (1952); Morse, Characterization: Shadow or Substance,
49 COLuM. L. REv. 1027 (1949).
94. See Lorenzen, supra note 5, at 746.
95. Id.
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predated the vested rights theories, at least as formulated by Beale. 96
Notwithstanding criticism, the vested rights approach took a strong
hold on several states. 97 California courts, however, relied on a
competing traditional choice of law theory advanced by Story.98 Story,
like Beale, was a territorialist. His theories were also built on terri-
torial sovereignty as a foundation. 9 He nevertheless, and contrary
to Beale, concluded that foreign law could be applied in another
state on the basis of comity of nations. He developed certain maxims
to explain the operation of his comity theory. First, he agreed with
Beale that the law of no state could, ex proprio vigore, have extra-
territorial effect. 100 Whatever effect such laws had in another country
was determined by the voluntary consent of such a state as expressed
through its laws and municipal regulations.' 0 Thus, the concept of
comity of nations was closely tied to the consent and voluntary
application of foreign law. But Story recognized the public policy
exception in the following words:
No nation can be justly required to yield up its own fundamental
policy and institutions, in favor of those of another nation. Much
less can any nation be required to sacrifice its own interests in favor
of another; or to enforce doctrines which, in a moral or political
view, are incompatible with its own safety, or happiness, or con-
scientious regard to justice and duty. In the endless diversities of
human jurisprudence many laws must exist in one country, which
are the result of local or accidental circumstances, and are wholly
96. The attack by Lorenzen and other scholars in the realist movement on public policy
was not limited to its use in the choice of law process. It was but part of a much more
comprehensive realist challenge to analytical jurisprudence, scholasticism, and the formalist
formulation of the legal system and its inherent attributes. See supra note 93. According to
the realists, if all phenomena were dealt with a posterioi, thereby stripping law of all fictions,
the need for public policy would disappear. In other words, if the courts were not required
to resolve disputes with pre-ordained legal principles, there would be a legal solution to each
dispute without the necessity to rely on the escape device of public policy. This criticism
applies to both domestic and interstate or international disputes. While the debate between
the formalist and the realist is interesting, it can not be properly engaged in here given the
specific nature of our task.
97. A number of scholars have, in recent times, examined the adoption and application
of the various types of choice of law theories in the United States. In an authoritative chart,
Professor Kay. demonstrated that the First Restatement approach is still well and alive in
several states. See Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L.
REv. 521, 591-92 (1983). For another useful chart, see Smith, Choice of Law in the United
States, 38 HAsniNGs L.J. 1041, 1172-73 (1987). See also Symeonides, Choice of Law in the
American Courts in 1988, 37 AM. J. CoMP. L. 457, 459-61 (1989) (addition to the choice of
law geography).
98. ST RY, supra note 87.
99. Id.
100. Id. at § 23.
101. Id.
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unfit to be ingrafted upon the institutions and habits of another. 02
After a discussion of various types of non-traditional western legal
systems and their laws, Story concluded that "there would be extreme
difficulty in saying that other nations were bound to enforce laws,
institutions or customs of that nation which were subversive of their
own morals, justice or polity."' 13
Story's comity theory has influenced California courts for nearly
a century. In the 1894 case of Whitney v. Dodge,' 4 the issue was
whether a trustee should be allowed to repudiate the trust and not
be compelled to render account of the trust fund. The trust had been
established under a testamentary disposition of property in Pennsyl-
vania subject to certain conditions. These conditions were valid under
Pennsylvania law but invalid under California law. Relying on a
prior precedent and quoting extensively from Story, the California
Supreme Court explicitly adopted the comity theory as its choice of
law method. Holding that a trustee must be held to the terms of the
trust and render an account, the court argued that mere difference
in the law of the two states was not sufficient to hold the trust
invalid. 0 15 In fact, the court thought it would be contrary to public
policy to rule otherwise. The following passage sums up the court's
rationale:
It may be said, generally, that it would not be within the scope of
a just and enlightened public policy to allow a trustee with trust
funds in his hands, received under a will perfectly valid in another
state, to avoid the trust, appropriate the funds to his own use, and
defeat the beneficiaries, by the simple devise of coming to this state
and bringing the funds with him.1°6
The case is important in terms of the tone the court set in the
application of the repugnancy doctrine. Whitney stood for the pro-
position that the mere existence of a difference in law could not
necessarily justify the use of public policy. In spite of the difference
in law, the court found a common public policy of California and
Pennsylvania favoring validating the trust. Moreover, the court em-
ployed public policy affirmatively to ensure justice and fairness. 07
102. Id. at § 25.
103. STORY, supra note 87, at § 25.
104. 105 Cal. 192, 38 P. 636 (1894).
105. Id. at 201.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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This somewhat restrained and reasonable application of public
policy by the Whitney court seems to have influenced subsequent
decisions. The influence was not evident, however, until 1932, in
Loranger v. Nadeau, when the California Supreme court adopted a
clear formulation of public policy. 108 Loranger was a guest statute
case. The defendant and plaintiff, both California residents, were
involved in an accident in Oklahoma. The question was whether it
was contrary to California public policy to allow the plaintiff to
recover under the standard of ordinary negligence under Oklahoma
law as opposed to the gross neglicence standard of California. Relying
explicitly on the formulation of public policy by Judge Cardozo in
Loucks v. Standard Oil,109 the California Supreme court rejected the
public policy argument.110 Writing for the court, Justice Shenk argued
that allowing a California plaintiff to recover under those circum-
stances could hardly be said to violate any fundamental principles
of justice or California public policy, and no good morals seemed
to be involved."' The emphasis of the court in allowing the use of
the repugnancy doctrine only in significant cases of deeply rooted
values, is reflected in its choice of law decisions. In cases where
some fundamental public policy was at stake, the court allowed the
repugnancy doctrine to defeat the foreign law. Such cases are,
however, not many.
In cases where the repugnancy doctrine has been properly invoked,
it generally involved some conduct, transaction, or activity of social
or public significance. The conduct or activity should generally pose
a serious threat to the basic values of society or to the public
confidence in fundamental morality. Certain disputes tend to raise
these questions more easily than others. For instance, disputes con-
cerning family issues such as bastardy, loss of affection, and polyg-
amy tend to attract the public policy exception. Contracts for
prostitution or gambling related transactions also evoke the public
policy exception. There are, however, several other disputes involving
general contractual rights, torts, wrongful death, or strict liability
questions, where the public policy exception has been invoked but
with less success.112 The discussion of California conflict of laws
108. 215 Cal. 362, 10 P.2d 63 (1932).
109. 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918), cited in Loranger, 215 Cal. at 366.
110. Loranger, 215 Cal. at 367.
111. Id.
112. For limitations on damages, see Victor v. Sperry, 163 Cal. App. 2d 518, 329 P.2d
728 (1958), where it was held that it was not contrary to the public policy of California or
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cases will be limited to these categories, using a few cases as illus-
trations.
The first category of cases in which public policy was successfully
invoked to reject the application of foreign law was in the family
law arena. So important was marriage to society that the common
law adopted rather harsh and severe rules restricting the legal rights
of bastards or illegitimate children.13 Such rules were contrary to
the basic principles of individual responsibility enshrined in the
American legal system. The law would generally impose legal re-
sponsibility only on actors. In this case, the law permitted innocent
children to suffer for the sins of their parents. The inequity and
injustice of the law of reverse vicarious liability were, nevertheless,
rationalized as necessary to compel the parents to curb their extra-
marital amorous adventures." 4
The California Supreme Court first addressed this question in
Blythe v. Ayres." 5 At stake in Blythe was the inheritance of the vast
wealth of Thomas H. Blythe. Blythe, a California resident, died
intestate and was survived by several relatives and an illegitimate
daughter. The issue was whether a postnatal legitimation by Blythe
was valid under California law such that the daughter would inherit
his property. If the strict common law rules applied, the daughter
would have been entitled to inherit nothing. After an exhaustive
discussion of English authorities and decided cases, the court con-
injurious to the welfare of its people to enforce limitations imposed by the law of Mexico on
the amount of damages. It was, however, further held that it was contrary to California public
policy to impose liability without fault. Id. at 524-26. But see Rubin v. Schupp, 127 F.2d 625
(9th Cir. 1942) (public policy argument rejected in wrongful death action).
113. See infra notes 115-20.
114. Id. There has always been concern about the inconsistency of vicarious liability with
other common law principles. For instance, the basic premise of legal responsibility is that
each individual should be responsible for his actions. Thus, D. W. Holmes, Jr., queried
whether vicarious liability was not against common sense in the following words:
I assume that common-sense is opposed to making one man pay for another man's
wrong, unless he actually has brought the wrong to pass according to the ordinary
canons of legal responsibility-unless, that is to say, he has induced the immediate
wrong-doer to do acts of which the wrong, or, at least, wrong, was the natural
consequence under the circumstances known to the defendant. . . .I therefore assume
that common sense is opposed to the fundamental theory of agency, although I have
no doubt that the possible explanations of its various rules which I suggested at the
beginning of this chapter, together with the fact that the most flagrant of them now-
a-days often presents itself as a seemingly wholesome check on the indifference and
negligence of great corporations, have done much to reconcile men's minds to that
theory.
Holmes, Jr., Agency, 5 I-HARv. L. REv. 1, 14 (1891).
115. 96 Cal. 532, 31 P. 915 (1892). Blythe involved several relatives of Thomas H. Blythe,
decedent, who sought and fought vigorously to disinherit decedent's daughter so that they
could share in his vast wealth. Id.
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cluded that under both California and English law Blythe could, by
a subsequent conduct, change the status of his daughter. 116 In modern
governmental interest analysis, that would have been a false conflict
since the policies behind both the English and California laws would
have been the same. The California Supreme Court addressed the
case as a purely domestic dispute regarding the interpretation of a
California statute. The meaning of this statute, the court concluded,
should not be affected by the policies of foreign countries. According
to the court:
Legitimation is the creature of legislation. Its existence is solely
dependent upon the law and policy of each particular sovereignty.
The law and policy of this state authorize and encourage it, and
there is no principle upon which California law and policy, when
invoked in California courts, shall be made to surrender to the
antagonistic laws and policies of Great Britain"
17
It was held, therefore, that Blythe's conduct had legitimated the
status of his daughter and that she was entitled to inherit her father's
property.
The court's reaction to bastardy questions was much more direct
in the case of The Estate of Lund."8 The question raised in Lund
was whether the stigma of bastardy was of such an. indelible character
that a Norwegian bastard could be cut off from his father's will
even after a post-majority legitimation by the father. Relying on its
opinion in Blythe, the court stressed several times that the California
civil code provisions of legitimation were a statement of the state's
public policy. According to the court, the legislature had adopted a
policy which repudiated the common law rule compelling the sins of
the father to be visited on the children."9 To the extent that the
California statute was a statement of its public policy favoring
legitimation, the court held that it would be contrary to such public
policy to limit legitimation to only minor children, or to allow
contradictory foreign laws to apply.'
20
Though questions of bastardy seem to be issues of the past, these
cases illustrate the lead that California and its courts took in dealing
with family law questions in a liberal fashion. It seemed of funda-
mental importance, in trying to encourage traditional family values,
116. Id. at 576.
117. Id. at 575.
118. 26 Cal. 2d 472, 159 P.2d 643 (1945).
119. Id. at 480.
120. Id. at 491-92.
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that children or innocent individuals did not become sacrificial lambs.
A liberal interpretation of the statutory provisions allowing inheri-
tance by otherwise "disinherited" children was guided by the public
policy of fairness and justice in the operation of basic legal principles.
Similarly, the courts of California seemed to have found an over-
riding and fundamental public policy interest in cases involving loss
of affection. In Thome v. Macken,12 1 the plaintiff, an Oregon resi-
dent, sought to recover damages for loss of affection. Even though
the claim was actionable under Oregon law, and notwithstanding the
mandate of Article IV of the United States Constitution on privileges
and immunities, the California Court of Appeals rejected jurisdiction
over the case on public policy grounds. 2 2 At issue was the question
whether a California statutory provision denying causes of action for
alienation of affection was a statement of California public policy.
Since the legislature had expressed no views on the issue, the court
sought help from states with similar statutes. It examined the policy
rationale behind those statutes. It found that the cause of action for
loss of affection was rejected because it was conducive to extortion,
blackmail, fraud, and havoc. It would cause society greater injury
than benefit.121 From this analysis, the court concluded that the
California statutory provisions were similarly an expression of public
policy compelling rejection of jurisdiction over the dispute. 2 4 How-
ever, in another family law case addressing the question of whether
the wives of a polygamous husband could inherit his California
property upon death intestate, the court held that it was not against
California public policy for the wives to share the property equally. 125
While California does not recognize polygamous marriages celebrated
within its borders, it does not consider it against its public policy to
recognize foreign polygamous marriages.
The position of California courts on issues involving gambling
transactions and debts, however, is not clear. Two lines of cases
seem to have evolved on gambling questions. One line of cases holds
gambling to be contra bonos mores and, hence, unlawful. 2 6 When
a California court is called upon to enforce a foreign gambling
121. 58 Cal. App. 2d 76, 136 P.2d 116 (1943).
122. Id. at 84.
123. Id. at 82.
124. Id. at 83-84.
125. Estate of Bir, 83 Cal. App. 2d 256, 262, 188 P.2d 499 (1948).
126. Braverman v. Horn, 88 Cal. App. 2d 379, 198 P.2d 948 (1948); Lavick v. Nitzberg,
83 Cal. App. 2d 381, 188 P.2d 758 (1948); Union Collection Co. v. Buckman, 150 Cal. 159,
88 P. 708 (1907).
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contract or debt, it is supposed to reject enforcement on public policy
grounds. There is recent authority, nevertheless, for the view that
gambling does not necessarily implicate any California public policy.
Confronted with this question in Nevcal Enterprises Inc. v. Cal-Neva
Lodge, Inc.,'27 the court, relying on Cardozo's formulation of public
policy, rejected the notion that California could act piously about
gambling when it authorizes various forms of gambling. California
courts, it was argued, could not be shocked on the ground of public
morals when called upon to enforce a contract for the operation of
licensed casinos in Nevada. 28 On the other hand, in the case of
gambling debts, the courts have taken a longstanding position that
it is against the public policy of California to enforce gambling
debts. 129 When, for example, a gambler was allowed to cash checks
for gambling purposes in a Nevada casino, it was held that these
check transactions were illegal and could not be collected on public
policy grounds. 30 The continuing vitality of the public policy excep-
127. 194 Cal. App. 2d 177, 14 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1961).
128. Id. After examining its precedents on public policy, the court concluded as follows:
In these modern days Californians cannot afford to be too pious about this matter
of gambling. Stud poker is contrary to good morals (so it seems), but not draw
poker or draw low ball poker, although they actually constitute gambling. This
situation grows out of the concept that the "determination of public policy of states
resides, first, with the people as expressed in their Constitution and, second, with
the representatives of the people-the state Legislature." So draw poker, not being
declared illegal by statute, is held to be lawful. Hence some of our less ascetic
communities license draw poker parlors which are conducted to the edification of
the citizenry and presumably to the profit of the treasury and the taxpayer.
Horse racing was said in Hankins v. Ottinger to contravene good morals, and it
was held that bets thereon are unenforceable. But the legislature by enactment of
the Horse Racing Act of 1933 and the People by constitutional amendment ratifying
said law, have reversed that policy with respect to such gambling done upon the
licensed premises of a racing association and through pari-mutuel machines. The
state licenses qualified applicants to conduct horse racing and betting thereon if
made within the track enclosure and through the pari-mutuel betting machines, i.e.,
where the customers bet with each other and not with the house. If made inside the
fence the bet is lawful and winnings recoverable. But if made outside, bets are still
illegal and the proceeds not recoverable. All persons other than those specifically
mentioned in section 19572 (such as known bookmakers or touts) have a right to
enter the race track and indulge freely in betting. The state itself has a large interest
in the enterprise through fees collected by it based upon percentages of the betting
pool ranging from 5 per cent to 8 per cent of the gross, also through its right to
half of the breakage.
County fairs are placed in the same status as licensed race tracks for betting on
horse races (citations omitted).
Id. at 180-81.
129. See Hamilton v. Abadjian, 30 Cal. 2d 49, 51, 179 P.2d 804 (1947), where it was held
that the courts of California will not lend their support to the collection of gambling losses
as contrary to California public policy.
130. Lane & Pyron Inc. v. Gibbs, 266 Cal. App. 2d 61, 65, 71 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1968).
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tion in gambling debts is doubtful for two reasons. First, the excep-
tion is narrowly drawn to require that gambling advances be made
for gambling purposes and be used for gambling. 3 ' Second, with the
advent of the California lottery, California courts may follow the
reasoning of the court in Nevcal Enterprises Inc., and enforce gam-
bling debts. Such a position will be consistent with the legal obligation
of the Lottery Commissioner to pay all winners. It would seem
inconsistent to have a public policy that encourages gambling, but
discourages seriously the collection of gambling related debts. How-
ever, if the underlying gambling transaction is illegal, then it would
be against the public policy of California to enforce any debts arising
from the transaction.
32
2. Wong v. Tenneco and Interest Analysis
According to the critics, public policy was an inevitable outcome
of the rigidity of the traditional approach to the choice of law
process. The process produced predetermined but sometimes unde-
sirable results. To avoid these results, courts relied on the public
policy exception. Modern choice of law theories were designed to
eliminate, in part, the use of public policy as an escape device. One
of the arguments advanced by proponents of interest analysis was
that it would take into account the policies behind any particular
law, thereby removing the necessity to rely on the public policy
exception. 3  The actual operation of interest analysis and other
modern choice of law theories seems to suggest that public policy
continues to influence the choice of law process. Some courts,
supposedly using modern choice of law theories, seem to retreat to
the traditional analysis and the public policy exception when con-
fronted with difficult choice of law questions. Other courts find ways
to inject public policy analysis into their modern choice of law
decisions. The recent public policy decision by the California Supreme
Court in Wong v. Tenneco134 is an example of the behavior of courts.
131. Id. at 65, 68-69.
132. Id. at 65. Moreover, the enforcement of illegal transactions would run contrary to
public policy because it would undermine the role of the courts and result in loss of confidence
in the judicial system. Id.
133. See Currie, Married Women's Contracts, supra note 84; Currie, supra note 6. See
also Hill, Governmental Interest-and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27
U. Cm. L. REv. 463 (1960); Symposium, Comments on Babcock v. Jack, A Recent Devel-
opment in Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLum. L. Rv. 1212 (1963) [hereinafter Comments on
Babcock].
134. 39 Cal. 3d 126, 702 P.2d 570, 216 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1985).
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As already noted above, this decision raises several questions about
the explicit return of the public policy exception in California choice
of law doctrine.
Wong involved a dispute between two California residents over
their contractual rights in a failed Mexican foreign investment ven-
ture. The plaintiff, Wong, set up his vegetable growing operations
in Mexico. It was alleged that he used Mexican front men in violation
of Mexican law prohibiting foreign ownership of land.135 Through a
series of contracts with the defendant Tenneco, Wong received fi-
nancial support in exchange for the defendant's exclusive right to
market Wong's produce and to manage his business. The venture
collapsed upon pressure from the government of Mexico for taxes,
the Mexican front men, and other creditors. Tenneco severed its
relations with the plaintiff and remitted profits from the operations
to the Mexican front men. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract
and misrepresentation. The case was tried before a jury at the trial
court level. The jury returned a substantial verdict in favor of the
plaintiff and a smaller amount for the defendant on a counterclaim.
Notwithstanding the verdict, the trial judge ruled that the plaintiff
could not recover because of unclean hands. The court looked beyond
the simple contract and examined the underlying farming transactions
giving rise to the contractual claims. Finding them tainted with
illegality, the trial court denied the remedy on public policy grounds.
A sharply divided California Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's opinion by a narrow margin. One source of the disagreement
135. Id. The illegality of the failed Mexican operations was debated by the court. The
disagreement was based in part on the interpretation of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution
of 1917 which states in part:
Art. 27
I. Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican companies have the right
to acquire ownership of lands, waters, and their appurtenances, or to obtain
concessions for the exploitation of mines or of waters. The state may grant the same
right to foreigners, provided they agree before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to
consider themselves as nationals in respect to such property, and bind themselves
not to invoke the protection of their governments in matters relating thereto; under
penalty, in case of noncompliance with this agreement, of forfeiture of the acquired
property to the Nation. Under no circumstances may foreigners acquire direct
ownership of lands or waters within a zone of one hundred kilometers along the
frontiers and of fifty kilometers along the shores of the country (our emphasis).
Id, at 129 n.2.
The language of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 is subject to different
interpretations on the question of illegality. The plaintiff, however, admitted in court that the
farming operations were illegal under Mexican law. In addition to the constitutional provisions,
the court also dealt with the role of Mexican foreign investment laws in the failed venture by
examining The Law for the Promotion of Mexican Investment and Regulation of Foreign
Investment (Mar. 9, 1973). Id.
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was the characterization of the dispute. If, according to the dissent,
the case were characterized as a California dispute between two of
its residents over a contract to be performed in California, no choice
of law questions would have arisen. 136 Besides, the contract was
lawful under California law. This fact would have, prima facie,
eliminated the application of the public policy exception. The ma-
jority, however, found the contract claim to be of secondary impor-
tance. Agreeing with the lower court, the majority argued that the
underlying Mexican farming operations of the plaintiff formed the
centerpiece of the contractual claims.137 By shifting the focus of the
case to the farming operations, the majority found a choice of law
question to decide. How this choice of law issue was resolved was
even more puzzling than the characterization of the dispute. Starting
with Reich v. Purcell,138 and following with several of its earlier
choice of law decisions, 3 9 the California Supreme Court made a
decided shift away from its traditional comity doctrine to modern
governmental interest analysis.Y40
The court, in recent prior decisions, adopted its own version of
interest analysis, the comparative impairment doctrine. Applying this
concept in the case of Bernhard v. Harrah's Club,'4' the court
explained that comparative impairment requires the forum, in the
event of a true conflict, to apply the law of the state whose interests
would be most impaired if its policies were subordinated to those of
the other state. In an earlier decision, the court unanimously reaffired
the application of the comparative impairment doctrine to choice of
law disputes. 4 2 If there were a choice of law question to be resolved,
136. Id. at 142-44.
137. Id. at 133 n.8.
138. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
139. See generally People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957);
Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961) (California
Supreme Court applied interest analysis).
140. According to interest analysis, the forum, in determining a choice of law question,
must take into account the underlying policies behind the laws of all states with a legitimate
and competing interest in having their laws apply. See Currie, Married Women's Contracts,
supra note 84. The theory of interest analysis divides choice of law problems into various
categories: (1) false conflicts, Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.
2d 743 (1963); (2) true conflicts, Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964); (3)
apparent true conflicts, People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 906, 12
Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961); (4) the unprovided for case, Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 454, 506 P.2d
494 (1973).
141. 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976). The California comparative
impairment approach seems to have been significantly influenced by two conflicts scholars and
their contributions to the field. See Baxter, supra note 20; and Horowitz, supra note 20.
142. Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 867 (1978).
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one would have then expected the court to apply the comparative
impairment doctrine. However, without much explanation, and with
only a passing reference to interest analysis in a footnote, the majority
returned to the traditional comity doctrine established in 1894.
Relying on the comity principle, the court held that Mexican law
governed the dispute. It also held that the applicable Mexican law
was not so antagonistic or prejudicial to California public policy or
to recognized standards of morality as to negate its application. 143
But why should Mexican law govern? The majority found support
in yet another old and well established choice of law principle, the
situs rule. 144 According to this rule, questions relating to the control
of real property are governed by the law of the place where such
property is located. Notwithstanding the fact that Mexico, but not
California, restricted foreigners from owning certain types of prop-
erty, this was not a sufficient reason for the application of the
California public policy exception. On the contrary, the court found
the plaintiff's Mexican farming operations to have been legal under
California law. It nevertheless found the transactions in contravention
of California public policy because they were purposefully designed
to violate Mexican law.145 The test for this public policy violation
was the illegality of the plaintiff's activities. In an earlier decision,
the court held that there existed a settled public policy against
allowing a party to have its illegal contract enforced by a court of
law. 146 It appears from this opinion, and from the cases relied on by
the court, that the real test for the violation of California public
policy was the illegality of the transactions rather than the place
where they took place.147 This use of public policy conforms with
Justice Crompton's object and means test discussed in the Egerton
case. 48 In some of the gambling cases discussed above, the transac-
tions sued on were illegal in both California and the other states.
Thus, a violation of California law and public policy could easily be
143. Wong v. Tenneco, 39 Cal. 3d 126, 136, 702 P.2d 570, 216 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1985).
144. One of the most entrenched principles in conflict of laws is the situs rule; see, e.g.,
In re Barrie's Estate, 240 Iowa 431, 35 N.W.2d 658 (1949) (holding situs of real property
determines validity or revocation of will). The situs rule has been the subject of criticism and
evasive schemes in the hands of creative litigants. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 20, at 15-17;
Hancock, Equitable Conversion and the Land Taboo in Conflict of Laws, 17 STAN. L. Rav.
1095 (1965); Hancock, Conceptual Devices for Avoiding the Land Taboo in Conflict of Laws:
The Disadvantages of Disingenuousness, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1967).
145. Wong, 39 Cal. 3d at 137-38.
146. Id. at 135.
147. Id.
148. Egerton v. Brownlow, [1853] 10 Eng. Rep. 359, 417.
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found. 149 In this case, the court extended the public policy concern
to cover foreign illegalities. If the plaintiff cannot establish his claim
without relying on an illegal foreign transaction, the courts of Cali-
fornia will not lend their support to the enforcement of such a claim.
The apparent retreat from the comparative impairment and use of
public policy deserves some explanation. It seems of importance to
the court that the plaintiff deliberately engaged in a scheme to
frustrate the constitutional provisions of Mexico. The court must
have found the evasive scheme so extraordinarily offensive that it
felt compelled to condemn it in no uncertain terms. The laws of
Mexico are not unique in their attempt to control the behavior of
foreign investors and to regulate access to natural resources. 50 Such
laws are rampant, and the behavior of the plaintiff was not atypical.
It is well established that many foreign investors, when confronted
with similar restrictive laws, resort to various evasive schemes. 5 1
Deliberate evasive conduct by foreign investors is likely to be con-
demned outright by most governments and local courts as illegal and
contrary to public policy. Similarly, there are federal and state laws
in the United States prohibiting evasive schemes, dubious and ma-
nipulative transactions, and other forms of illegality in investment
behavior.152 The federal anti-bribery law, for example, condemns
foreign conduct as illegal even if such conduct is not illegal in the
foreign country. 53 The unequivocable condemnation of the conduct
of the plaintiff in Wong should be seen as serving several purposes.
It may be a warning to American investors abroad that flagrantly
149. See supra notes 123-29.
150. For a discussion of such laws in other countries, see Yelpaala, The Impact of Industrial
Legislation on the Behavior of Multinational Enterprises- and Labor in the Industrializing
Countries of East and Southeast Asia, 6 Micit. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 383 (1984). A valuable
contribution to the subject by a Nigerian scholar relying on decided cases was made by
Fabunmi, Indigenisation Law as a Means of Economic Control: The Nigerian Experience, 5
Y.B. AzR. L. 13 (1984). See also Achebe, The Legal Problems of Indigenization in Nigeria:
A Lesson for Developing Countries, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. R~v. 637 (1989); UNCTC,
NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS RELATING TO TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1983).
151. See sources cited supra note 150.
152. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985);
16 C.F.R. § 13.315 (1986). See also Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
153. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a note, 78m(b), 78 dd-1, 78 dd-2, 78 ff(a) (1982 & Supp. III
1985)). There is a vast amount of intellectual commentary on the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act.. See generally Herlihy & Levine, Corporate Crisis: The Overseas Payment Problem, 8
LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 547 (1976); McLanglilin, The Criminalization of Questionable Foreign
Payments by Corporations: A Comparative Legal Systems Analysis, 46 FoRDHAm L. Rlv.
1071 (1978); Gevurtz, Using the Antitrust Laws to Combat Overseas Bribery by Foreign
Companies: A Step to Even the Odds in International Trade, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 210 (1987).
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illegal foreign conduct will not be tolerated at home. It may also be
a warning to investors in the United States that California law will
not always provide a shelter for their foreign operations. The intensity
of the public policy denunciation in this case also suggests that it
could be extended to schemes within the letter of the law but clearly
violative of its spirit. In international disputes, the public policy
exception might even be used by the courts as a gesture toward the
maintenance of friendly international relations. It must be noted,
however, that since the dissent in this case was strongly worded, and
since the court is constituted differently today, Wong may be viewed
as an aberration.
The majority opinion nevertheless casts doubt over the continuing
vitality of the comparative impairment approach. One conflict of
laws scholar has noted that lower courts in California seem lost and
confused about the application of the comparative impairment ap-
proach. 154 To such courts, the decision in Wong could constitute a
convenient and compelling signal to retreat to the comity doctrine
and the public policy exception. Given the occasional application of
the comity doctrine by lower courts, the danger is real. Furthermore,
Wong might be part of a growing concern over the degree of utility
of modern American choice of law methods. The Supreme Court of
California is not alone in this apparent retreat. At least two other
State Supreme Courts have in the recent past discussed or used the
public policy exception. Of importance is that these courts were
supposedly applying modern choice of law methods. 15  While the
154. Kay, Comparative Impairment, supra note 84.
155. See Comment, Choice of Law. A Fond Farewell to County and Public Policy, 74
CALnr. L. REv. 1447, 1465 (1986); Boardman v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 470 So. 2d 1024
(Miss. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 65
N.Y.2d 189, 480 N.E.2d 679, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985). It should be noted that Wong has not
drawn as much attention as other trend setting cases. It is relegated to the position of a note
case in one of the leading Conflict of Laws casebooks. See CRAMTON, CsURM & KAY, supra
note 1, at 276.
Concern over the re-emergence of the public policy exception in New York conflict of laws
was addressed by a lower court in New York. See Feldman v. Acapulco Princess Hotel, 137
Misc. 2d 878, 520 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). In this case, the question was whether
it was against the public policy of New York to apply the law of the place of the tort, Mexico,
to determine damages for pain and suffering even though Mexico imposed a ceiling on such
damages. New York had no such ceiling. The court lamented the popular view that New York
public policy is believed to be often invoked to protect New York residents. After an
examination of the case law and intellectual commentary, the court concluded that the "precise
status of the public policy exception in New York... remains unclear." Id. at 484. The court
suggested that to the extent of the existence of the public policy exception, it should be limited
to the narrow formulation of Judge Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99,
110-11, 120 N.E. 198 (1918). The court concluded that it was not against New York public
policy to apply Mexican law to the issue of damages. Feldman, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
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number of cases is very small, in a period of doctrinal uncertainty
only one decision may be required to change views, as happened in
Jackson v. Babcock,156 the case that ushered in interest analysis.
Assuming, however, that Wong and the other cases fail to influence
any return to the old methods, what is the role of public policy in
the comparative impairment approach? Under the traditional vested
rights or comity approaches, the forum first determines whether
foreign law is applicable to the particular dispute. It may then defeat
the application of such foreign law on public policy grounds. Under
the comparative impairment approach,'5 7 the forum must first deter-
mine whether there exists a true conflict of laws by taking into
account the laws, the facts, and the policies behind the laws. In the
event that two or more states have a legitimate interest in having
their laws and policies govern a particular issue, the forum would
be faced with a true conflict of laws problem and could apply its
own law. While the process calls for the incorporation of legislative
policies, it does not necessarily always involve public policy as
discussed here. In other words, to the extent that all laws and
common law principles are not declaratory of public policy, 15 8 interest
analysis may or may not involve public policy. When used properly,
interest analysis may make the distinction between specific policy
and public policy irrelevant. The courts may, in fact, react differently.
In the Oregon case of Lilienthal v. Kaufman,159 the Oregon Su-
preme Court held that in a true conflict of laws case the forum
could apply its law on public policy grounds. In Lilienthal, an Oregon
spendthrift entered into a contract with a California resident plaintiff.
Not only was the contract entered into in California, but it was also
to be performed there. The contract was enforceable under the laws
of California but voidable under an Oregon spendthrift statute. Under
all applicable choice of law theories, California law would govern
this transaction. Upon examining the facts, the circumstances sur-
rounding the case, and the relevant policies of the two states, the
court, nevertheless, found a true conflict of laws problem. Oregon,
but not California, had decided to subordinate its policy of favoring
the validity and enforcement of contracts to that of protecting
spendthrifts. Finding the interest of both states to be equally bal-
156. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). For a discussion of this
case, see Comments on Babcock, supra note 133.
157. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing Foley).
159. 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
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anced, the court held that the public policy of Oregon should prevail
and that Oregon law should be applied. 160 What is perhaps even more
significant is that the court examined the public policy of Oregon in
determining the respective governmental interests in the dispute. To
the extent that the Oregon statute expressed Oregon public policy,
these concerns should naturally be applied in the governmental in-
terest analysis. The Oregon statute, however, could have been an
expression of Oregon specific policies on spendthrifts. Whether the
controlling policy involved is public policy or specific policy, the
results of a properly employed interest analysis process should pro-
duce similar outcomes. Considering that interest analysis only dictates
that the forum can apply its law in the case of true conflict of laws,
it still leaves open the possibility of the forum using public policy as
an aid in making that decision.
Comparative impairment, on the other hand, may produce different
outcomes. As noted above, comparative impairment calls for the
application of the laws of the state whose policies would be most
impaired if they were subordinated to those of the other state.16' The
process is an explicit invitation to weigh the competing policies of
interested states as is apparent in the California Supreme Court
decision in Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co.162 In the
Offshore case, the court used various techniques to weigh and balance
the policy interests of California and Louisiana in determining which
law should govern a suit for the loss of services of the plaintiff's
key employee. Holding that Louisiana's laws would govern, the court
took into account the intensity of each state's interests in having its
policy prevail. It examined the fit between the respective policies and
the means by which the two states sought to advance such policies.
In addition, it discussed the current vitality of the substantive legal
rule in question. In doing that, it considered whether the rule in
question was archaic or modern. It took into account the comparative
pertinence of the governmental concerns of California and Louis-
iana.6 3 This process may result in an implicit or explicit use of public
policy as in the case of Lilienthal. If, when using interest analysis,
the courts resort to public policy in difficult cases, it is not because
the theory calls for it. Rather, the courts again find public policy a
160. Id. at 549.
161. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
162. 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
163. Id. at 167.
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convenient device to resolve disputes when all other bases are inad-
equate or non-existent.
In summary, it seems almost impossible to eliminate public policy
completely from the choice of law process. It has always been seen
by the courts as a useful, if not convenient, instrument for dispensing
justice. The attacks on the traditional vested rights and comity
approaches to the choice of law process should not lead one to
confuse certain fundamental issues. The attack does not question the
notion that civil societies and their legal systems are built upon
certain fundamental values, aspirations, and ideals. The idea that
justice in the courts or the resolution of judicial disputes should be
guided by, and not undermine, the fundamental values enshrined in
any system seems appealing to common people and judges alike. It
is, therefore, not surprising that the modern choice of law theories
have been unsuccessful in completely keeping public policy from
infiltrating the choice of law process. Like the ghost of Banquo,
public policy will continue to appear when least expected, and, like
the charmeleon, its colors will continue to change with its environ-
ment.
B. Choice of Forum Clauses
The justification for the use of public policy to defeat or modify
the express will of the parties as to the method and place to resolve
their disputes may depend critically on the reasons for the choices
made, the subject matter of the dispute, the type of parties, or the
characteristics of the chosen forum. 64 In a world of ever increasing
economic interdependency, complex legal disputes frequently arise
involving merchants of different nation states with yet different
cultural, political, and ideological orientations. National courts, be-
cause of their parochial or sometimes myopic tendencies, are often
unsuited for resolving complex international disputes. 65 The parties
to an international dispute may be intensely suspicious of the neu-
164. For a more extensive discussion of the reasons for forum selection clauses, see Yelpaala,
supra note 15, at 209.
165. See Carbonneau, American and Other National Variations on the Theme of Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration, 18 GA. J. INT'L & Con'. L. 143, 149 (1988) [hereinafter
Carbonneau]; Carbonneau, Transnational Litigation, 18 INT'L LAW. 522 (1984); von Mehren,
Transnational Litigation in American Courts: An Overview of Problems and Issues, in ParVATE
INvESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 1 (J. Moss ed.
1985); G. DELAUME, 2 TRANsNATioNAL CONTRACTS, APPLICABLE LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES: A STUDY OF CONFLICT AvOIDANCE (1981).
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trality of local tribunals in fashioning equitable solutions to disputes
which often have political overtones.'6 Beyond the question of neu-
trality is concern over the competence of local tribunals. 16 7 The typical
international dispute raises several complex jurisdictional and sub-
stantive legal questions. Unfamiliarity of the courts with the socio-
economic and political complexities of certain subject matters may
make- them unsuitable for judicial resolution. Some local tribunals,
induced by cultural arrogance, may not only adopt liberal or expan-
sive rules of adjudicatory jurisdiction, but also apply their laws to
any dispute before them.1
68
Notwithstanding these limitations on national tribunals, there is
neither internationally acceptable judicial institutions with the power
to resolve private international disputes nor established legal stan-
dards and substantive legal rules applicable to such disputes. 16 9 While
we have marched into the era of the trading nation state, there is
166. When the parties to an international dispute are intensely suspicious of the neutrality
of an arbitration in each others national courts, a neutral forum becomes a necessity. For
example, after the Iranian hostage crisis in 1980, both Iran and the United States sought to
avoid this problem and to bring about a more efficient way of resolving their disputes through
an international tribunal. See Stein, Jurisprudence and Jurists' Prudence: The Iranian Forum
Selection Clause and Decisions of the U.S.-Iran Tribunals, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1984). See
also United States v. Iran, 1980 I.C.J. 3; Recent Development, International Adjudication:
Embassy Seizure, United States v. Iran, 21 HAV. INT'L L.J. 748 (1980) (both discussing
dispute resolution in international tribunals).
1 167. Certain international disputes may involve subject matter unfamiliar to the forum or
may be so complex that it would be better to find another forum which is familiar with the
character of the dispute and the law surrounding it. The Bhopal disaster typified one aspect
of this problem. While one cannot question the competence of the courts of India, the accident
caused questions about the capacity of the courts to handle complex and massive litigation.
See Nanda, For Whom the Bell Tolls in the Aftermath of the Bhopal Tragedy: Reflections on
Forum Non-Conveniens and Alternative Methods of Resolving the Bhopal Dispute, 15 DEN.
J. Irr'L L. & PoL'Y 235 (1987); see also Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why so Little Has Happened
in India After the Bhopal Tragedy, 20 TEx. ITrr'L L.J. 273 (1985); (article in symposium on
Bhopal tragedy); McCaffrey, Accidents Do Happen: Hazardous Technology and International
Tort Litigation, I TaRSNAT'L LAW. 41 (1988) (discussing Bhopal tragedy).
168. The problem manifests itself most visibly in jurisdiction to prescribe cases. See
Grunduan, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application of United States Law, 14
INT'L LAw. 257 (1980); Toms, The French Response to the Extraterritorial Applications of
United States Laws, 15 Ir'L LAw. 585 (1981); Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law,
46 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 145 (1975); Fugate, Antitrust Jurisdiction and Sovereignty, 49 VA. L.
REv. 925 (1963); Samie, Extraterritorial Enforcement of United States Antitrust Laws: The
British Reaction, 16 INT'L LAw. 313 (1982); Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The
British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981). Extraterritorial
jurisdiction questions are becoming relevant in the European Economic Community. For
example, a recent decision by the European Court of Justice allowed jurisdiction over foreign
companies without any EEC presence. Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A. Ahlstrom Oy and Others v.
E.C. Commission, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. -, [1988] C.M.L.R. 901; Kuyper, European
Community Law and Extraterritoriality: Some Trends and New Developments, 33 INT'L &
Coap. L.Q. 1013 (1984).
169. See Carbonneau, supra note 165, at 145-49.
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growing resistence to the exercise of jurisdictions over sovereign
traders in foreign courts. The concept of sovereign immunity and
the act of state doctrine are often seen by private litigants as unfair
obstacles to justice and reasonable dispute resolution. 170 The need
for internationally established alternative dispute resolution institu-
tions is hardly in doubt. Yet, nation states have still to evolve such
an institution to satisfy the needs of all the participants in the global
market. Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the
parties to an international agreement would seek greater certainty in
the settlement of future disputes. What is surprising then is that the
public policy exception would be available to frustrate the search for
certainty in international dispute resolution. If unrestrained party
autonomy is respected, forum selection clauses may be used by
individuals to undermine or subvert certain fundamental societal
values. However, if public policy is an elusive concept used as a
catch-all or a last resort doctrine in troublesome cases, local tribunals
may indeed find it to be an attractive instrument for controlling
party autonomy in international litigation. That appears to be the
case in the United States, and in particular California, in forum
selection cases.
Inspired by a protectionist and paternalistic attitude toward local
residents, American courts, historically, found policy reasons to show
little tolerance for choice of forum clauses.' 7' The protective policies 7 2
of the state were considered so important that courts viewed them
as not being subject to modification or change in private bargains.
170. The debate over sovereign immunity has resulted in a number of Western industrialized
countries passing statutes limiting the immunity of foreign sovereigns. For the United States,
see Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976). For a
comprehensive collection of cases and statutes on sovereign immunity, see UNITED NATIONS
LEGISLATIVE SERIES, MATERIALS ON JURISDICTIONAL IMfUNrrIEs OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY,
U.N. Sales No. E/F.81.V.10 (1982); see also von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, 17 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1978); Bachrah, Sovereign Immunity in Belgium,
10 INT'L LAW. 459 (1976); Weinschenk, A Note on Sovereign Immunity and Judicial Remedies
for Aliens in Courts of the Federal Republic of Germany, 10 INT'L LAW. 467 (1976); Hamson,
Immunity of Foreign States: The Practice of the French Courts, 27 BaR. Y.B. INT'L L. 293
(1950); White, State Immunity and International Law in English Courts, 26 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 674 (1977). For a most informative statement on sovereign immunity, see Sucharitkul,
Fourth Report on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, International Law
Commission 34th Session, Geneva, 3 May-23 July 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/357 [and corr.
11 (1982).
171. For an extensive discussion, see Yelpaala, supra note 15, at 223-26. See also Insurance
Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874) (United States Supreme Court took protectionist
stand on enforcement of choice of forum clauses); Bergman, Contractual Restrictions on the
Forum, 48 CALIF. L. Rnv. 438 (1960).
172. See, e.g., Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 451.
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Forum selection clauses were seen as contrary to such protective
policies, an ouster of the courts' jurisdiction, and, therefore, illegal.173
In a landmark decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 174
the Supreme Court of the United States denounced this hostility and
reduced the scope of the protective umbrella of American laws. The
Court held that forum selection clauses are prima facie valid and
should be enforced unless shown to be unreasonable under the
circumstances by the party resisting them. 175
Several reasons were offered why years of open hostility should
be ended. The Court could find no justification for a parochial or
paternalistic stance in the face of growing and constantly shifting
patterns of asymmetrical dependence in international trade and in-
vestment.1 76 It then called for a recognition of the changed conditions,
and an expanded view of party autonomy in international business
transactions. Party autonomy plays an important role in bringing
some certainty to international transactions affected by a constantly
shifting and expanding world trade system. Holding the parties to
their bargain therefore serves an overiding policy interest. Thus, the
Court concluded that forum selection clauses freely and voluntarily
entered into in arms length transactions should be respected by the
parties and enforced by the courts.17 It noted, however, that forum
selection clauses affected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening
bargaining power would not be enforced. 17
Another condition recognized by the Bremen Court for not en-
forcing forum selection clauses is public policy.1 79 In other words, a
forum selection clause that is violative of some fundamental public
policy of the forum should not be enforced. When, though, may it
be against the public policy of the forum to enforce a forum selection
clause? The elusiveness of the concept, as demonstrated above, makes
this question difficult to answer in any definite terms. There are,
173. See supra note 171. See also General Acceptance Corp. v. Robinson, 207 Cal. 285,
289, 277 P. 1039 (1929); Beirut Universal Bank v. Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 832, 843,
74 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1969); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Codiga, 62 Cal. App. 117,
119, 216 P. 383 (1923).
174. 407 U.S. 1 (1971).
175. Id. at 10. In Bremen, the parties had agreed to resolve any dispute arising out of a
contract to tow a drilling rig from Louisiana to Italy in the United Kingdom. One of the
parties, in contravention of the contract provision, brought suit before a federal court in
Florida. Id.
176. Id. at 9.
177. Id. at 10.
178. Id. at 15.
179. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15.
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nevertheless, three situations in which enforcing a forum selection
clause may be held to be contrary to public policy. First, if the
selected forum would apply its substantive law to the dispute in
contravention of some fundamental public policy of the forum, then
the forum selection clause should not be enforced. 180 Of significance
here is the fact that the public policy argument does not arise from
the choice of forum clause, but rather from the choice of law rules
of the chosen forum. With the current spate of decisions by the U.S.
Supreme Court supportive of party autonomy 8' and restricting the
policy reasons for negating party autonomy, it is doubtful whether
federal courts or state courts dealing with federal substantive law
questions will follow this public policy exception. Second, the public
policy exception is available if the choice of forum clause was inserted
to avoid some mandatory statutory requirements of the forum.182
Under such circumstances, the purposeful evasiveness of the clause
should be considered contrary to public policy and unenforceable.
Finally, it is suggested that where the transaction has no connection
with the chosen forum either in terms of the subject matter, the
parties, or the law, it would be contrary to the public policy of the
forum and unreasonable to enforce the choice of forum clause. 83
Prior to the Bremen decision, California courts, like those of most
other jurisdictions, followed the rule that forum selection clauses
were so offensive to the protective policies of the state as to be
declared illegal.& The duty of the state to ensure that its residents
have access to its courts was seen as overriding any express choices
or preferences to the contrary shown by private parties to a contract.
The Bremen decision was specifically limited to federal courts sitting
in admiralty and is, therefore, only persuasive precedential value to
sate courts. However, in a leading post-Bremen case, Smith, Valen-
tino & Smith Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 the California Court of
Appeals also halted this historical trend in California. Relying heavily
on, and quoting extensively from the Bremen opinion, the California
Court of Appeals held that the forum selection clause was valid and
180. See Gruson, Forum Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial
Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 133 (1982) [hereinafter Gruson].
181. See infra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
182. Reese, A Proposed Uniform Choice of Forum Act, 5 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 193,
201 (1966).
183. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 16-17.
184. See sources cited supra note 173.
185. 52 Cal. App. 3d 360, 124 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1975).
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enforceable.'86 Acknowledging that California had a strong protective
policy favoring the provision of a forum for its resident litigants,
the court indicated that such protection could nevertheless be bar-
gained away by residents in a forum selection clause. 18 7 Accordingly,
the court maintained that forum selection clauses freely and fairly
entered into in arms length transactions should be respected by the
parties and enforced by the courts provided that enforcement would
not be unreasonable, terribly inconvenient, or so burdensome as to
deprive an individual of her day in court.
88
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals'
decision was affirmed. 89 The California Supreme Court also adopted
and applied the Bremen rationale. Of importance is the court's
treatment of the older cases which had considered forum selection
clauses as an ouster of jurisdiction. The court tried to distinguish
these cases, but concluded that to the extent of any inconsistency
with their opinion in Smith those cases should not be followed. 9°
The Bremen exceptions have been the subject of an in-depth
analysis elsewhere' 9' and will not be repeated here. What is of
particular interest to us is the public policy exception. Smith had
argued that the forum selection clause which compelled him to sue
Life Assurance in California was void on public policy grounds. This
contention was based on old California cases which viewed forum
selection clauses as ousting the jurisdiction of the court, and conse-
quently void for public policy reasons. The California Supreme Court
rejected this argument, and held that there was no strong public
policy reason not to enforce the forum selection clause.
19 2
It may be asked when a California forum may appropriately refuse
to enforce a forum selection clause on public policy grounds. This
question was partially addressed in Hall v. Superior Court of Orange
186. Id. at 921-22. Smith concerned the validity and enforceability of a forum selection
clause in an agency agreement between Smith, a California corporation, and a Pennsylvania
Corporation, Life Assurance Company of Pennsylvania (Life Assurance). In the agreement,
Smith had agreed to represent Life Assurance in California for the purposes of soliciting group
insurance policies. The agreement contained a forum selection clause requiring the suit to be
brought in Pennsylvania. Id.
187. Id. at 923.
188. Id. at 924-25. These were the conditions attached to forum selection clauses by the
Bremen Court.
189. 17 Cal. 3d 491, 492, 131 Cal. Rptr. 374, 376 (1976).
190. Id. at 495-96.
191. Yelpaala, supra note 15, at 226-40.
192. Smith, 17 Cal. 3d at 495-96. For the Court of Appeals treatment of the public policy
argument, see Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. App. 3d 360, 365,
124 Cal. Rptr. 917, 923 (1975).
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County.193 The dispute in Hall involved an oil and gas limited
partnership agreement between two Californians covered by the Cal-
ifornia Corporate Securities Law of 1968, a state enactment fashioned
after the federal securities laws. Although no substantial or serious
transactions took place in Nevada, the parties nevertheless had agreed
to submit subsequent disputes arising from the transaction to Nevada
courts and to Nevada law. The question raised before the court was
whether the choice of forum and choice of law provisions should
not be enforced on public policy grounds. Relying on Smith, it was
held that a choice of forum agreement freely entered into would be
enforced unless it was contrary to California public policy.
194
The court considered the Corporate Securities Law of 1968 as an
expression of an important California policy designed to protect
investors.' 95 So important is this protective policy, that the statute
makes any agreement waiving its protection void. The effectiveness
of such legislated protection may be undermined, however, by the
parties to a contract through a choice of law provision. The court
then concluded that the validity and enforceability of the choice of
forum clause in Hall was contingent on the validity of the choice of
law provision.' 96 It had to determine the extent of the protective veil
of the statute. According to the court, the protective policies included
and mandated the application of California law and its concomitant
nuances. 97 This was part of the protection that could neither be
waived nor evaded by the parties in their contract. Since the court
viewed the choice of law provision as an evasive device designed to
qualify or even negate the statutory requirements and protection, it
concluded that the choice of law clause could not be enforced on
public policy grounds.' 98 It followed then that the choice of forum
clause would not be enforced., There was another reason why the
choice of forum clause was unenforceable. Inasmuch as the California
securities law was similar to federal law, the court relied on the well
known U.S. Supreme Court decision in Wilko v. Swan' 99 which held
that the nonwaiver provisions of the federal securities act prohibited
193. 150 Cal. App. 3d 411, 197 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1983).
194. Id. at 416.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 418.
198. Hall, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 411.
199. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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the enforcement of an arbitration agreement in a securities transac-
tion.200
The reasons given by the California Court of Appeal for not
enforcing the forum selection clause are, however, of doubtful du-
rability given current trends. Typically, the validity of a forum
selection clause does not depend on the validity of an accompanying
choice of law clause. As pointed out by the concurrent opinion in
Hall,201 neither the Smith2 2 opinion nor its supporting Bremen2°3 case
could support any linkage between forum selection clauses and choice
of law provisions for determining validity questions. In one of its
recent opinions, the U.S. Supreme Court argued that in determining
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in a contract with a
choice of law provision, the Court should not be influenced by a
prejudgment of the choice of law question.204 If the California courts
continue to rely on federal cases on party autonomy, the lasting
validity of the opinion in Hall is in question. Besides, it is also
doubtful whether a court in Nevada could constitutionally apply
Nevada law since Nevada had no substantial contacts or aggregation
of contracts with the dispute.2 5 There was, therefore, no necessity,
even on public policy grounds, to condition the validity of a forum
selection clause on the results of a choice of law process.
Two other recent U.S. Superior Court decisions raise serious doubts
that California courts will follow Hall's reliance on Wilko. In Shear-
son/American Express v. McMahon,206 decided in 1987, the Court
reexamined the basis of its 1953 decision in Wilko. The Court
explained that Wilko was premised on several factors: (1) the sus-
picion about the desirability and competence of arbitration tribunals;
(2) the view that the arbitration process was an inadequate medium
for enforcing statutory claims; and (3) the inadequacy of the regu-
latory authority of the Securities Exchange Commission to supervise
the arbitration of securities claims. 207 Things have changed signifi-
cantly since Wilko. 208 Arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution
200. Hall, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 418.
201. Id. at 420-21.
202. 407 U.S. 1 (1971).
203. 17 Cal. 3d 491, 551 P.2d 1206, 131 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1976).
204. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985).
205. See discussion and sources cited supra note 8.
206. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). See also Jarvis, The Use of Civil RICO in International
Arbitration: Some Thoughts after Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 1 TRANSNAT'L
LAW. 1 (1988).
207. Shearson/American Express, 482 U.S. at 231.
208. Id. at 233.
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 2
process has become widely acceptable, not only to Congress and the
courts, but also to foreign legal systems. 20 9 Arbitral tribunals are now
seen as competent and capable of resolving several claims, including
statutory claims. 210 Moreover, the Commission now has expanded
powers to supervise the procedures for arbitrating federal securities
claims. In view of these changed conditions, the Court held that pre-
dispute arbitration agreements of claims under the Exchange Act are
enforceable.21' The Court even went further in a recent 1989 decision,
Rodriguez v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., and overruled
Wilko. 21 2 The issue raised in Rodriguez was whether the non-waiver
provision of the Securities Act of 1933 rendered pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreements of claims under the Act void. The Court concluded
that "Wilko was incorrectly decided and is inconsistent with the
prevailing uniform construction of other federal statutes governing
arbitration agreements in the setting of business transactions.' '213
Overruling its own decision is not a task taken lightly by the Court,
particularly since Wilko had been the controlling precedent for over
three decades. In this case, the Court reasoned that the inconsistency
and the need for uniformity in statutory interpretation compelled the
result.
21 4
In view of these developments, it is unclear whether the conclusion
in Hall, that the non-waiver provisions of the California Securities
209. That arbitration has become an international phenomenon can be demonstrated from
the number of arbitration institutions worldwide. There are at least five institutions well known
and quite active in international arbitration. They are:
(1) International Center for the Settlemlent of Investment Disputes (I.C.S.I.D.);
(2) International Chamber of Commerce (I.C.C.);
(3) American Arbitration Association (AAA);
(4) United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules (Uncitral);
and
(5) Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC).
For academic commentary, see Farer, Economic Development Agreements: A Functional
Analysis, 10 CoLTJM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 200 (1971); Note, Developments in International
Commercial Arbitration, Latin America and International Arbitration Conventions: The Quan-
dry of Non-Ratification, 17 HARv. INT'L L.J. 131 (1976); Tiewul & Tsegah, Arbitration and
the Settlement of Commercial Disputes: A Selective Survey of African Practice, 24 INT'L &
Coup. L.Q. 393 (1975); Ryans & Baker; The International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), 10 J. WORLD TRAiE L. 65 (1976); Note, The Growing Consensus on
International Commercial Arbitration, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 709 (1974); McLaughlin, Arbitration
and Developing Countries, 13 INT'L LAW. 211 (1979); Baker & Davis, Establishment of an
Arbitral Tribunal under the Uncitral Rules: The Experience of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal, 23 INT'L LAW. 81 (1989); de Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Con-
tractual Substitute for National Courts, 57 Tin.. L. REv. 42 (1982).
210. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985).
211. Shearson/American Express, 482 U.S. at 238.
212. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
213. Id. at 1922.
214. Id.
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Act make choice of forum clauses violative of public policy, to the
extent of its reliance on Wilko, is still good law in California. The
Hall decision could still be justified, however, on two grounds. First,
by passing the California Corporate Securities Law, the California
legislature may have intended to codify its protective policies by
requiring the resolution of disputes under the statute in only Cali-
fornia. If that is the legislative intent, and in the absence of any
contradictory controlling federal law, the policies expressed in the
California law would override the Bremen public policy exception to
the extent of any inconsistency. Second, the Hall decision could still
be justified on the basis of the deliberate evasiveness by parties of
the courts in matters which may be purely domestic. In Bremen, the
U.S. Supreme Court hinted that its decision might have been different
had the dispute been a purely domestic conflict which the parties
sought to resolve in some foreign distant forum. 215 In other words,
neither McMahon nor Rodriguez can be read to negate the public
policy and other exceptions available under Bremen, Soler and Smith.
IV. ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND PUBLIC POLICY
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
1. Historical Developments
The U.S. Supreme Court has described arbitration agreements as
a species of forum selection clauses to which the Bremen rationale
would apply.2 16 Arbitration agreements, however, are sufficiently
different and subject to a distinct body of law justifying the separate
analysis to be undertaken in this section. One of the centerpieces to
the enforcement of forum selection clauses is what the Bremen court
described as "ancient concepts of freedom of contract. ' 217 The policy
215. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17 (1971).
216. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974). In this case, the Court
said:
An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specified kind
of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure
to be used in resolving the dispute .... [W]e hold that the agreement of the parties
.. to arbitrate any dispute arising out of their international commercial transaction
is to be respected and enforced by the federal courts in accord with the explicit
provisions of the Arbitration Act.
Id.
217. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 11.
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of freedom of contract may be subordinated to a much more fun-
damental policy of a higher order if enforcing the intention of the
parties would produce a conflict. Arbitration agreements are likewise
the result of an exercise of the freedom of contract. Is the right to
choose arbitration so similar to the right to choose a forum that the
same public policy qualifications should logically exist?
In the case of forum selection clauses, there is no controlling
federal statute or uniform state legislation governing such clauses.
Much of the current jurisprudence and policies are based on deci-
sional rules by courts. The case of arbitration agreements, however,
is vastly different. There is a controlling Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA)218 that is applicable to all states. The question then presented
is whether in interpreting congressional intent as expressed in the
FAA a court can find a legitimate basis for the public policy
exception. In other words, when Congress has spoken on a particular
subject, should, or do, the courts exercise judicial restraint in inter-
pretations that would negate the result desired by Congress?
The starting point for an analysis of these questions is the FAA
itself. Passed in 1925, the FAA was designed as a measure to control
or halt decades of judicial hostility towards arbitration. 219 In 1970,
the United States ratified the New York Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards20 and subse-
218. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988).
219. No better proof of this can be found than congressional debates before the FAA was
passed. One proponent of the bill, Rep. Graham of Pennsylvania, had this to say about the
Act:
This bill is one prepared in answer to a great demand for the correction of what
seems to be an anachronism in our law, inherited from English jurisprudence.
Originally, agreements to arbitrate, the English courts refused to enforce, jealous of
their own power and because it would oust the jurisdiction of the courts. That has
come into our law with the common law from England. This bill simply provides
for one thing, and that is to give an opportunity to enforce an agreement in
commercial contracts and admiralty contracts-an agreement to arbitrate, when
voluntarily placed in the document by the parties to it. It does not involve any new
principle of law except to provide a simple method by which the parties may be
brought before the court in order to give enforcement to that which they have
already agreed to. It does not affect any contract that has not the agreement in it
to arbitrate, and only gives the opportunity after personal service of asking the
parties to come in and carry through, in good faith, what they have agreed to do.
It does nothing more than that. It creates no new legislation, grants no new rights,
except a remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and in admiralty
contracts.
65 CONG. Rac. 1931 (1924).
220. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, acceeded to with reservations by the United States, Sept. 30, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517,
T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
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quently enacted the new Arbitration Actz21 in 1970 to comply with
its obligations under the convention. With these actions, it is clear
that Congress intended to treat arbitration agreements differently
from other forms of forum selection agreements. Congressional intent
is captured in section 2 of the FAA which states as follows:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration
a controversy thereafter arising out of such a contract, transaction,
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.m (emphasis added)
The meaning and scope of section 2 has been the subject of an
intense intellectual debate among scholars and judges for decades.Y2
Notwithstanding the apparent clarity in the text of the quoted passage
above, its meaning has been clouded by, and buried in the dust of
the historical circumstances in which it was born. One area of
disagreement has been construing the meaning of section 2 from the
congressional intent behind it. Unfortunately, viewed from its his-
torical context, the meaning of this section has been shrouded in
several uncertainties to be discussed later. Certain congressional ob-
jectives are clear, however, from the legislative history of the statute.
It is incontestable that prior to the passage of the FAA there
prevailed in the United States a "national policy" against enforcing
arbitration agreements.22 Jealous of their powers, judges viewed
privately bargained alternative dispute resolution methods as an en-
221. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988).
222. Id. at § 2.
223. Shortly after the passage of the Act there was a spate of intellectual commentary on
its meaning and scope. For some of the notable commentaries, see Phillips, Arbitration and
Conflict of Laws: A Study of Benevolent Compulsion, 19 CORNELL L.J. (1934); Baum &
Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts, 8
N.Y.U. L. REv. 238 (1931); Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L.
Ray. 265 (1926); Poor, Arbitration Under the Federal Statute, 36 YALa L.J. 667 (1927); Stem,
The Conflict of Laws and Commercial Arbitration, 17 LAw & ConraMv. PROB. 567 (1952);
Note, Commercial Arbitration and the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLuar. L. REv. 902 (1956);
Healy, Federal Arbitration Act, 13 J. MAR. L. & Com. 223 (1982); Note, Arbitrability of
Disputes Under the FederalArbitration Act, 71 IowA L. RE. 1137 (1986); Heilman, Arbitration
Agreements and the Conflict of Laws, 38 YALE L.J. 617 (1929).
224. This national policy is best captured in the legislative history of the Act. See supra
note 219. Professor Lorenzen eloquently described the national mood in the United States
concerning arbitration agreements on the eve of the Act, stating that enforcing arbitration
agreements was rejected practically by all the courts except those in Pennsylvania. See Lorenzen,
Commercial Arbitration-International and Interstate Aspects, 43 YALE L.J. 716, 754 (1934)
[hereinafter Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration].
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croachment on those powers. They concluded that arbitration agree-
ments like other forum selection clauses ousted the jurisdiction of
the courts, and, on that account, were contrary to public policy and
unenforceable.25 In most states, arbitration agreements were either
invalid or revocable at any time before the grant of the award.
2 6 It
is abundantly clear that Congress intended to eradicate the common
hostility toward arbitration agreements by adopting an unequivocal
national policy favoring arbitration agreements in two limited areas:
maritime and interstate commercial transactions. 227 There is also little
doubt that by making arbitration agreements "valid," "enforceable,"
and "irrevocable," Congress wanted to end another mischief. It
intended to stop the nationwide discrimination against arbitration
agreements and put them on the same footing with all other con-
tracts.228 Section 2 provides the same basis for the revocation of
arbitration agreements as any other contract. Beyond these discernible
objectives, it is unclear what else the 1925 Congress might have
intended. Indeed, it is unclear whether Congress formed, or should
have formed, any other intent at all on all other matters relating to
arbitration.
It should be noted that our task here is not just a simple one of
statutory construction. What meaning we discover in section 2 is
likely to touch upon serious and complex questions of U.S. feder-
alism. Whether or not California can use its public policy depends
225. See Yelpaala, Choice of Law and Forum Clauses in International Transactions in
Common Law Jurisdictions, in DRAFrsNo AND ENFORCING CONTRACTS IN CIVIi AND COMMON
LAW JURISDICTIONS 209, 222 (K. Yelpaala, M. Rubino-Sammartano & D. Campbell eds. 1986)
[hereinafter Yelpaala, Choice of Law]. The hostility towards choice of forum clauses can be
seen in the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445
(1874), where the Court stated:
Every citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of the country, and to invoke the
protection which all the laws or all those courts may afford him. A man may not
barter away his life or his freedom, or his substantial rights.... That the agreement
of the insurance company is invalid upon the principles mentioned, numerous cases
may be cited to prove. They show that agreements in advance to oust the courts of
the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void.
Id. at 451. See also Reese, A Proposed Uniform Clause of Forum Act, 5 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 193 (1966); Bergman, Contractual Restrictions on the Forum, 48 CALIF. L. Rav. 438 (1960),
226. Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration, supra note 224, at 755; see also Kochery, The
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts: Erie v. Tompkins, 39 CORNBLL
L.J. 74, 82 (1953) [hereinafter Kochery].
227. One of the earliest commentaries on the Act adressed congressional intent. See
Committee on Comerce, Trade and Commercial Law, The United States Arbitration Law and
its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153 (1925) [hereinafter Committee on Commerce].
228. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924), describing the purpose of the
Act as making arbitration agreements enforceable.
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on the answer to several choice of law questions raised by the Act.229
As a start, what law did Congress intend to govern section 2 issues,
state or federal law? Congress failed to fully and expressly state or
articulate any legal principles governing the choice between state and
federal law in matters concerning the FAA. Furthermore, did Con-
gress intend to create a body of preemptive federal common law
overriding all contradictory state law? There is no express language
in the statute suggesting that it did. Nor is there any language
indicating that it expected any existing federal common law to
control. Second, to the extent that the FAA evidences a strong
congressional intent to put arbitration agreements on the same footing
as all other contracts, can one infer the grant of complete party
autonomy? In other words, can the parties to an arbitration agree-
ment freely choose any law, federal or state, to govern their rights
and obligations? Finally, to what extent do these choice of law
questions apply to international arbitration agreements?
2. Choice of Applicable Law: Federal or State?
a. The Erie Doctrine and the Federal Arbitration Act
With regards to the choice between federal and state law, as noted
above, the issue is not just a simple one of determining congressional
intent. It implicates fundamental questions of U.S. federalism, the
separation of powers, and the power of federal courts to develop a
general body of federal common law applicable to all states. 20 It is
unclear from the plain meaning of section 2 whether Congress
intended that the courts should apply an existing body of federal
common law or create a new body of law pertaining to arbitration
agreements. Furthermore, from the phrase, "such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract," it is not
clear that Congress ruled out the application of non-contradictory or
229. See Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration
Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1305, 1327 (1985) [hereinafter Hirshman].
230. The question of federal common law in U.S. federalism has gained importance and
prominence in the current debate in Constitutional law and statutory interpretation. The
literature is so voluminious that it will be fruitful only to cite a few here. See, e.g., Field,
Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HAv. L. REv. 883 (1986); Merrill,
The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1985) [hereinafter
Merrill]; Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. Rev.
543 (1988); Note, Federal Common Law, 82 HAgv. L. REv. 1512 (1969); Hart, The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLm. L. Rev. 489 (1954); Friendly, In Praise of Erie-
And the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383 (1964).
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non-discriminatory state law public policy and other defenses to the
enforcement of arbitration agreements.231 Congress might have in-
tended that state law govern these defenses to the extent that their
application would not undermine the purpose of the FAA.
Determining congressional intent in this case is complicated by
several factors. The FAA was enacted at a time when federal courts,
under the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 3 2 could create federal rules of
decision for cases within their jurisdiction. They had the power to
announce general federal common law. Indeed, the prevailing policy
under Swift v. Tyson was nationwide uniformity in diversity cases.233
Federal courts applied federal common law rules or "general law"
which prohibited the specific performance or enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements.2 4 Congress was not unaware of this fact, nor was
it unconscious of the separation of powers enshrined in the United
States Constitution. Congress was clearly determined to remove one
"evil": the hostility towards arbitration agreements. Beyond this
clearly articulated objective, it failed to determine expressly whether
the FAA was a set of procedural or substantive rules applicable to
both federal and state courts, and thus a preemption of the public
policy defense under state law.
One way to resolve this ambiguity is to examine the interpretation
of the New York Arbitration Act, which served as a model for the
FAA. According to contemporary New York Court of Appeals
opinions, arbitration agreements are remedial or procedural, but not
substantive in nature. Almost single-handed, Judge Cardozo created
and helped to entrench this interpretation of arbitration agreements.
In the case of Meacham v. Jamestown Franklin & Clearfield,23 5 the
majority rejected enforcement of an arbitration agreement on grounds
similar to the public policy exception. 236 However, Judge Cardozo,
in a concurring opinion, introduced the remedial classification in the
following words:
An agreement that all differences arising under a contract shall be
submitted to arbitration relates to the law of remedies, and the law
that governs remedies is the law of the forum.237
231. Note, Incorporation of State Law Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 MicH. L.
REv. 139, 140 (1980) [hereinafter Note].
232. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
233. See Kochery, supra note 226, at 90.
234. Id. at 75.
235. 211 N.Y. 346, 105 N.E. 653 (1914).
236. Id. at 351-52.
237. Id. at 352.
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Several years later, Judge Cordozo again, and this time writing for
a unanimous court, reaffirmed his remedial classification of arbitra-
tion agreements as follows:
The common law limitation upon the enforcement of promises to
arbitrate is part of the law of remedies .... The rule to be applied
is the rule of the forum. Both in this court and elsewhere the law
is so declared. Arbitration is a form of procedure whereby differ-
ences may be settled. It is not a definition of rights and wrongs
out of which differences grow. This statute did not attach a new
obligation to sales already made. It indicated by a new method the
obligation then existing.
238
The view that arbitration agreements were procedural and not
substantive had support not only in state courts but also in federal
courts before and after the enactment of the FAA. 2 9 The procedural
classification also had support in the legislative history and intellectual
commentary following the Act. 2  The procedural interpretation was
later reinforced by the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,241 which overruled Swift v. TysonY42 In
Erie, the Court stated that there is no general federal common law.
It denied Congress the power to announce any substantive common
law rules applicable to the states in the following words:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State.... There is no federal general common law. Congress has
no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in
a State whether they be local in their nature or "general," be they
commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the
Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal
courts. 243
238. Matter of Berkowitz v. Arbib & Houldberg, 230 N.Y. 261, 270, 130 N.E. 288 (1921).
239. See Committe on Commerce, supra note 227, at 155. The first U.S. Supreme Court
decision characterizing arbitration agreements as procedural came in the case of Heckers v.
Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123 (1864), then came Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruits Co., 264
U.S. 109 (1924). See Local 19 Warehouse Union v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 236 F.2d 776
(6th Cir. 1956), holding the FAA to be procedural. In view of the vagueness in the statute,
there was understandably general confusion among the courts and scholars on this question.
See Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration, supra note 224, at 751-57. See also Cook, Substance
and Procedure in Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933) [hereinafter Cook]; Kochery,
supra note 226, at 85; California Prune & Apricot Growers Ass'n v. Catz American Co., 60
F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1932).
240. Committee on Commerce, supra note 227.
241. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
242. 41 U.S. (17 Pet.) 1 (1842).
243. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79.
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According to this statement and what is generally called the Erie
Doctrine, state law would govern federal courts sitting in diversity
unless the matter is controlled by the United States Constitution or
a federal statute. However, the decision in Erie did not resolve the
interpretational problems presented by the FAA. It merely raised the
question whether the FAA could be interpreted in a manner consistent
with the United States Constitution to give federal courts the power
to announce federal common law in arbitration cases. 244 If Congress
intended by the Act to announce substantive common law rules, the
statute would be unconstitutional on that account based on Erie.
However, under Erie, Congress, by passing the FAA, could have
empowered federal courts to develop a body of substantive federal
common law rules if the subject matter was one over which Congress
had the power to legislate. According to Field, the power of federal
courts to develop common law must be found in some enabling
federal statute such as the FAA or the United States Constitution. 25
Two related issues were thus raised by the Erie decision. First, did
Congress empower the federal courts through the FAA to create a
body of federal common law governing arbitration agreements? Sec-
ond, did section 2 create substantive rather than procedural rights?
If arbitration agreements were interpreted as only procedural, it
would have significant implications on the right to revoke arbitration
agreement under section 2. The public policy exception and other
defenses would be a matter of state law. If, on the other hand, the
FAA were interpreted as creating substantive rights, the public policy
defense under state law would not necessarily be unavailable. The
availability of a state law public policy defense would depend on
whether Congress intended to preempt the entire field.
b. Early Post-Erie Cases
The first post-Erie opportunity for the U.S. Supreme Court to
wrestle with the interpretation of the FAA was in Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co.246 Bernhardt was a diversity suit involving an em-
244. The power of Congress to mandate the creation of federal common law in cases where
Congress has the power to legislate is not in question. For example, the U.S. antitrust statute
is so vague and imprecise that the courts have had to develop a body of substantive federal
common law rules governing the area. For a discussion of the point raised here, see Merrill,
supra note 230, at 30-36.
245. Field argued that the power of federal courts to make federal common law is not
based on diversity but on the enabling statute. Whether federal common law can be made
depends on interpreting the enabling statute. See Field, supra note 230, at 928.
246. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
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ployment contract which contained an arbitration agreement An
application was made under section 3 of the FAA to stay litigation
pending arbitration under the contract. The question presented was
whether section 3 was purely procedural and, therefore, empowered
federal courts to stay litigation without violating the Erie Doctrine.
Conscious of the constitutional issues raised by Erie, the Court
sidestepped the interpretational problems by adopting a narrow def-
inition of section 3. It held that section 3 would only apply if the
transaction involved was covered by sections 1 and 2 of the FAA.247
However, by further holding that the employment contract involved
was neither a maritime nor a commercial transaction under section
2, the FAA did not apply.4 Thus, the Court did not have to
determine whether section 2 was procedural or substantive. Further-
more, the Court pointed out that under the Erie Doctrine, Congress
could not make arbitration agreements enforceable contrary to state
law in diversity cases. Though the FAA did not apply to the dispute
at hand, the Court examined the enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments to such cases in diversity disputes. It concluded that such
arbitration agreements created substantive and not procedural rights
under state law. In its own words, the Court said:
We deal here with a right to recover that owes its existence to one
of the states, not to the United States. The federal court enforces
the state-created right by rules of procedure which it has acquired
from the Federal Government and which therefore are not identical
with those of the state courts. 49
The importance of this interpretation of arbitration agreements
outside the scope of the FAA may be overshadowed by the attempt
of the Court to avoid the constitutional questions raised. A holding
by the U.S. Supreme Court that an arbitration agreement created
substantive rights under state law was a significant step toward
resolving the substance and procedure debate. Such a decision tended
to undermine the validity or continuing viability of previous cases
holding to the contrary. This includes the Court's own precedent 2 0
and the "famous" Cardozo remedial classification in Meacham
251
and Bertkowit. 2 2 It has, indeed, been demonstrated that Cardozo's
247. Id. at 202.
248. Id. at 200.
249. Id. at 202-03.
250. See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruits Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924); and supra note 239.
251. Meacham v. Jamestown Franklin & Clearfield, 211 N.Y. 346, 105 N.E. 653 (1914).
252. Matter of Berkowitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N.Y. 261, 270, 130 N.E. 288 (1921).
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remedial classification was on a weak analytical basis. 2 1 Whether or
not arbitration agreements Were remedial, procedural, or substantive
was not subject to a single and definite answer. Arbitration agree-
ments may be procedural or substantive depending on the purpose
for which the classification is made. 214 As a method of dispute
resolution, an arbitration agreement may be procedural. If the ques-
tion is whether a party to an arbitration agreement is entitled to
enforce the right to arbitrate, it relates to a substantive contractual
right and its corresponding obligation.
The apparent blanket characterization by Judge Cardozo in Mea-
cham ignored the rights and duties incident to the contract to
arbitrate. Moreover, Cardozo's remedial characterization, it has been
argued, was not based on any authority. 2"5 He cited none to support
that position because there was none. Besides, the validity of the
statement that arbitration agreements were only remedial has been
challenged by several commentators.2 56 First, in cases where the
arbitration agreement was revocable at any time prior to an award,
it created a substantive right. A breach of that right entitled an
aggrieved party to nominal damages. The unusual character of the
damages related to the quantum of the remedy which could not,
however, determine the substantive nature of the rights under the
arbitration agreement. In other words, the right which gave rise to
the nominal damages remains substantive irrespective of the size of
the legal remedy. Second, in states where arbitration agreements were
unenforceable, the right created by the agreement remained valid and
substantive even though those states denied access to the courts for
enforcement .2 7 A finding by the U.S. Supreme Court that arbitration
253. Kochery developed a persuasive analysis of the cases before and after Meacham and
Berkowitz in which he exposed the weakness in Cardozo's holding in both cases. See Kochery,
supra note 226, at 81.
254. Id. at 85; see also Cook, supra note 239; Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration, supra
note 224, at 751-54.
255. Kochery, supra note 226, at 81.
256. See supra notes 253-55.
257. In its commentary on the statute in 1925, the Committee on Commerce, Trade and
Commercial Law took pains to argue that there was a misconception about the legal effects
on arbitration agreements. In its view, arbitration agreements existed as a matter of law but
were merely unenforceable. This is what the Committee had to say:
The courts have always recognized that such agreements have existed but have
refused to enforce them. It was often said loosely that arbitration agreements were
void, even under the common-law rule. This statement was not accurate. While the
courts refused to enforce arbitration agreements specifically, they recognized their
existence because they gave another remedy. From the earliest times it was held that
for a breach of arbitration agreement the aggrieved party was entitled to damages.
Committee on Commerce, supra note 227, at 155.
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agreements outside the scope of the FAA were substantive set the
stage for future decisions. Furthermore, this holding tended to erode
the application of the law of the forum and its public policy defense.
It, however, did not resolve the issue of congressional intent.
Without definite guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court on the
choice of law question, federal courts were divided on the subject.
Some courts held that the FAA created a substantive federal law
preempting contradictory state law. 258 The leading decision on this
point was rendered by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Robert
Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc. 2 9 Robert Lawrence was a
diversity suit in which the issue was whether an allegation of fraud
in a commercial transaction containing an arbitration agreement was
to be determined by federal or state law. Finding that the arbitration
agreement was covered by the FAA, the Court held that "Congress
intended by the Arbitration Act to create a new body of federal
substantive law affecting the validity and interpretation of arbitration
agreements. ' ' 260 The Court went even further in stating that Congress
intended the FAA to be as widely effective as possible.2 61 Thus, the
FAA constituted a statement of national law of equal force in both
state and federal courts. The logical implication of the pro-federal
stance of Robert Lawrence would be the preemption of the state law
public policy defense.
262
On the other hand, other courts interpreted section 2 to allow
reference to state law, but even then they differed in their reasons
for looking to state law. 23 For instance, in Lummus Co. v. Common-
258. See, e.g., Kentucky River Mills v. Jackson, 206 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 887; Collins Radio Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 467 F.2d 995 (8th Cir. 1972); Georgia
Power Co. v. Cimarron Coal Corp., 526 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 952
(1976); LeIl v. Jacoby-Gender Inc., 542 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1976); Becker Autoradio U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk Gmbt, 585 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1978); Hart v Orion Ins. Co., 453
F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1971); In re Ferrara S.P.A., 441 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y 1977).
259. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
260. Id. at 406.
261. Id. The Court said: "It is clear that the Congress intended to exercise as much of its
Constitutional power as it could in order to make the new arbitration Act as widely effective
as possible." Id.
262. A thoughful student note, while applauding the decision in Robert Lawrence, argued
that the Court went too far in announcing what was in essence the creation of federal common
law. See Note, Erie, Bernhardt and Section 2 of the United States Arbitration Act: A Farrago
of Rights, Remedies and A Right to Remedy, 69 YuE L.J. 847, 859 (1960) [hereinafter Note,
Erie, Bernhardt and Section 21. See also Recent Development, United States Arbitration Act
Held to Create Federal Substantive Law Applicable in Both State and Federal Courts, 60
COLUM. L. REv. 227 (1960).
263. See Southeastern Enameling Corp. v. General Bronze Corp., 434 F.2d 330 (5th Cir.
1970); Litton Res., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 511 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1975);
American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 269 F.2d 811, 815-17 (6th
Cir. 1959).
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wealth Oil Ref. Co.,24 the First Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed
with the opinion in Robert Lawrence, holding that state law governed
the same issues raised in Robert Lawrence.2 5 It became obvious that
the Supreme Court would have to resolve this disagreement among
the Circuit Courts. The Court got that opportunity in Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.266 In Prima Paint, the issue was
whether allegations of fraud in a consulting contract containing an
arbitration agreement was a question for the courts or arbitrators to
decide. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's opinion that the question of fraud in the container contract
was to be determined only by the arbitrators. In so holding, it relied
on the Robert Lawrence national law characterization of the FAA.267
The U.S. Supreme Court found that the consulting agreement fell
within the scope of the FAA, and agreed with the lower courts that
the arbitration agreement was severable from its container commercial
or maritime contract. Any attack on the arbitration agreement, the
Court said, must only be directed at the arbitration clause itself and
not the container contract.2 8 Since the allegations of fraud in Prima
Paint related to the container clause and were not specifically directed
at the arbitration clause, the Court concluded that the question of
fraud had to be decided by arbitration. The Court was unwilling,
however, to endorse or support the expansive Second Circuit inter-
pretation of the FAA in Robert Lawrence.269 It is important to note
that the Court did not consider the issue of severability of the
arbitration clause from its container contract as preemptive substan-
tive federal law. It held that the question of severability was specif-
ically addressed by Congress in section 4 of the FAA, which authorizes
a court to compel arbitration "once it is satisfied that the making
of the agreement for the arbitration or the failure to comply with
the arbitration agreement is not at issue.''270
Thus, the power of a federal court to order arbitration was not
based on the creation of a substantive federal law, but on the duty
of federal courts to apply federal statutes if they are constitutional.
264. 280 F.2d 915 (Ist Cir. 1960).
265. Id. at 924.
266. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
267. 360 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1976).
268. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04.
269. For a discussion, see Hirshman, supra note 229, at 1329-34.
270. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403.
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The question then was whether Congress could constitutionally pre-
scribe how federal courts may conduct themselves on a subject that
Congress had the power to legislate. Answering that question affir-
matively, the Court noted that "it is clear beyond dispute that the
federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined to the incon-
testable federal foundations of control over interstate commerce and
over admiralty." 271 The Court concluded that federal courts are
bound to apply the provisions of federal statutes such as the FAA.
However, complying with specific congressional instructions in the
statute does not necessarily suggest that the statute created substantive
federal law.
It is significant to note that the Prima Paint Court rejected the
aggressive and expansive interpretation of the FAA by the Second
Circuit. To have endorsed that approach would have cast serious
doubts over the availability of public policy and other normal de-
fenses to contract under state law. It was careful enough to leave
open the option of state law defenses. Besides, the Court was
conscious of the goals of Congress in enacting the FAA. 272 One such
goal was to accord equality of treatment between arbitration agree-
ments and other contracts. As a general rule, other contracts are not
immunized from judicial review. It is hardly surprising that Congress
provided for judicial intervention or challenge to arbitration agree-
ments similar to what is available to any contract. One of the basic
defenses to any contract is the public policy exception, which is
generally a matter of state common law. After Prima Paint, any
public policy defense to the enforcement of an arbitration agreement,
whether under state or federal law, must be directed specifically at
the arbitration clause, not at its container contract.
As a practical matter, the holding in Prima Paint will have a
dampening effect on the use of the public policy and other defenses
to the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Arbitration agreements
are often part of a standard form contract in which the parties would
seldom have the opportunity for separate negotiations on the arbi-
tration clause. Even in the case of non-standard form contracts, the
arbitration clause might not be the subject of a separate bargain.
Requiring the grounds for the revocation of arbitration agreements
to be specifically directed at the manner in which the clause was
included seriously limits the opportunity for the public policy defense.
271. Id., at 405.
272. Id. at 403-04.
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For while the public policy exception may be applicable to the
container contract, the dispute would still be submitted to arbitration
because it does not necessarily affect the arbitration clause itself.
The issue of arbitration clause enforcement was addressed in a
recent California Court of Appeals decision in Lewis v. Prudential
Bache Securities.273 The plaintiff in Lewis alleged that Prudential
fraudulently calculated interest charges in its dealing with the plaintiff
and other customers. Prudential's standard customer agreement con-
tained an arbitration clause. It was contended that given the fraud,
the contract of adhesion, and the fact that California public policy
disfavored the interest charges in question, the arbitration clause
should not be enforced. The Court of Appeals rejected this conten-
tion. It recognized the problem that there might have been an exercise
of monopolistic overreaching in the container contract, but that was
not sufficient to override the FAA provisions as interpreted by Prima
Paint, and other U.S. Supreme Court decisions.274 Furthermore, the
court recognized the defenses of fraud and unconscionability, but
concluded that they had to be directed at the arbitration clause
itself.275 Finally, in response to the public policy defense, the court
argued that the fact that the substantive claims of the plaintiff may
have serious public policy implications is not a sufficient basis for
the use of the public policy exception under the Prima Paint ra-
tionale. 276
The Lewis case is consistent with relevant U.S. Supreme Court
decisions. However, it raises important questions which may become
relevant in different factual settings. Can the fraudulent inducement
of the entire contract ever negate an arbitration clause? Or could the
exercise of excessive bargaining power ever constitute a defense to
an agreement to arbitrate, if only indirectly?277 From the language
273. 179 Cal. App. 3d 935, 225 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1986).
274. Id. at 942.
275. Id. at 943-44.
276: Id.
277. Yelpaala, Choice of Law, supra note 225, at 232. One implication of Prima Paint is
that issues relating to the formation of arbitration agreements may indeed be controlled by
state law. Contract formation is a matter of state law. A challenge to the formation and
validity of the arbitration agreement should then be a matter of state law. A number of cases
have supported this conclusion. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987), where in footnote
9 the court said that the formation of arbitration contracts can be wholly a matter of state
law if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability
of contracts. Id. at n.9. See also Supak & Sons Mfg., 593 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1979); Duplan
Corp. (Dupan Yarn Division) v. W.B. Davis Hosiery Mills, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Ross v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 236 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1956); Securities
Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 703 F. Supp. 146 (D. Mass. 1988).
442
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of the decided cases, it should be possible to reach the arbitration
agreement through the container contract if the claim is properly
pleaded, i.e., if the defense is directed not only at the container
contract, but also at the arbitration clause.
The refusal by the U.S. Supreme Court to endorse the Second
Circuit interpretation, however, left the debate over the substance
and procedure and the choice between federal and state law unre-
solved. It was still unclear whether a party resisting an arbitration
agreement on public policy grounds had to rely on state or federal
law. The Prima Paint Court suggested that the answer to challenges
to arbitration could be found in the statute itself through construction
and interpretation. If the answer to the questions presented could be
found through this method, there would be no choice of law problem.
However, in complex situations where the issues can not be easily
resolved through mere statutory construction, the choice of law
problem might emerge.2 78 It was then still unclear from the Prima
Paint opinion what law would govern the public policy defense to
arbitration. Notwithstanding the apparent limitations suggested by
Prima Paint, federal courts started to apply federal law to state law
challenges to arbitrability in an expansive manner. 279 In a few deci-
sions it was intimated that state law defenses should be rejected only
if they manifested some discrimination against arbitration, thus con-
travening the pro-arbitration national policy announced by Congress
in the FAA.
280
c. The New Arbitration Trilogy
From these decisions, it again became obvious that the U.S.
Supreme Court would have to deal with the choice of law question.
In three of its most recent landmark decisions described as the new
arbitration trilogy,2' the U.S. Supreme Court re-examined section 2
and established new controlling precedents for arbitration agreements
under the FAA. Even though these cases were essentially domestic
278. Hirshman, supra note 229, at 1327.
279. For a review of cases applying federal law, see Annotation, Conflict of Laws as to
Validity and Effect of Arbitration Provisions in Contracts for Purchase or Sale of Goods,
Products, or Services, 95 A.L.R. 3d 1145, 1150 (1979 & Supp. 1989) [hereinafter Annotation].
280. See, e.g., Wydel Associates v. Thermasol Ltd. 452 F. Supp. 739 (V. D. Texas 1978);
Duplan Corp. (Duplan Yarn Division) v. W. B. Davis Hosiery Mills, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 86
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). See Note, supra note 231, at 1400.
281. Professor Hirshman compares the impact of three recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions
to the way in which arbitration in the labor area was unified under controlling federal law.
See Hirshman, supra note 229, at 1306-07. See also Carbonneau, supra note 165, at 197.
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or local with no conflict of laws questions, they nevertheless constitute
controlling precedents in interstate and international arbitration ques-
tions. The basic tenet of these cases i s the establishment of a federal
policy on arbitration. In fact, the policy announced by the Court
was facilitated by an improved judicial attitude towards forum selec-
tion clauses, 282 the growing acceptance of arbitration, the increasing
case load in the Courts, 2 3 and the ratification of the New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards.
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp.,2 the first of the trilogy, the Supreme Court explained that
at the core of congressional intent in passing the FAA was the
establishment of a liberal federal policy on arbitration. Such a policy
was to guarantee the expeditious enforcement of private contractual
arrangements to arbitrate disputes. 285 It was to ensure party autonomy
and freedom of contract. The Moses Court went a step further and
stated in clear terms that section 2 simply created a body of federal
substantive law covering the establishment and the regulation of the
duty to honor arbitration agreements.n6 In other words, whether
there exists a duty to arbitrate, and if so, how that duty may be
regulated is a question of federal substantive law. The Court did not
stop there. It took yet another step towards resolving the federal/
state choice of law debate. It extended the scope of its newly declared
federal substantive law under the FAA to defenses to arbitration in
the following terms:
The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law,
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is
the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.287
The Moses Court, by these statements, established a strong pro-
federal policy favoring arbitration similar to that announced by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Robert Lawrence.28 The depth
282. Reese, The Supreme Court Supports Enforcement of Forum Clauses, 7 INT'L LAW.
530 (1973); Gruson, supra note 180, at 133.
283. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1971), where the Court
complained about the increasing caseload.
284. 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
285. Id. at 22.
286. Id. at 24.
287. Id. at 24-25.
288. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
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and intensity of the federal arbitration policy as announced by the
Court was reinforced in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,2 9 the
third of the trilogy. In Bryd, the Supreme Court noted that the FAA
required the courts to vigorously enforce arbitration agreements since
the preeminent concern of Congress was the enforcement of private
agreements.2 90 It was argued that the overriding purpose of the Act
was to promote expeditious and efficient resolution of disputes. The
Court rejected this argument by relying on the House Report which
stated that Congress intended to "place an arbitration agreement
upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.' '291 This
objective of Congress is but an extension of the primary purpose of
Congress to enforce private agreements.
The second case in the trilogy, Southland Corporation v. Keating
292
is a California case which, for that reason, deserves greater coverage.
Keating involved a class action suit concerning a franchise agreement
between Southland, the franchisor and owner of 7-Eleven Conven-
ience stores, and Keating, franchisee and representative of other
franchisees. The question raised in Keating was whether an arbitration
agreement found in all Southland's contracts should be enforced.
The suit involved several claims including breach of contract, fraud,
misrepresentation, and violation of the disclosure requirement of the
California Franchise Investment Law. 293 Southland obtained a motion
from the Superior Court compelling arbitration of claims except
those under the Franchise Investment Law. 294 The Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court decision holding that section 2 of the FAA
compelled the arbitration of all claims and the Franchise Investment
Law was invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution to the extent that it required otherwise. 2 5 Reversing the
Court of Appeals, the California Supreme Court held that the claims
under the Franchise Investment Law were not arbitrable.
296
The decision of the California Supreme Court was influenced by
its search for the legislative intent behind the Franchise Investment
Law and by its own precedent on statutory interpretation. The
Franchise Investment Law contained a non-waiver provision similar
289. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
290. Id at 219.
291. Id.
292. 464 U.S. 559 (1984).
293. CAL. CoRp. CODE § 31512 (West 1977).
294. Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1982).
295. Keating v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 3d 784, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1980).
296. Keating, 31 Cal. 3d at 598.
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to that found in the Federal Securities Act of 1933.297 According to
the court, the California legislature purposefully and deliberately
adopted parallel non-waiver provisions based on the interpretation
of these provisions in the Securities Act of 1933 by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Wilko. 298 The obvious intention of the California legislature
was to have the non-waiver provisions of the Franchise Investment
Law controlled by Wilko, thereby making the Franchise Investment
Law claims non-arbitrable. In reaching this conclusion on the legis-
lative intent, the court relied on its own precedent on statutory
interpretation stating as follows:
This court has long recognized the principle of statutory construction
that "[w]hen legislation has been judicially construed and a subse-
quent statute on the same or an analogous subject is framed in the
identical language, it will ordinarily be presumed that the Legislature
intended that the language as used in the later enactment would be
given a like interpretation. This rule is applicable to state statutes
which are patterned after the federal statutes.299
While acknowledging that the FAA contains applicable substantive
federal law, the court questioned whether it preempted the ability of
California to adopt statutory regulations including non-waivable ju-
dicial remedies. It concluded that the FAA preempted the field when
federal jurisdiction exists, but not the case at hand.2°°
Upon review, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the opinion of the
California Supreme Court, stating that the latter's interpretation of
the Franchise Investment Law provisions was in direct conflict with
section 2 of the FAA. 30 1 Virtually endorsing the position of the
California Court of Appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court asserted that
Congress has plenary powers under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution to prescribe rules governing interstate or
international commerce. 30 2 In exercise of these powers, Congress
enacted section 2, by which it preempted states' power to determine
questions of arbitrability or strictly judicial resolution of certain
claims subject to an arbitration agreement. Reaffirming its earlier
decision in Prima Paint,3 3 and Moses, the Court held that issues of




300. Id. at 604.
301. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 (1984).
302. Id. at 11-12.
303. 338 U.S. 395 (1967).
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catable to federal and state courts.3 4 Thus, it concluded that section
31512 of the California Franchise Investment Law was in violation
of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.
30 5
The opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Keating may suggest
that the Court was laying the last brick in the edifice of an evolving
federal law of commercial and maritime arbitration. The decision
seems to have resolved the substance-procedure debate and the pre-
emption questions that plagued the interpretation of the FAA for
decades. However, the pro-federal and expansive interpretations of
the FAA by the lower courts explicitly rejected in Prima Paint,
306
but expressly endorsed in Moses, 07 ran into opposition in Keating.
Justice O'Connor, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Rehn-
quist, challenged the majority interpretation of section 2 as creating
substantive federal law.3°8 The dissent argued that the FAA was
intended to be a procedural statute applicable to only federal courts.
Second, Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, agreed that section
2 created preemptive federal substantive law, but rejected the pre-
emption of state law defenses under the saving clause of section 2. 30,
As noted earlier, the ambiguity in the legislative history of the Act
is such that the procedural characterization of the dissent could easily
be supported.310 However, the fact that there is support for a pro-
cedural characterization of the Act does not preclude the intent to
create substantive rights. Whether or not Congress intended by section
2 the creation of substantive federal law as to the validity and
enforcement of arbitration agreements requires a return to the pre-
vailing conditions of the time. It may be recalled that prior to the
Act arbitration agreements were either invalid, unenforceable, or
revocable in most states.3X 1 A federal statute which states that a
304. Keating, 465 U.S. at 12.
305. Id. at 16.
306. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
307. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
308. Keating, 465 U.S. at 31.
309. Id. at 18.
310. See Committee on Commerce, supra note 227, where the purpose of the statute was
stated as follows:
That the enforcement of arbitration contracts is within the law of procedure as
distinguished from substantive law is well settled by the decisions of our courts....
The rule is succinctly stated in the Meacham case, "An agreement that all differences
arising under a contract shall be submitted to arbitration relates to the law of
remedies, and the law that governs remedies is the law of the forum."
Id.
311. See Note Erie, Bernhardt and Section 2, supra note 262, at 854-56; Kochery, supra
note 226, at 84; Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration, supra note 224, at 754.
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written contract to settle commercial or maritime disputes by arbi-
tration "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable," from its plain
and contextual meaning, creates a substantive right. What was pre-
viously invalid, unenforceable, or revocable under state law is now
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable under federal law. 12 Thus, a new
right is created in each situation notwithstanding the fact that a
substantive right might have existed in the case of unenforceable and
revocable arbitration agreements. The substantive rights that existed
under state common law discussed earlier is different from the new
substantive right under federal law. The process by which these rights
may be enforced is undeniably procedural. The right to invoke the
process is, however, substantive, a point that seems to have escaped
Judge Cardozo in Meacham and Bertkowitz. There is significant
intellectual commentary supporting the creation of new and federal
substantive rights.3 13 The majority position on this point is a logical
extension of the Court's earlier holding in Bernhardt that other
arbitration agreements not covered by the FAA created substantive
rights under state law.
However, the euphoria of the pro-arbitration and pro-federal at-
titude of the lower courts seems to have swept through the Supreme
Court. The holding in Prima Paint was much narrower than its
subsequent interpretation and use by the Court in Moses and Keating.
That the FAA created federal substantive law is consistent with
congressional intent to stop the hostility against arbitration agree-
ments. Section 2, therefore, preempted any contradictory state com-
mon law rules or statutes. It is apparent from the legislative history
and intellectual commentary that Congress merely wanted to overrule
state law which made arbitration agreements invalid, revocable, and
unenforceable.31 4 Congress also wanted to bring arbitration agree-
ments within the same legal framework as other contracts. It did not
intend to elevate arbitration agreements above the legal treatment
accorded contracts in general. Thus, Justice Stevens argued that
Congress did not intend to preempt state law defenses under the
saving clause "such grounds as exist at law or equity for the revo-
cation of any contract.''315 In view of the ambiguity in the legislative
history and the lack of clear and manifest congressional intent to
312. See supra note 311.
313. See supra notes 224, 226, and 262.
314. See discussion and accompanying notes on legislative history, supra notes 219, 223,
and 257.
315. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984).
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occupy the field completely, he argued that extending the preemption
to the defenses to the enforcement of arbitration agreements would
be inconsistent with the limited objectives of Congress in passing the
Act.
In a footnote, the majority responded to Justice Stevens in carefully
crafted language. They agreed that a party "may assert general
contract law defenses such as fraud to avoid enforcement of an
arbitration agreement."3 16 They concluded, however, that:
the defense to arbitration found in the California Franchise Invest-
ment Law is not a ground that exists at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract but merely a ground that exists for the
revocation of arbitration provisions in contracts subject to the
California Franchise Investment Law. 3
17
In other words, the majority did not reject the notion of applicable
non-discriminatory state law defenses. It found that the Franchise
Investment Law was discriminatory against arbitration agreements
and, therefore, contravened the stated national policy favoring ar-
bitration. To the extent that Justice Stevens was concerned with the
preservation of non-contradictory state law defenses in general, the
majority opinion is consistent with that position. The majority po-
sition on this point is, therefore, rational, but quite limited in scope.
Thus, it is submitted that the public policy and other defenses to
arbitration should be permitted notwithstanding the suggestion to the
contrary in Moses.
The Moses Court seemed affected by the winds of change blowing
from under and did not exercise as much judicial restraint as the
Keating Court. Besides, the federal policy favoring arbitration is not
subverted in any way by allowing general contract law defenses under
state law to govern. General defenses to contract such as fraud,
duress, mistake, unconscionability, and public policy are well devel-
oped under state law. To the extent that any state law defenses
including public policy discriminates against arbitration agreements,
they would be inconsistent with the FAA and, therefore, invalid.
Moreover, arbitration agreements are not so different a category of
contracts as to warrant a special and different treatment. The public
policy defense and other challenges to the enforcement of other
contracts are not governed by federal substantive law. Giving arbi-
tration agreements a special treatment would be clearly inconsistent
316. Id. at 16.
317. Id.
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with the primary objective behind the Act. Finally, it could be argued
that denying states the right to use non-contradictory state law
defenses would serve the purpose of developing a comprehensive
national policy of arbitration similar to what pertains to the labor
statutes.3 18 But the national policy of arbitration is hardly as perva-
sive, nor are the consequences of commercial disputes similar to
those of labor strife, strikes, and industrial upheavals. Total and
complete occupation of the field by federal law would be unwarranted
under the present circumstances and the legislative history of the
Act.
The wave of pro-arbitration mood in the United States may,
however, lead to a reaffirmation of the preemptive reasoning in
Moses and Keating. The language of these cases provides some basis
for a subsequent reassertion of the preemption argument. The logic
of the majority opinion in Keating and Moses left little room for a
non-preemptive argument. By holding, (1) that the California law
was violative of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Consti-
tution, (2) that Congress intended to preempt questions relating to
the duty, the regulation, and enforcement of arbitration agreements,
and (3) that a contrary interpretation of section 2 would undermine
congressional intent, the majority, by the force of its own logic, had
to find that section 2 preempted California law defenses under law
or equity.
If section 2 preempts questions of permissible defenses against the
enforcement of arbitration agreements, state courts will then have to
rely on substantive federal law in the application of section 2. There
is a growing body of federal substantive law of defenses to the
enforcement of forum selection clauses. The first modern case in
which the defenses were explicitly developed by the U.S. Supreme
Court was Bremen.3 19 The Court identified three categories of de-
fenses to forum selection clauses. The first category dealt with usual
defenses to contracts such as fraud, undue influence, and over-
weening bargaining power.3 20 The second covered a species of forum
non-conveniens defense. That is, a permissible defense exists if the
318. The perceived importance of calm in the shops led to the establishment of the law of
the shop under what is generally called the "Steelworkers Trilogy" interpreting section 301 of
the Taft-Hartley Act. See United Steel Workers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564 (1960); United Steel Workers of America v. Warriers & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960); and United Steel Workers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
319. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1971).
320. Id. at 12.
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enforcement of the forum selection clause could so burden the
resisting party as to deprive him of his day in court. 321 The third
category addressed the public policy exception. Relying on its 1949
opinion in Boyd v. Grand Trunk W.R. Co.,322 the Court held that
"a contractual choice of forum provision should be held unenforce-




One important question raised by the FAA is whether the parties
to an arbitration agreement covered by the Act can freely choose
state law to govern their rights and obligations. It has been argued
above that a liberal reading of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions
may sugggest that, where the FAA is applicable, party autonomy is
eliminated through the preemption argument. Such a reading of
recent Supreme Court decisions would be too expansive a view of
the Court's interpretation of the FAA. The Court has noted quite
appropriately on several occasions that the purpose of the FAA was
to put arbitration agreements on the same footing as other con-
tracts. 32 Party autonomy in general contract law is recognized by
the Second Restatement of the Conffict of Laws.3 2 Section 187 states
that the law of the state chosen by the parties will be applied unless,
inter alia, its application would contravene some fundamental policy
of another state. 26 Thus, the Second Restatement, while recognizing
party autonomy, also accepts the public policy exception. An increas-
321. Id. at 19.
322. 338 U.S. 263 (1949).
323. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15.
324. The equality of treatment has been stressed by the Court in virtually every case where
there is an opportunity to do so. See discussion of the new trilogy supra notes 284-91 and
accompanying text.
325. See REsTATEmENT (SEcomN) oF CONFuCT OF LAWS 561 (1969).
326. Id. Section 187(2) provides as follows:
The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and
duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not
have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless
either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction
and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental
policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the
determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be
the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the
parties.
Id. at § 187.
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ing number of states are adopting the Second Restatement.3 27 The
question then is whether party autonomy and its public policy limi-
tations would be available to arbitration agreements covered by the
FAA.
The possible existence of the public policy exception in party
autonomy in arbitration cases is complicated by the strictures of the
Prima Paint rationale. It may be recalled that the Prima Paint Court
established the principle that any attack on an arbitration agreement
must be directed at the manner in which the arbitration agreement
was obtained, but not the general contract containing that agree-
ment.32 Thus, if a choice of state law is possible under the FAA, it
may be defeated on public policy grounds if the method by which
the arbitration clause was obtained contravened some fundamental
public policy of the forum. 329 The first question, however, is whether
the parties to an arbitration agreement under the FAA are at liberty
to choose state law over the FAA to govern their rights and duties.
There is some disagreement among the courts over the extent to
which party autonomy exists under the FAA. Some courts have held
that implicit in the Prima Paint decision was a prohibition of the
choice of state law in areas governed by the FAA. According to one
Circuit Court of Appeals, "[t]o permit the parties to contract away
the application of the Act by adopting state law to govern their
agreement would be inconsistent with the Act itself and with the
holding in Prima Paint.' ' 30 However, it has been argued that the
FAA should only preempt contrary state law chosen by the parties."'
State law is, therefore, preempted if it contradicts the FAA or
undermines its policy objectives. This interpretation of the statute is
consistent with its legislative intent and the non-preemptive arguments
advanced so far.
The question whether the FAA preempts any choice of state law
may well have been resolved by another recent U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
327. For a discussion of the approaches adopted by various states, see Kay, Theory into
Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REv. 582, 591-92 (1983). For a more
recent update, see Symeonides, Choice of Law in American Courts in 1988, 37 AM. J. CoMp.
L. 457 (1989).
328. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
329. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
330. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corps., 541 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1976).
See also Webb v. Rowland & Co., 800 F.2d 803, 807 (1986); Ainsworth v. Allstate Ins., 634
F. Supp. 52, 54 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
331. See Lorenzen, supra note 224, at 759. See also Annotation, supra note 279 at 1162.
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the Leland Stanford Junior Univ..332 In Volt Information Sciences,
the parties to a construction contract agreed that they would arbitrate
all disputes arising out of that contract under the laws of the state
in which the contract was to be performed, which was California.
When a dispute arose, the rights of two other companies not subject
to the arbitration agreement were implicated. Volt petitioned the
Superior Court to compel arbitration and stay prosecution of the
case before the court. Stanford, in turn, responded with a motion
to stay arbitration pursuant to the provisions of California Code of
Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c). It argued that the pending lawsuit
involved third parties not subject to the arbitration agreement. While
the Code of Civil Procedure of California would permit a stay of
arbitration, there is no similar provision in the FAA. The Superior
Court denied the motion to compel arbitration. In a well reasoned
opinion, the California Court of Appeals affirmed.333 The U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions.
The California Court of Appeal had construed the choice of law
clause as incorporating the California rules of arbitration into the
arbitration agreement. 334 Volt argued that such an interpretation
compelled it to "waive" its federally created and guaranteed rights.
It contended further that the validity of the "waiver" was a matter
of federal rather than state law. Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, who had joined in the dissent with Justice O'Con-
nor in Keating, rejected the "waiver" argument as a misconception
of what rights were actually created by the FAA. 335 He emphasized
two primary objectives of the FAA: 1) to overrule the longstanding
judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements, and 2) to place such
agreements on equal footing with other contracts. 3 6 For there to be
a right to arbitrate under section 4 of the Act, there must exist an
agreement to arbitrate. Section 4 "confers the right to obtain an
order directing that arbitration proceed in the manner provided for
in the parties' agreement. ' 337 Thus, by incorporating the California
arbitration rules into their contract, the parties had agreed not to
arbitrate disputes covered those rules. The right to arbitrate under
332. 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989).
333. See Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Volt Information
Sciences, Inc., 240 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1987) (ordered not published by California Supreme Court).
334. Id. at 559-60.
335. Volt Information Sciences, 109 S. Ct. at 1253.
336. Id.
337. Id.
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the terms of the agreement never existed. There could not, therefore,
be a waiver of such a right.
Of even greater implication is the Court's response to Volt's second
contention. Volt argued that the Court of Appeal's construction of
the choice of law clause violated the settled federal rule that questions
of arbitrability should be liberally interpreted to accommodate the
pro-arbitration federal policy. The Court rejected the contention that
the pro-arbitration policy announced in its earlier precedents was
offended by the decision of the Court of Appeal .38 For one, by
choosing California arbitration rules, the parties were merely adopting
one set of procedural rules manifestly designed to encourage resort
to arbitration. The pro-arbitration federal policy does not favor
arbitration under any particular set of procedural rules. The Court
felt that California was even playing a positive leadership role in this
area by providing a remedy in an area that the FAA was silent.3 39
Of importance to the Court is the pro-arbitration character of the
California arbitration procedures. If these procedures had been less
hospitable to arbitration agreements, and therefore non-neutral, the
choice of California law might well have been ineffective. Such a
holding would not negate party autonomy, but would rather be an
indictment of the chosen state law as being inconsistent with the
federal policy favoring arbitration.
Next, the Court dealt with the question of preemption of the
California arbitration rules by the FAA, given that the former stayed
arbitration involving interstate commerce. It held that the parties, by
their choice of law clause, can replace sections 3 and 4 of the FAA
dealing with procedural rules with those of the state.340 This holding
must be read, however, in conjunction with the argument that the
California procedures were "manifestly designed to encourage resort
to the arbitration process." ' 341 In other words, the ability to replace
federal with state procedural rules may critically depend on, at least,
the neutrality and, at most, the pro-arbitration qualities of the state
law procedures. Equally important is how the Court addressed the
rest of the preemption argument. Relying on its 1956 decision in
Bernhardt, it argued that there is no express provision in the FAA
suggesting preemption, or that Congress intended to occupy the entire
338. Id.
339. Id. at 1254 n.5.
340. Volt Information Sciences, 109 S. Ct. at 1254 n.5.
341. Id.
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field. Any preemption of state law must be found through actual
conflict with the FAA. The Volt Information Sciences Court reinter-
preted its precedents by narrowing the broad preemptive implications
of Moses and Keating. It concluded that a general preemptive ar-
gument could not be inferred from these cases, although specific,
i.e., contradictory, state statutory provisions might be preempted.
The question of preemption is an important one. It is best to quote
the Court's exact language. It said:
[I]t does not follow that the FAA prevents the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in
the Act itself. Indeed, such a result would be quite inimical to the
FAA's primary purpose of ensuring that private agreements to
arbitrate are enforced according to their terms. Arbitration under
the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally
free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit. Just
as they may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate
... so too may they specify by contract the rules under which that
arbitration will be conducted. Where, as here, the parties have
agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration, enforcing those rules
according to the terms of the agreement is fully consistent with the
goals of the FAA, even if the result is that arbitration is stayed
where the Act would otherwise permit it to go forward. By per-
mitting the courts to "rigorously enforce" such agreements accord-
ing to their terms, . . . we give effect to the contractual rights and
expectations of the parties, without doing violence to the policies
behind by the FAA.
3 42
The Volt Information Sciences decision is clearly consistent with
the intent of Congress to put arbitration agreements on the same
footing as other contracts. It is also consistent with the Court's
longstanding policy of enforcing the reasonable expectations of the
parties as expressed in Bremen, Scherk, and Soler. The dissent argued
that the traditional choice of law process does not address the
interaction between federal and state law. Thus, when there is a
conflict between federal and state law, federal law would govern
notwithstanding any choice of law provision to the contrary. In view
of this, a vast majority of lower courts have rejected party autonomy
when federal law is implicated.
343
While the argument is not without merit, its weight is significantly
reduced when examined in light of the purpose of the Act. Congress
342. Id. at 1255-56.
343. Id. at 1261.
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wanted to eradicate the hostility towards arbitration agreements and
compel the enforcement of privately bargained agreements to arbi-
trate. Its first task was to eliminate all state statutes and common
law rules against the enforcement of arbitration agreements. In
putting arbitration clauses and other contracts on the same footing,
it thereby created a federal right. Any state law that discriminates
against the enforcement of arbitration clauses would be invalid and
preempted to the extent of such inconsistency. A choice of contra-
dictory state law by the parties would therefore be invalid and
unenforceable.
So far as the substantive rights to arbitrate are concerned, there
is no choice of law possibility if state law is inconsistent with the
FAA. In the case of consistent state law, a choice of such law would
not contradict the goals of the FAA, and, therefore, poses no
significant problems. The problem, however, exists in two areas: 1)
state procedural rules for the enforcement of arbitration awards, and
2) state law defenses to arbitration. With regard to the first, the Volt
Information Sciences court, as noted above, allowed party autonomy.
In the case of state law defenses to arbitration, party autonomy
would be consistent with the goals of the FAA as long as the defenses
are general contract law defenses. Indeed, one of the earlier com-
mentators of the FAA argued that party autonomy in the choice of
governing law should be allowed if the chosen law has a reasonable
connection with the case and the enforcement of the agreement would
not be contrary to the public policy of the forum.344 This is the
position adopted by the Second Restatement on party autonomy.
Thus, to the extent that state law defenses are not preempted, party
autonomy in the choice of law area would advance the goals of the
FAA, as would the public policy defense.
4. International Arbitration
The availability of the public policy defense to international arbi-
tration agreements is complicated by the New York Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 45 The
Convention has been the subject of extensive commentary which will
344. See Lorenzen, supra note 224, at 759.
345. New York Convention, supra note 220.
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not be repeated here. 46 We are only interested in the limited question
of the use of the public policy defense under the Convention. Since
the United States is a signatory to the Convention, the Convention
has become part of federal law that is applicable to all states. It is,
therefore, necessary to compare the FAA with the Convention on
the issue of public policy.
As a start, the Convention arguably covers a wider range of
arbitration agreements than the FAA. It may be recalled that section
2 covers only maritime and commercial transactions. Also, while the
Convention is concerned primarily with post-arbitral enforcement
questions, section 2 deals with pre-dispute questions. The Convention
nevertheless deals with pre-award matters in Article II. It states that:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or
any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them
in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or
not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitra-
tion.14
7
Article II does not define the limits of the types of arbitration
agreements, though some limitations may be found in Article I.
According to Article I, the Convention applies to foreign or non-
domestic arbitral awards. Thus, the Convention is much broader in
its coverage than the FAA, which deals with interstate and maritime
transactions. However, it is unclear from Article 11 (1) what defenses
a party resisting the enforcement of an arbitration agreement may
have.3 48 The obligation on contracting states is to recognize arbitration
agreements. The Convention does not seek to predetermine issues of
validity of the agreement. The obligation to recognize an arbitration
agreement becomes operative if a valid agreement exists. The validity
of the agreement may hinge on the nature of the defenses to contract
formation under some substantive body of law unspecified by the
Convention. The drafters considered but rejected the notion of
346. See Contini, International Commercial Arbitration: The United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 8 Am. J. Comp. L. 283
(1959) [herienafter Contini]; Samelers, Consolidated Commentaries on Court Decisions on the
New York Convention, 1958, 4 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 231 (1979); Aksen, Application of the New
York Convention by the United States Courts, 4 Y.B. Comm. ARB. 341 (1979); A. BERG, THE
NEw YORK ARBTRATioN CONVENTION OF 1958 (1981).
347. New York Convention, supra note 220.
348. For a commentary on the Convention, see Quigley, Accession by the United States
to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1062 (1961) [hereinafter Quigley].
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predetermining the validity of agreements covered by the Conven-
tion.149 By implication, they intended to leave questions of validity
for the contracting states. They also gave contracting states the right
to determine what subject matter is arbitrable. It may be argued that
the contracting states may rely on their notions of public policy to
limit what is arbitrable. It is doubtful, however, whether the public
policy defense would be available in an action to stay litigation
pending arbitration. Article II (3) mandates that the courts of a
contracting state refer the parties to arbitration in such situations
unless they find that "the said agreement is null and void, inoperative,
or incapable of being performed. ' 3
50
Article 11 (3) does not tell us what law should govern the issues
of validity; nor does it say explicitly whether its list of defenses is
exhaustive. It may be presumed that the forum, when seized of a
stay of litigation proceeding, would apply the law chosen by the
parties, and failing that, the applicable law, based on its conflict of
laws rules and policies. Under this Article, the applicable defenses
such as nullity and others may include the public policy exception.
However, the drafters were interested in eliminating any basis for
eroding the goals of the Convention. Thus, the explicit exclusion of
the public policy defense in Article 11 (3) might have limited the
occasions when arbitration agreements would not be enforced. In-
deed, the reason why Article II was included was to ensure that the
contracting states did not undermine the enforcement of arbitral
awards by not recognizing the agreement to arbitrate. 5' The question
is whether one can read the Convention as denying the public policy
defense to the enforcement of international arbitration agreements.
At least one federal district court has suggested that the public
policy exception is not available to the enforcement of international
arbitration agreements. In Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Chemtex Fibers Inc. ,352 it was argued that Article V (2)(b) of the
Convention, as embodied in the amendment to the FAA, authorized
a court to hold certain RICO claims non-arbitrable on public policy
grounds. The court pointed out that Article V (2)(b) refers to
enforcement of arbitral awards, not arbitration agreements. The
language of this Article clearly prohibits domestic authorities from
349. Contini, supra note 346, at 292-95.
350. For commentary of Article II, see id. at 295-96; Quigley, supra note 348, at 1062.
351. Quigley, supra note 348, at 1063.
352. 617 F. Supp. 55 ($.D.N.Y. 1965).
1989 / Public Policy in International Conflict of Laws
denying recourse to arbitration. According to the court, "it is clear
that the Convention does not contemplate the expression of local
public policy as a barrier to arbitrability of claims. ' 35 3 While the
Convention might have contemplated liberal recourse to arbitration,
it is highly debatable that the drafters would have dealt with all the
defenses to arbitration agreements in such a cryptic manner in Article
II (3). Moreover, the main objective of the Convention was the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, not the enforcement
of arbitration agreements. This is a matter of contract law. It is
unlikely that the drafters sought to predetermine questions of validity
of all defenses to contract in scores of countries with different legal
systems.
We have seen above that the U.S. Supreme Court has developed
certain defenses to the enforcement of forum selection clauses in
international transactions. To what extent would such defenses be
applicable to international arbitration agreements? Since arbitration
agreements are a species of forum selection clauses, would all the
Bremen defenses, including public policy, be applicable to arbitration
cases? The first post-Bremen arbitration case that the Court took
was Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.3 54 Scherk involved an international
commercial arbitration dispute which raised the question whether an
agreement to arbitrate any dispute in an international transaction
should be enforced when the claims alleged violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Following the Bremen rationale, the Court
held such claims arbitrable.35 It did not seem to endorse, however,
the full range of Bremen defenses. It recognized fraud and coercion
as possible defenses, but was unwilling to include public policy as
an exception to the enforcement of international arbitration agree-
ments.356 The court was concerned about the U.S. international
obligations under the New York Convention and the provisions of
the FAA. Both the Convention and the FAA share similar policy
goals of enforcing arbitration agreements. The Court relied on its
holding in Prima Paint limiting a challenge to only the arbitration
clause. It found that the drafters and delegates to the Convention
were motivated by the desire to eliminate parochial attitudes that
would minimize the enforcement of arbitration agreements. It there-
353. Id. at 57.
354. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
355. Id. at 519.
356. Id. The Court dealt with defenses to arbitration in note 14. Id. at n.14.
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fore endorsed the narrow application of its Prima Paint precedent
to international arbitration cases. The Court, however, did not refer
to, nor did it comment on, the defense to enforcement under Article
11 (3).357 It is unlikely that the Scherk Court would have interpreted
Article 11 (3) any more expansively than it viewed Article 11 (1).
Consistent with its goals, the Convention recognizes several excep-
tions to the enforcement of arbitration awards, including the public
policy exception and the non-arbitrability of certain subject matters.
358
As the primary focus of the Convention is not the enforcement of,
and defenses to pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate, the Scherk Court
did not have to be influenced by the Convention on the question of
the public policy defense. It nevertheless explained in a footnote that
the public policy exception may be available at the award enforcement
stage. 3. 9 It is unclear what the Court meant by this statement. Did
the Court believe that the public policy defense was unavailable to
the enforcement of international arbitration agreements or to all
arbitration agreements? If, as we have argued above, the public
policy defense is available under domestic arbitration agreements,
why should it not be available in international arbitration agree-
ments?316 Because it did not specifically reject the public policy
exception in pre-dispute enforcement cases, the Court, arguably, has
preserved that option, and perhaps for only the most blatant abuses
of public policy. Such an interpretation would not be inconsistent
with the Court's current global orientation, and its ever increasing
and maturing respect for international arbitral tribunals.
The apparent reluctance of the Court to accept the public policy
defense was shown in another international commercial arbitration
case, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.1
61
Soler posed the question of the arbitrability of antitrust claims under
the Sherman Act. The plaintiff, inter alia, advanced policy arguments
to resist the arbitration of these claims. Relying on American Safety
Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.,362 he argued that the policy
of private prosecution of antitrust claims produced deterrent effects
which would be lost in arbitration. The Court reviewed the American
357. Id. at 519. The Court addressed the Convention for Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards in note 15. Id. at n.15.
358. Id. at 520.
359. New York Convention, supra note 220. Article V of the Convention recognizes several
defenses, including the public policy defense embodied in sub-paragraph 2(b) of Article V. Id.
at art. V.
360. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 (1974).
361. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
362. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
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Safety doctrine extensively and rejected its application to international
commercial arbitration agreements.3 63 It reiterated the importance of
the national policy favoring arbitration and the enforcement of
arbitration agreements. It considered this policy so important that it
would not prejudge how the arbitrators would resolve the governing
law issue and use that as a reason for not enforcing the agreement.
3 6
As in Scherk, the Court recognized the public policy exception, but
only at the award enforcement stage. National courts of the United
States, it argued, would have an opportunity at the award enforce-
ment stage to insure that their statutory provisions and underlining
policies were complied with by the arbitrators. If the arbitral award
was violative of some fundamental public policy of the forum, a
tribunal of the forum could reject enforcement on public policy
grounds.
3 6.
The Soler decision has been the subject of mixed reviews. It has
been criticized on several grounds. One commentator described it as
radical and unpredictable. 366 According to other critics, the Court
failed to adequately protect the public interest in antitrust disputes.
By making antitrust claims arbitrable but reviewable on public policy
grounds only at the award enforcement stage, the Court does not
necessarily, nor sufficiently, protect any national interest of the
United States. In Soler, the plaintiff was an American and the
defendant a Japanese corporation. The enforcement of any arbitral
award granted in Japan against a Japanese defendant was more likely
to be enforced there than in the United States. 367 Such an award
might be faulty, but nevertheless be enforced even in a third country.
Thus, there would be no occasion for the United States courts to
police the award at the enforcement stage. The solution, the critics
argue, lies in controlling the subject matter of the arbitration, a
conduct that is authorized by the Convention.
3 68
In general, the critics have a valid argument if the subject matter
of the arbitration is considered to be one of fundamental value
363. Soler, 473 U.S. at 632-34.
364. Id. In a footnote, the Court gives a warning that it would not hesitate to condemn
an agreement to arbitrate as against public policy if a choice of law clause worked as a
prospective waiver of statutory claims under the antitrust law. Id. at n.19.
365. Id. at 638.
366. See Lipner, International Antitrust Law: To Arbitrate or Not to Arbitrate, 19 GEo.
WAsH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 395, 414 (1985).
367. Id. at 426.
368. Carbonneau, The Exuberant Pathway to Quixotic Internationalism: Assessing the Folly
of Mitsubishi, 19 VAND. J. TRASNAT'L L. 265, 270, 280 (1986) [hereinafter Carbonneau,
Assessing the Folly].
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systems or deeply rooted morality. Furthermore, questions of arbitr-
ability may be determined by statute. In the case of the United
States, the FAA addresses these concerns. The Court has correctly
interpreted the FAA as not shielding commercial disputes even if
they are antitrust claims. Saying that antitrust disputes are arbitrable
does not deny the national policy interest embodied in the Sherman
Act. International intercourse is generally based on the good faith
of the participants. The efficacy of the Convention hinges on whether
contracting states would, in good faith, apply its provisions. 69 The
Soler Court adopted the proper stance by relying on the arbitrators
to apply the proper law of the contract, and Japan to follow the
provisions of the Convention. There was no reason not to allow the
system agreed upon by the contracting states to work.
However, the critics have other concerns. The public policy excep-
tion, it has been argued, "would eventually cloud an already limpid
international standard. ' 370 The Court in Soler issued a veiled threat
which would result in pressuring arbitrators to conclude that U.S.
law applies, when it does not, in order to avoid any subsequent
enforcement problems.3 71 The danger of issuing an unenforceable
award or judgment is not a creation of the U.S. Supreme Court. In
most countries, foreign country arbitral awards and judgments may
be unenforceable on public policy grounds. It is a fact which the
Convention codified in Article V 2(b). The real issue is how the
contracting states would use the public policy exception in the en-
forcement of arbitral awards.
B. Arbitration in California and Public Policy
We have seen thus far that when the FAA is applicable the U.S.
Supreme Court has stated unequivocably that section 2 establishes
an emphatic federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration
agreements. In a line of recent decisions, the Court has held that
section 2 is preemptive of contradictory state laws on questions of
arbitrability. 372 There are, however, some questions about the full
369. Quigley, supra note 348, at 1070. The notion that treaties must be observed in good
faith, or pacta sunt servanda is well established in international law. For an extensive discussion
of the concept, see A. McNAm, Tr LAW OF TREATIBs 493-505 (1961); S. ROSENNE, THE LAW
OF TREATIES 196 (1970); 1. SnNcLAm, Ti VIENNA CONVENTION ON TE LAW OF TREATiEs
(1973).
370. Carbonneau, Assessing the Folly, supra note 368, at 284.
371. Id. at 288. See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 631 (1985).
372. See supra notes 284, 289, and 292.
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extent of the preemptive scope of section 2. Several states, including
California, have, over the years, established their own arbitration
policies, statutes, and defenses to the enforcement of arbitration
agreements. Did Congress, by passing section 2, intend to preempt
the entire field on questions of arbitration? It is obvious that section
2 limits its application to maritime transactions and commercial
contracts. So far as these two categories of agreements are concerned,
there is strong language in the Court's recent decisions suggesting
the preemption of contradictory state laws.373 There are, nevertheless,
several other categories of transactions and agreements to which
section 2 would not be applicable or would be of doubtful applica-
tion. For instance, section 2 might not cover employment contracts,
interspousal maintenance and support transactions, child custody and
support matters, 374 and several other noncommercial matters. More-
373. See supra notes 292-317 and accompanying text.
374. One area in which arbitration agreements may be subject to only state laws and
policies is family law. In general, the regulation of certain domestic relations falls within the
domain of states. There is little doubt that questions of marriage, divorce, child custody, and
support constitute important policy concerns in all states. There is, however, a question whether
these policy concerns are so fundamental and deep that the basic principles of freedom of
contract or party autonomy should not apply to transactions connected with them.
Suppose, for instance, that in a separation agreement, a husband and wife agree on the
custody of their children, and the payment of support by the husband for the children and
the mother. If this agreement contains an arbitration clause stating that any controversy arising
from the agreement shall be submitted to arbitration, should the California courts enforce the
arbitration clause? There are at least three parts to the agreement between the husband and
the wife: (1) the child custody agreement; (2) the child support arrangement; and (3) the
interspousal support settlement. Although all three fall under the general rubric of family
relations, the policy considerations underlying each of them may be different. They are,
nevertheless, still faced with the same basic policy questions; that is, whether the concerns of
society over family matters are so important that they should be reserved exclusively for the
courts.
Family law questions have always exercised the minds of jurists and the concerns of law-
makers. The literature dealing with societal concerns is so voluminous that only a sample will
suffice here. See Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and
Borax, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 26 (1966); Krauskopf, Divisible Divorce and Rights to Support,
Property and Custody, 24 Omo ST. L.J. 346 (1963); Paulsen, Support Rights and an Out-of-
State Divorce, 38 MwN. L. REv. 709 (1954). Child custody issues have in recent times taken
on both national and international dimensions. The concern over custody battles resulted in
the drafting of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) which has been adopted
by all the states and the District of Columbia. See 9 U.L.A. 115 (1968). For commentary on
the UCCJA, see Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative
Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. Ray. 1207 (1969);
Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing Jurisdiction Under the
UCCJA, 14 Ftm. L.Q. 203 (1981). The concern of society is further manifested in the attempts
to stop child kidnapping through federal legislation. Congress enacted the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act (PKPA) in 1980. See Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566 (1980) (codified as
amended in scattered titles and sections of the U.S.C.). For commentary on this Act, see
Foster, Child Custody Jurisdiction: UCCJA and PKPA, 27 N.Y.L. ScH. L. Rv.. 297 (1981);
Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction, Recognition, and Enforcement, 66 MiNN. L.
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over, to the extent that Congress has not defined what constitutes
commerce, and the question of interpretation of the scope of the
Commerce Clause by the U.S. Supreme Court is unsettled,3 75 it is
uncertain whether the states do not retain certain powers to regulate
arbitration agreements under their own statutes. In view of these
uncertainties, some time will be devoted to California policies and
laws on arbitration.
In 1927, two years after the passage of the FAA, California
adopted its first modern arbitration statute, modelled after the federal
statute. It made arbitration agreements enforceable on terms similar
to those of section 2 of the FAA. In 1961, it. passed its current
arbitration statute retaining substantially the same philosophy towards
arbitration agreements.3 76 The general rule in California is that the
courts should take every step to enforce arbitration agreements unless
REv. 711 (1982). In the international context, there is the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects
of Child Abduction designed to coordinate efforts in solving the problem. See 19 I.L.M. 1501,
reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,498 (1986). For commentaries on the Hague Convention, see
Auton, The Hague Convention on Interntional Child Abduction, 30 INT'L & CoiMP. L.Q. 537
(1981); Bodenheimer, The Hague Draft Convention on International Child Abduction, 14 FAm .
L.Q. 99 (1980). The nature and extent of both federal and state government involvement in
custody, maintenance, and support matters clearly demonstrates social policy concerns.
On the question whether family disputes should be arbitrable, see Stark, Enforceability of
Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARiozo L. Rnv.
481 (1981). Virtually all known cases dealing with the arbitrability of family disputes are New
York cases. The courts of New York are understandably divided over the issue on public
policy grounds. See, e.g., Sheets v. Sheets, 22 A.D.2d 176, 179, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320, 323 (1964)
(custody decree in separation agreement arbitrable only if arbitral award is subject to court
review to accommodate policy interest involved). For a contrary holding, see Agur v. Agur,
32 A.D.2d 16, 298 N.Y.S.2d 772, (1969), where it was held that the state had an overriding
interest as parens patriae in the protection of minor children which could best be achieved
through the courts, thus making custody issues non-arbitrable on public policy grounds. For
the arbitrability of child support, see Schneider v. Schneider, 17 N.Y.2d 123, 216 N.E.2d 318,
269 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1966) (child support agreements between parents held arbitrable). For
interspousal support, see Hirsch v. Hirsch, 37 N.Y.2d 322, 333 N.E.2d 371, 372 N.Y.S.2d 71
(1975), where the New York Court of Appeals rejected the public policy defense to the
arbitration of interspousal support and maintenance agreements without explanation.
375. In its latest interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the United States Supreme Court
continues to view Congressional power under the Commerce Clause to be very broad. Once
Congress determines through some rational basis that a particular activity affects interstate
commerce, it may regulate it. Thus, in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reclam. Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264 (1980), it was held that the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause was
broad enough to permit regulation of activities causing air and water pollution and other
environmental hazards. Id. at 282. It also empowered Congress to regulate surface coal mining
on private land. Id. at 290. However, in a separate opinion, Justice Rehnquist argued that
congressional power under the Commerce Clause was limited to the regulation of activities
which have some substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 310-11. (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring). See also L. TzmE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUTONAL LAW 310-11 (2d ed. 1988).
376. CAL. CIrv. PRoc. CoDn § 1280 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989).
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the particular dispute is not covered by the agreement.3 77 This general
rule is best captured in the following statement by the Court of
Appeals:
Arbitration is highly favored as a method for settling disputes....
Courts should indulge every intendment to give effect to such
proceedings.. .and order arbitration unless it can be said with
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an inter-
pretation that covers the asserted dispute.
378
The friendly judicial attitude towards arbitration was further stressed
by the California Supreme Court in Keating. 79 Similar to the attitude
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, California courts have con-
stantly used liberal interpretation of arbitration agreements to include
tort claims that have their roots in a contractual relationship between
the parties. 80 So strong is this policy favoring enforcing arbitration
agreements that the courts closely examine most defenses to their
enforcement. For instance, in Keating the court noted that any claims
of the waiver of the right to arbitration must be closely scrutinized.3 1
Moreover, the claim that an arbitration agreement is part of a
contract of adhesion has no automatic appeal. Arbitration agreements
found in contracts of adhesion should be enforced unless they do
not fall within the reasonable expectations of the weaker party, or
they are unduly oppressive or unconscionable.
3 82
Notwithstanding the favorable legislative and judicial attitude to-
wards arbitration, the Supreme Court of California has recognized
certain possible public policy defenses to the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements. These exceptions include agreements to arbitrate
various sales agreements, the liquidation of insolvent insurance com-
panies, antitrust claims, and claims based on regulatory statutes where
the public interest is best served by requiring only a judicial remedy.
After the recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Soler, McMahon,
377. See Pacific Investment Co. v. Townsend, 58 Cal. App. 3d 1, 19, 129 Cal. Rptr. 489
(1976); Lewsadder v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 36 Cal. App. 3d 255, 259, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 405 (1973); Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 44 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1003, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 130 (1975).
378. Pacific Investment Co., 58 Cal. App. 3d at 9.
379. Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1982).
380, Pacific Investment Co., 58 Cal. App. 3d at 1.
381. Keating, 31 Cal. 3d at 604.
382. Id. at 594. See also Graham v. Scissor-Tail Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 80, 623 P.2d 165, 171
Cal. Rptr. 604, 616 (1981), where the California Supreme Court held that an arbitration
agreement may not be enforced if it is deemed to be unconscionable. Note, Graham v. Scissor-
Tail, Inc.: Unconscionability of Presumptive Biased Arbitration Clauses Within Adhesion
Contracts, 70 CAis. L. REv. 1014 (1982).
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and Rodriguez, these defenses are of doubtful validity.383 The public
interest doctrine was also addressed by the California Court of
Appeals in Bos Material Hauling, Inc. v. Crowen Controls Corp. ,384
which was decided in 1982 after Keating.
The controversy in Bos centered around the enforceability of an
arbitration agreement in a year-to-year dealership contract. The agree-
ment in question contained an arbitration clause requiring the arbi-
tration of disputes in Dayton, Ohio and under Ohio law. Among
other questions, the court was presented, for the first time, with the
issue of the arbitrability of antitrust claims under the California
antitrust statute, the Cartwright Act.385 This statute was patterned
after the federal Sherman Act and similar statutes in other states.
Naturally, the court was influenced by federal jurisprudence on the
matter, other states' laws, policies and judicial interpretation of these
laws, and policies on the question of the arbitrability of antitrust
claims.
One of the earliest cases dealing with the public policy considera-
tions on this question was the landmark decision in a New York
case, Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tamar Products Inc.386 The New
York Court of Appeals in this case held that the enforcement of the
Donnelly Act, the state antitrust statute, could not be left to arbi-
trators. It reasoned that antitrust questions implicated public policy
concerns of the first magnitude.3 87 According to the court, so per-
vasively important was the public policy interest in issues of economic
liberty, free and unfettered competition that the Donnelly Act codi-
fied it. 388 Moreover, the court felt that arbitration would undermine
the efficacy of the deterrent policies of antitrust laws. The efficacy
of antitrust laws, the court argued, were linked to the fear of excessive
damages, treble damages, and the significant and often burdensome
jury verdicts. 38 9 Knowledge of these possible damages constitutes an
effective deterrent tool which would be lost in fair compensations
awarded by arbitrators. Without saying so, the court seemed to have
383. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985);
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriguez v. Shearson/
American Express, 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
384. 137 Cal. App. 3d 99, 186 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1982).
385. Id. at 109.
386. 21 N.Y.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d 223, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968).
387. Id. at 625.
388. Id. at 626.
389. Id.
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been employing public policy in its protective sense suggested by the
Lord Chief Baron in the Egerton case.
390
The California Court of Appeals relied on the policy analysis in
Aimcee. It also relied on federal precedents, particularly U.S. Su-
preme Court decisions which held that statutory claims, including
antitrust claims, were non-arbitrable. It specifically relied on Amer-
ican Safety and Wilko. 391 Based on these cases, the court held that
the Cartwright Act was an expression of the fundamental policy of
California to preserve free and unfettered competition.392 Accord-
ingly, it decided to follow the mainstream of judicial opinion and
held that claims under the Cartwright Act could not be excluded
from judicial scrutiny and determination through private contractual
agreements .3
93
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Soler 94 may have changed all
this, however. One of the issues the court had to decide in Soler,
was the arbitrability of antitrust claims in international commercial
disputes. Relying on the American Safety doctrine, it was argued
that antitrust claims, being statutory, were non-arbitrable. The Su-
preme Court dealt with this argument by examining the full scope
of the American safety doctrine. According to the Court, this doctrine
was premised on several factors: (1) the pervasive public interest in
the enforcement of antitrust claims; (2) the pivotal role of private
parties in the enforcement of antitrust laws; and (3) the fundamental
importance of antitrust laws to democratic capitalism. 395 In addressing
the role and impact of the American Safety doctrine, the Court
returned to the basic and fundamental question: What did Congress
intend by passing the Sherman and Clayton Acts?
While admitting the public interest argument and the importance
of treble damages in private litigation in enforcing antitrust laws, the
Court could not find any congressional intent compelling the conclu-
sion that antitrust claims must be submitted only to American courts.
3
9
After examining the legislative history of the two statutes, the Court
concluded that section 4 of the Clayton Act and Section 7 of the
Sherman Act were conceived of, primarily, as a remedy for the
390. Egerton v. Brownlow, [1853] 10 Eng. Rep. 359.
391. Bos Material Hauling, Inc. v. Crowen Controls Corp., 137 Cal. App. 3d 99, 110, 186
Cal. Rptr. 740 (1982).
392. Id. at I11.
393. Id.
394. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
395. Id. at 632.
396. Id. at 635-37.
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people of the United States as individuals. 397 Their basic purpose was
compensating injured parties, not levying a penalty. Although treble
damages would penalize wrongdoing, and thereby produce some
deterrent effect, the provisions did not create rights in society at
large. 398 Like punitive damages, treble damages may penalize without
becoming penal. If they could be characterized as penal, there would
be a strong public policy reason for not enforcing the arbitration
agreement.
However, the fact that Congress did not intend to insulate antitrust
claims from arbitration does not mean that there are no overriding
public policy reasons for not enforcing such arbitration agreements.
One commentator has argued that public policy should be invoked
to stop the arbitration of claims where the legislative intent behind
a statute is to achieve some purpose other than justice between the
parties to the dispute. 399 According to this view, antitrust claims,
because of the pervasive public interest in democratic capitalism,
would fall into this category. On its face, this argument seems rational
and interesting. Unfortunately, the author fails to define public
policy. Thus, it leaves the implication that every statute concerned
with more than justice between parties is an expression of public
policy. Virtually every statute designed to support free enterprise,
facilitate commerce, or encourage capitalism would fall into this
category. Justice between the parties to a dispute has definite social
and jurisprudential utility. It helps to bolster confidence in the system
of justice through the law, even though it may be merely compen-
satory. Without defining public policy, this concept could constitute
yet another wide loophole to avoid the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.
Moreover, the recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions discussed above
might make our discussion here merely academic. It may be recalled
that in McMahon the Court held that claims under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 were arbitrable. 40° It also held that civil claims
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)
are arbitrable.4°' Furthermore, it overruled its own precedent in
Wilko, holding that claims under the Securities Act of 1933 were
397. Id. at 636.
398. Id.
399. See Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public
Policy Defense, 2 CARDozo L. REv. 481, 483 (1981).
400. Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
401. Id.
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arbitrable 02 The public interest in these statutes can hardly be
doubted. But the Court could not find any congressional intent to
insulate civil claims arising under these statutes from arbitral tribun-
als. The public interest in these statutes is further demonstrated by
the existence of criminal provisions designed to protect the public
and punish certain types of conduct. One would then have expected
that the public interest in civil claims under these statutes would rise
to the level of fundamental public policy overriding arbitration
agreements. The U.S. Supreme Court held, however, that such over-
riding public policy interests must be found not in its previous
decisions, but within the narrow confines of congressional intent.
Thus, the fundamental question that needs resolution is whether
the Cartwright Act of California can now be interpreted to require
only judicial resolution of antitrust claims. Any answer to this
question will again be confronted with the preemption issue and the
legislative intent of the California Legislature. In Keating, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that section 2 of the FAA created substantive
federal rights enforceable in state and federal courts.4°3 The enactment
of section 2 was the exercise of congressional powers under the
Commerce Clause. As interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Commerce Clause has no definite meaning, nor does it have concrete
contours predetermining its application.4 It is then possible that
certain categories of activities may well fall outside its ambit and
exclusively within the domain of state laws. To the extent that this
is the case, discovering the legislative intent behind the Cartwright
Act becomes crucial.
In Bos, the California Court of Appeals argued that by adopting
an antitrust statute similar to the Sherman Act and that of New
York, the California Legislature intended to codify the fundamental
policies expressed in those laws. 4°5 There are two possible implications
of this interpretation. The California Legislature might have intended
to codify the particular meaning attributed to the Sherman Act and
the Donnelly Act at that point in time. In that case, subsequent
changes in those laws should not affect the legislative intent. On the
other hand, the state legislature, being sensitive to the need for a
coherent federal system, might have intended to adopt policies that
402. Rodriguez v. Shearson/American Express, 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
403. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
404. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclam. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
405. Bos Material Hauling, Inc. v. Crowen Controls Corp., 137 Cal. App. 3d 99, 111, 186
Cal. Rptr. 740 (1982).
469
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 2
would coordinate with and facilitate federal policies in the field.4°6
Thus, federal precedents that formed the basis for state legislation
would not be petrified, but would rather be allowed to affect the
interpretation of such statutes when modified or overruled by the
federal courts. Indeed, it may be argued that a reasonable legislature
that relies on a judicially determined rule or the judicial interpretation
of a statute intends to be bound by subsequent changes in the rule
or interpretation, especially on a subject requiring harmony in poli-
cies. As is apparent from this discussion, the issue of determining
the appropriate legislative intent under these circumstances is complex
and remains an area in which the U.S. Supreme Court may have to
decide in the future.
C. Public Policy and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
An arbitration award is generally not self-enforcing in the United
States. A party to a domestic California or international arbitral
award may petition a court to recognize, confirm, enforce, correct,
or vacate the award. In the case of awards covered by the FAA, the
Act provides grounds for challenging awards within the courts. 4°7 The
406. One goal of statutory interpretation may be the achievement of uniformity and
consistency in an area of importance. In Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1922, Justice Kennedy,
writing for the Court, explained why the Supreme Court construed section 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act to overrule its own precedent, an act which the Court does not undertake
lightly, in these words:
Although we are normally and properly reluctant to overturn our decisions construing
statutes, we have done so to achieve a uniform interpretation of similar statutory
language, . . and to correct a seriously erroneous interpretation of statutory
language that would undermine congressional policy as expressed in other legisla-
tion. ... Both purposes would be served here by overruling the Wilko decision.
Id. at 1922.
407. Section 9 of the FAA deals with Arbitral Awards: confirmation, jurisdiction, and
procedure. Section 10 deals with the grounds for vacation. Section 10 states:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein
the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application
of any party to the arbitration-
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required
the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a
rehearing by the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988).
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statutory basis for judicial review of arbitral awards does not include
the public policy exception. Moreover, it is a well settled principle
that judicial review of arbitral awards should be very narrow. 408 In
California, the grounds for the vacation of an award are set out in
sections 1286.2 of the California Arbitration Act. 4° Conspicuously
absent in this section is the public policy exception. The New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, on the other hand, provides in Article V(2)(b) for the public
policy defense to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
Notwithstanding the absence of specific statutory language in the
California Arbitration Act or the FAA supporting the public policy
defense, courts have over the years, and on occasion, based their
refusal to recognize or enforce domestic arbitral awards on public
policy grounds. The courts took the position that granting a motion
to vacate an award on public grounds served the interest of justice.
4 10
They equated these motions with suits in equity, which provided
equitable relief as a supplement to inadequate statutory remedies.
41'
In this section, we shall review briefly the use of the public policy
exception in the enforcement of international, federal, and California
arbitral awards. Bearing in mind that the U.S. Supreme Court has
ruled that U.S. courts should rely on the public policy exception at
the award enforcement stage to police any excesses in foreign arbi-
tration processes, it. is important to determine how the courts have
408. Diapulse Corp. of America v. Carba Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1980).
409. The grounds for the vacation of an award as set out in section 1286.2 of the
Arbitration Act are that:
a. The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
b. There was corruption in any of the arbitrators;
c. The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a
neutral arbitrator;
d. The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected
without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted; or
e. The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the
arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or
by the refusal of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title.
An award may be corrected if the court determines that:
a. There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the
description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award;
b. The arbitrators exceeded their powers but the award may be corrected without
affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted; or
c. The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the
controversy.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982).
410. First National Oil Corp. v. Arrieta, 2 Misc. 2d 225, 151 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1956).
411. Finsilver Still & Moss Inc. v. Goldberg, Mass & Co., 253 N.Y. 382, 171 N.E. 579
(1930); Schafran & Finkel v. M. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc., 280 N.Y. 164, 19 N.E.2d 1005
(1939).
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responded. Besides, it should also be of interest to determine whether
or not the nature and character of the public policy exception varies
with the origins of the award (i.e., state, federal, or international)
sought to be enforced.
The leading case dealing with the enforcement of international
abritral awards in the United States is the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision in Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v.
Socittk Genrale de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA). 412 Parsons &
Whittemore involved a challenge to the entry of a summary judgment
pursuant to a foreign arbitral award in favor of RAKTA. The
appellants, Parsons, relying on the New York Convention, claimed
that enforcing the award would be contrary to the public policy of
the United States. The claimed U.S. public policy could be found in
the breach of diplomatic relations between the United States and
Egypt during the Six Day War between Egypt and Israel. Parsons
argued that they could not perform their contract, on which the
award was issued, for valid reasons. The termination was necessitated
by force majeure; that is, the termination of diplomatic relations.
They also argued that the U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment, which provided the financial backing to the project, withdrew
its support. From these events, one could discern a U.S. national
policy which they, as U.S. nationals, could not contravene.
The Court answered the public policy objection by examining the
legislative history and intellectual commentary on the Convention. It
found that the drafters intended to keep the public policy defense
narrowly confined.4 13 Of greater importance to the Court was the
history of the Convention and what inferences one could draw from
it. From this history, the Court concluded that:
[t]he general pro-enforcement bias in forming the Convention and
explaining its super-session of the Geneva Convention points toward
a narrow reading of the public policy defense. An expansive con-
struction of this defense would vitiate the Convention's basic effort
to remove pre-existing obstacles to enforcement. 414
The Court was concerned with yet another goal of the Convention:
reciprocity. An unrestrained use of the public policy defense might
412. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
413. Id. at 973. There is some controversy among commentators over the confines of the
public policy defense. See Contini, supra note 346, at 304, where he argues that the intent
was to narrow the scope of the public policy defense. For a contrary position see Quigley,
supra note 348, at 1070-71.
414. Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 973.
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encourage foreign courts to adopt and apply the public policy excep-
tion broadly against awards issued in the United States. For these
reasons, the Court held that the public policy defense under the
Convention should be construed narrowly. More specifically, the
Court held that "enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be
denied [on public policy grounds] only where enforcement would
violate the forum states most basic notions of morality and justice.''415
What is of interest to us is that the Court relied on the most popular
and narrow definition of public policy in the United States, an-
nounced by Judge Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.
41 6
In the case at hand, the Court explained that the appellant's public
policy defense was not meritorious. One could not equate any dis-
cernible United States national policy in that case with public policy.
The public policy defense, the Court explained further, was not
intended to be subjected to the vagaries of international politics.
417
It has been demonstrated above that the interpretation of the FAA
has produced nothing but divergent views among the circuit courts
on several important questions. In the case of the meaning and scope
of the public policy defense under the Convention, there is, so far,
welcome uniformity and consistency among the courts. Other circuit
courts using different terminologies have adopted narrow interpre-
tations of the public policy exception comparable to that of the
Parsons & Whittemore court.418 Federal district courts have consis-
tently relied on Parsons & Whittemore to reject the public policy
defense. For instance, in one case, a federal district court rejected
the public policy defense to a unanimous foreign arbitral award based
on allegations of bias or the likelihood of bias. 41 9 The court considered
it important to note that the public policy defense should be invoked
with caution. The public policy defense was also rejected in enforce-
ment proceedings before another district where fraud and "manifest
disregard of the law" were alleged. 420 In rejecting the argument, the
415. Id. at 974 (emphasis added).
416. 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
417. Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 974.
418. For more record, see Foto Clirome, Inc. v. Cepal Compal Ltd., 517 F.2d 512 (2d
Cir. 1975); Island Territory of Curacao v. Soritrou Devices, 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974); Gulf States Telephone Co. v. Local 1692 Int'l Brotherhood
of Electric Workers, 416 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1969); Revere Cooper and Brass Inc. v. Overseas
Private Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980).
419. Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Mgt. Inc., 517 F. Supp 948, 955 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
420. Brandeis Insel v. Calabrian Chem. Corp., 656 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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court noted that "efforts to vacate arbitral awards have met an
almost total lack of success."421 However, even if the defense were
available, manifest disregard of law, whatever the phrase means,
does not rise to the level of public policy under the Convention. The
court examined the goals of the Convention as stated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Scherk: 1) to encourage recognition and enforce-
ment of arbitral awards; and 2) to unify the standards for the
enforcement of arbitration agreements. It concluded that "salutary
goal and purpose will be better achieved by applying to proceedings
brought in this country to enforce foreign arbitral awards the narrow
concept of public policy ....
From these cases, one conclusion is inescapable. A reliance on
Cardozo's narrowly crafted public policy exception means that U.S.
courts will not favorably entertain the public policy defense under
the Convention unless the implicated policy is deeply rooted or of
fundamental importance. Mere allegations of some wrongdoing by
the arbitrator not covered by the Convention would probably be
unrewarding. A court cannot reject enforcement of a foreign award
merely because it disagrees with the outcome or the interpretation of
a contract by the arbitrator. The alleged public policy to be violated
must then be clear, definite, and significant.42
The unwillingness of the courts to allow the losing party in an
arbitration process to whittle away the sanctity of contract and
undermine the process has even deeper roots in U.S. federal arbitra-
tion law. The courts have consistently taken the position that judicial
review of arbitral awards must be limited in scope. Otherwise, the
federal policy of enforcing arbitration agreements could be subverted.
There are, however, some cases where judicial review and rejection
of arbitral awards on public policy grounds may be required. Prom-
inent among these cases are those dealing with arbitral awards in the
labor law area. 44 Arbitral awards from labor disputes and collective
bargaining agreements may negatively affect the constitutional and
421. Id. at 164.
422. Id. at 167.
423. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
Where the Court found a clear public policy interest violated or threatened by the enforcement
of the award, they would normally vacate the award. See, e.g., International Ass'n of
Machinists Dist. No. 8 v. Campbell Soup Co., 406 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 820 (1969); United States Postal Serv. v. American Postal Workers, 736 F.2d 822,
824 (Ist Cir. 1984); Local No. P-1236, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of
North America, AFL-CIO v. Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1982).
424. See Levine, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Criticism and Remedies, 10
EMp OYEE REL. L.J. 669 (1985).
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other statutorily protected rights of individuals. The courts have
established precedents for reviewing and vacating such awards on
public policy grounds. 425 The importance of public policy in anti-
discriminatory statutes, often implicated in such awards, is hardly in
doubt. Federal courts have for years used the public policy exception
to defeat the enforcement of arbitral awards when they felt it was
necessary. For instance, an award obtained through duress, 426 or
compelling the breach of law or some settled policy, 4 7 may be vacated
on public policy grounds. Also, an award that compelled the rein-
statement of a truck driver who had admitted drinking before over-
turning an eighteen wheel rig was vacated on public policy ground.428
Enforcing that award would be contrary to the settled federal policy
against drinking and driving. 429 In other cases, the courts rejected
arbitral awards that would compromise public safety 40 and public
health,43' or condone embezzlement, graft, or the breach of fiduciary
duties. 43 2 While rejecting these awards, the courts have at the same
time maintained that the public policy defense is not available to
every party for all alleged transgressions. Again, the emphasis main-
tained by the courts has been on the seriousness of the alleged public
policy affected.
In California, awards have been set aside when they are found to
be against general public policy and illegal. In Loving & Evans v.
Blick,433 the court stated that the power of the arbitrator to determine
the rights of the parties is dependent upon the existence of a valid
contract under which rights might arise. A claim arising out of an
illegal transaction is, thus, not a proper subject for arbitration. An
award granted from such an illegal contract stands on no higher
ground than the contract itself and no court will enforce it. In that
case, the court, having found the underlying contract entered into
425. See "Steelworkers Trilogy" cases cited supra note 318.
426. Transmarine Seaways Corp. of Monrovia v. Marc Rich & Co. A.G., 480 F. Supp.
352 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
427. Gulf States Telephone Co. v. Local 1692 Int'l Brotherhood of Electric Workers, 416
F.2d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1969).
428. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Great Western Food Co., 712 F.2d 122, 125 (5th Cir.
1983).
429. Id.
430. World Airways Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Airline Div., 578 F.2d
800, 803 (9th Cir. 1978).
431. Local No. P-1236, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America,
AFL-CIO v. Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1982).
432. United States Postal Serv. v. American Postal Workers Union, 736 F.2d 822, 825 (1st
Cir. 1984).
433. 33 Cal. 2d 603, 204 P.2d 23 (1949).
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by an unlicensed contractor to be void, held that a contract expressly
declared by law to be illegal and against the public policy of the
state was not enforceable.
43 4
Public policy does not only bar the enforcement of awards when
the underlying contract is illegal. If the award commands an act
which is unlawful or against public policy, it will be vacated. In
Black v. Cutter Laboratories,435 the Supreme Court of California
held that it was against the public policy of California to enforce an
award compelling the reinstatement of a member of the communist
party. Of importance to the court was the fact that the employee
was dedicated to the party's program of sabotage, force, and violence.
The employee also worked in a plant that produced antibiotics used
by both the military and civilians. It was concluded that there existed
federal and state public policy and laws against enforcing the award.
436
Ordinarily, errors in law or fact committed by the arbitrator are
n6t grounds for vacating the award where an issue is not in the
scope of the submission agreement and the parties have agreed to be
bound by the award. An exception applies when the error appears
on the face of the award and causes substantial injustice. In Kirby
Campbell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange,43 7 an arbitrator made an award
in excess of the limit stated in the insurance policy, subject matter
of the arbitration. The court held that the public policy favoring
arbitration and the finality of an arbitration award does not compel
judicial confirmation of an award which, on its face, represents a
manifest injustice to one of the parties.
D. Summary
The central tenet of the current debate among intellectual com-
mentators and the courts over the FAA is the extent of its preemptive
reach. The public policy exception is a defense to the enforcement
of arbitration agreements. Thus, the question investigated is whether
the public policy exception exists within the FAA and, if so, whether
it is a question of federal or state law. While an answer to this
question raises significant issues of U.S. federalism, statutory inter-
pretation, and choice of law, it has been demonstrated that the answer
can be found by discovering the legislative intent of Congress. Neither
434. Id. at 609.
435. 43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 P.2d 905 (1955).
436. Id. at 798-99.
437. 260 Cal. App. 2d 105, 67 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1968).
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from the plain meaning of section 2 of the FAA, nor from its
legislative history, can one find a clear intent of Congress to preempt
non-discriminary state law defenses to the enforcement of arbitration
agreements. The public policy defense is, therefore, available under
state law notwithstanding some language in recent Supreme Court
decisions to the contrary. A careful reading of Moses, Keating, and
Volt Information Sciences will confirm that Congress had two pri-
mary goals: (1) eliminating the hostility toward arbitration agree-
ments, and (2) putting arbitration agreements on the same footing
with other contracts. The basic defenses to any contract are governed
by state law. The goals of equality of treatment will be frustrated if
the defenses to arbitration agreements are governed by a separate
body of law other than state law. Thus, the public policy defense
must be a question of state not federal common law.
Granting that this finding of congressional intent is accurate, • party
autonomy would be available to the parties to an arbitration agree-
ment. The exercise of that party autonomy, however, may be checked
by the public policy exception under non-discriminatory state law.
Permitting freedom of contract in this case would again be consistent
with congressional intent in passing the FAA.
There is little doubt now that the Bremen decision ushered in a
new era of judicial internationalism. The Supreme Court demon-
strated an enlightened outlook on global trade questions, holding
that American traders could no longer conduct international trade
on their own terms and under the protective veil of U.S. laws. The
Scherk and Soler decisions reinforced and broadened this enlightened
judicial globalism by drawing a distinction between international and
domestic transactions on the question of arbitration. Notwithstanding
the fact that Bremen itself was an international dispute, the Court
seems unwilling to allow the public policy exception announced in
that case to apply to international arbitration cases. The reluctance
may be induced by the Court's perceptions of U.S. obligations under
the New York Convention, the national policy favoring enforcing
arbitration agreements, and the need to minimize the burden of
excessive litigation on U.S. courts.
In conclusion, while implicitly preserving the public policy defense
in the enforcement of pre-dispute agreements, the U.S. Supreme
Court is unlikely to allow that defense unless the public policy
implicated is real and fundamental. Mere public interest, as in the
case of securities transactions or antitrust violations, is not a sufficient
public policy reason for the revocation of pre-dispute agreements to
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arbitrate. This is especially true when Congress has spoken on the
matter. By stressing the public policy exception in post-award en-
forcement proceedings, the Court seems to provide a window to state
courts for the use of their own public, policy.
V. THE ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CALIFORNIA
Generally, any judgment rendered by the courts of a sister state
or a foreign country is considered in California as a foreign judg-
ment. 48 The enforcement of foreign judgments in California, as in
other states of the United States, is controlled to a large extent by
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution,43 9
and by the pervasive national policy of preclusion limiting repetitive
litigation.440 The policy of preclusion was clearly articulated by the
U.S. Supreme Court in a 1931 opinion when it stated that "one trial
of one issue is enough. '" 44' In a federal union such as the United
States, it is necessary to weld the different territorial units together
on critical and potentially divisive issues.4 2 The policy of preclusion
was, therefore, designed to assist the courts in the forging of a
unified and coherent federal system. The achievement of this goal
required the application of a single policy to all the states even if
that meant paying dearly for it. 443 The nature and extent of the
preclusive effects of a foreign judgment in California arise whenever
an enforcement is sought by a judgment creditor. If the states are
permitted to determine the effects of sister state judgments within
their own borders, it would undermine the unifying goals of feder-
alism.4" The broader goals of federalism and the unity of the nation
438. See ScoLDs & HAY, supra note 84, at 933.
439. See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290
U.S. 202 (1933); and Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
440. SconEs & HAY, supra note 84, at 918-25. See generally C. WioHT, A. MiLtER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTiCE AND PROCEDURE (1981); G. HAZARD, CvI PROCEDURE (2d ed.
1977); Note, Development in the Law: Res Judicata, 65 HA~v. L. REv. 818 (1952); Reese &
Johnson, The Scope of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REv.
153 (1949).
441. Baldwin v. Iowa State Travelling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931).
442. The history of the Full Faith and Credit Clause explains its overall importance to the
federal system. See Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the "Full Faith and Credit" Clause,
28 YAL L.J. 421 (1919); Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 81 U. PA. L. RaV.
371 (1933); Costigan, The History of the Adoption of Section 1 of Article IV of the United
States Constitution and a Consideration of the Effect on Judgments of that Section and of
Federal Legislation, 4 COLUM. L. Rnv. 470 (1904); Ross, "Full Faith and Credit" in a Federal
System, 20 MINN. L. Rnv. 140 (1936).
443. See In re Morris' Estate, 56 Cal. App. 2d 715, 723, 133 P.2d 452 (1943); Atherton
v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1900).
444. See sources cited supra note 442.
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have for years formed the bedrock on which the U.S. Supreme Court
built its edifice of federal jurisprudence on this subject.
The courts of California are not, therefore, at liberty to decide
what effects all foreign judgments have within its borders. The Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution and its accom-
panying federal statute mandate that:
the records and judicial proceedings of any court of any state-
shall have the full faith and credit in every court within the United
States-as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State-
from which they are taken. 45
It is obvious from this language that the federal Constitution imposes
a positive obligation on federal and state courts to recognize sister
state judgments. Once it can be shown that a foreign judgment was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause requires that the judgment be recognized and enforced
by the courts of California uhless, under law, or in equity, there are
some defenses to the recognition and enforcement." 6 The Full Faith
and Credit Clause does not apply, however, to foreign country
judgments, nor is there any controlling federal statute on the sub-
ject. 447 The enforcement of foreign country judgments may then be
governed by common law principles or any applicable state statutes.
The immediate task here is to determine the extent to which public
policy constitutes a defence to the enforcement of foreign judgments
in California. The literature on the enforcement of foreign judgments
is voluminous and still growing.448 In view of the limited scope of
445. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964 & Supp. 1989).
446. One requirement for enforcement is jurisdiction of the rendering court. See Durfee v.
Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873). See also
Boskey & Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack, 40 CoLum. L. REv. 1006 (1940);
Dobbs, The Validation of Void Judgments: The Bootstrap Principle, 53 VA. L. REv. 1003
(1967); Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87
YALE L.J. 164 (1977) (all discussing jurisdictional requirements).
447. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and
the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 72 CoLUM. L. REv. 220 (1972); von Mehren &
Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign-Country Judgments in the United States,
6 LAW POL. & INT'L Bus. 37 (1974) [hereinafter von Mehren & Patterson]; von Mehren &
Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81
HARv. L. Rnv. 1601, 1607 (1968).
448. See generally Lorenzen, The Enforcement of American Judgments Abroad, 29 YALE
L.J. 188 (1919); Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States,
9 UCLA L. REV. 44 (1962) [hereinafter Smit]; Comment, Recognition of Foreign Country
Divorces: Is Domicile Really Necessary?, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 93 (1952); Juenger, The Recognition
of Money Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1988); Leflar,
Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1932)
[hereinafter Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement]; Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments
Rendered Abroad, 50 COmTJM. L. Rav. 783 (1950) [hereinafter Reese]; Homburger, Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 18 AM. J. Comp. L. 367 (1970).
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this article and space considerations, much of that literature will not
be reviewed here. This section will nevertheless address the basic
rules applicable to the enforcement of foreign judgments. It will
emphasize the possible defenses to enforcement and, in particular,
the public policy defense.
There are two broad categories of foreign judgments that may be
the subject of an enforcement concern in California: money judg-
ments and equity decrees, and penal or tax judgments. The "enforce-
ment policies may differ between categories of judgments. In the
case of foreign country judgments, the absence of a controlling
federal statute may leave enforcement questions entirely to the states.
Individual state policies may diverge from those of the federal
government. The following sections will be devoted to an analysis of
these categories of judgments and the public policy doctrine.
A. Sister State Judgments:
A useful starting point for a discussion of the public policy defense
to the enforcement of foreign judgments is the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the U.S. Constitution and judicial interpretations of it.
One of the leading cases on the topic was the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Fauntleroy v. Lum. 4 9 In Fauntleroy, an action was
brought in Mississippi to enforce a Missouri judgment based on some
gambling transactions in cotton futures allegedly in violation of
Mississippi law. According to the judgment debtor, not only were
these transactions illegal, but they were also criminal under Missis-
sippi law. Having obtained an arbitration award in Mississippi on
these illegal activities, the judgment creditor subsequently sued and
obtained a Missouri judgment. The question presented before the
U.S. Supreme Court was whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause
required Mississippi to enforce the Missouri judgment notwithstand-
ing the fact that the underlying transactions were illegal, void, and
contrary to Mississippi public policy.
Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes argued that the commands
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause were clear as to the duty imposed
on sister states in the enforcement of judgment cases. Quoting from
an often-cited earlier opinion of Justice Marshall, he stated that:
The judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity,
and effect in every other court in the United States, which it had
449. 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
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in the State where it was pronounced, and that whatever pleas
would be good to a suit thereon in such State, and non others,
could be pleaded in any other court in the United States.
4 50
Thus, it was held that the Missouri judgment was entitled to enforce-
ment by the Mississippi court as long as the rendering court in
Missouri was a court of competent jurisdiction and the judgment
was final. 41 Neither the illegality of the original cause of action in
Mississippi nor the contravention of the fundamental public policy
of Mississippi could excuse the enforcement of the Missouri judg-
ment.4 2 Even though the Missouri court might have applied the
wrong law, the Court noted that not even a mistake of law constituted
a sufficient basis for the non-enforcement of the judgment. Further-
more, the fact that the arbitration award was probably void or
unenforceable in Mississippi provided no legitimate basis for rejecting
the Missouri judgment.
It is apparent from the language of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause itself, and from the famous quoted statement of Chief Justice
Marshall, that the rendering state is permitted to determine, but only
indirectly, the extra-territorial effect of its judgments by prescribing
these effects on judgments within its borders. 4 3 If the public policy
defense is available in the rendering state, the enforcing state would
be bound to recognize it. Where the rendering state does not recognize
the public policy defense, however, the enforcing state may only
inquire into the jurisdictional basis of the rendering court.454 In
Fauntleroy, the jurisdiction of the court was not in question, and
neither was the judgment of the Missouri court impeachable in
Missouri on public policy grounds. It followed then that a Mississippi
court could not refuse recognition of the judgment on public policy
grounds .4
55
The decision in Fauntleroy marked an important step in U.S.
federalism. It forbade states from engaging in competitive and ulti-
mately fissiparous evaluation of one another's substantive policies in
the creation of legal rights and obligations as evidenced by state
action. In one case, it was argued that recognizing divorce decrees
450. Id. at 236.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. This point was more elaborately developed by the United States Supreme Court in
Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
454. See Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873); Williams v. State of North
Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Williams v. State of North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
455. See Fauntleory v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 236 (1908).
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 2
from states with lax divorce laws and procedures would seriously
jeopardize the sovereignty of states which felt the need for stricter
controls of marriage as an institution.4 6 The U.S. Supreme Court
rejected this argument, stating that the objection raised in that case
would apply to all judgments. 457 While the Court recognized that
giving full faith and credit to such judgments might produce certain
undesirable consequences, it nevertheless concluded that "[s]uch is
part of the price of our federalism.' '458 Little wonder then that the
rationale of Fauntleroy has remained intact over the years. A few
cases will illustrate this point. In Yarborough v. Yarborough,45 9 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that a Georgia permanent child support
decree precluded any subsequent modification of the support by a
South Carolina court after the child had been moved there. As parens
patriae, South Carolina had a legitimate policy interest in the main-
tenance and support of its minor children. In addition, the child's
condition had changed, requiring additional funds for her education.
Yet, and against a strong dissent,460 the Court held that the perma-
nent, total, and final nature of the Georgia decree terminated any
further obligations of the child's father. It, therefore, concluded that
the decree must be recognized by the South Carolina court. 46' Thus,
Fauntleroy and Yarborough stand for the proposition that a state
cannot invoke its own public policy or interest against a sister state
judgment.
The underlying rationale or theme in Fauntleroy continues to hold
true today in other areas as evidenced in the Court's latest opinion
on the subject in a workers compensation case, Thomas v. Washing-
ton Gas Light Co.462 A sharply divided Court held that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause did not preclude the District of Columbia from
granting a worker's compensation award supplementary to that al-
ready granted by Virginia. 463 The Court arrived at this conclusion
through a circuitous route and sharp disagreement. It engaged in an
analysis of the respective and competing interests of the two states.
It examined the nature of worker compensation proceedings, the
456. See In re Morris' Estate, 56 Cal. App. 2d 715, 723, 133 P.2d 452 (1943).
457. Williams I, 317 U.S. at 302.
458. Id.
459. 290 U.S. 202 (1933).
460. Id. at 213 (Stone, J., dissenting). Justice Stone's dissent was strongly worded and
became famous among scholars in Conflict of Laws textbooks.
461. Id.
462. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
463. Id. at 279.
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powers of the Virginia tribunal, and the Court's precedent.4 From
this approach, one could wrongly be misled by Washington Gas into
thinking that state interests and policies have an overriding impact
on the enforcement of sister state judgments.
The Court's holding seems narrower than its overall analysis might
suggest. It held that full faith and credit must be given to the
determination the Virginia tribunal was empowered to make. Full
faith and credit need not be given to what it did not have the power
to make.46 Thus, the Court, after examining the powers of the
Virginia worker compensation tribunal, concluded that it was not a
court of general jurisdiction and could not have determined applicable
law questions. 4" The decision of the Virginia tribunal had certain,
but not complete, preclusive effects on subsequent actions by an out
of state tribunal. Since the tribunal did not have the powers to
determine petitioner's rights under the law of the District of Colum-
bia, they could not prohibit a new adjudication of those rights by
the District of Columbia. This case, therefore, reaffirmed the long-
standing tradition of Fauntleroy that the recognition of sister state
judgments cannot be conditioned by the policies or interests of the
enforcing state.
The rigor with which the U.S. Supreme Court expressed the
mandatory requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution leaves very little, if any, room for state courts to
maneuver. In several cases, California courts could not find any
window to escape from the grip of Fauntleroy and its progeny. One
of the earliest post-Fauntleroy California cases dealing with the public
policy defense was the Estate of Morris.47 In this case, a ninety-two
year old California man adopted another sixty-one-year old Rhode
Island man. While the adoption was valid in Rhode Island and
created the status of father and son, its validity in California was
doubtful because it allegedly conflicted with the declared policies of
464. Id. at 277-81.
465. This was what the plurality opinion had to say about the demands of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause requirements:
Full faith and credit must be given to the determination that the Virginia Commission
had the authority to make; but by a parity of reasoning, full faith and credit need
not be given to determinations that it had no power to make. Since it was not
requested, and had no authority, to pass on petitioner's rights under District of




467. In re Morris' Estate, 56 Cal. App. 2d 715, 723, 133 P.2d 452 (1943).
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California. Notwithstanding the contravention of California public
policy, the California Court of Appeals held that full faith and credit
must be given to the Rhode Island adoption decree and the status it
created. 418
In other cases, California courts expanded on this theme, holding
that full faith and credit must be given other state judgments even
when the cause of action was barred by local statute of limitations
or was not actionable on other statutory grounds. For instance, in
California, public policy prohibits the rendering of any deficiency
judgment on a note secured by a trust deed or mortgage in the sale
of certain types of real estate. This limitation on California courts
could not justify the refusal by California courts to enforce a
Colorado deficiency judgment.
469
Similarly, foreign judgments based on gambling debts are entitled
to enforcement even though such claims are not actionable in Cali-
fornia on public policy grounds.470 The most recent attempt by a
judgment debtor to resist the enforcement of a sister state judgment
on public policy grounds was in Tyus v. Tyus.471 After a review of
applicable precedents, the California Court of Appeals held that there
is no public policy exception to the requirement that sister state
judgments be recognized. 472
468. Id. at 723.
469. See United Bank of Denver v. K & W Trucking Co., Inc., 147 Cal. App. 3d 217,
195 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1983); Sanpietro v. Collins, 250 Cal. App. 2d 203, 58 Cal. Rptr. 219
(1967).
470. See Harrah v. Craig, 113 Cal. App. 2d 67, 247 P.2d 955 (1952).
471. 160 Cal. App. 3d 789, 206 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1984).
472. Id. The California Court of Appeals held enforceable a Texas judgment which
mandated a United States serviceman to share his military retirement benefits with his wife
even though the United States Supreme Court held such retirement benefits not subject to
sharing by nonearning spouses. See McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981). The Texas
judgment had been entered prior to this decision but enforcement was sought after the McCarty
decision. The California Court of Appeals likened the legal question raised to that of Fauntleroy
v. Lum, relating to mistake of law which would not be sufficient basis for non-enforcement.
The appellate court made emphatic statements about the obligation to give full faith and credit
under the United States Constitution. The following is instructive of the court's views:
Commentators and judicial opinions have pointed out that there is no public policy
exception to the requirement that sister state judgments be recognized; there is only
a limited exception where a sister state judgment contravenes an important interest
of the state in which enforcement is sought.
The United States Supreme Court has established that the full faith and credit
clause requires states to recognize the judgments of courts of sister states, according
them full res judicata effect, even though the judgment would be in conflict with
the policy of the enforcing state ....
The Restatement of Laws does not provide an exception for the recognition of
sister state judgments which are merely against the public policy of the enforcing
state. (See Rest.2d Conf. of Laws, §§ 93, 103-121.)
Id. at 793.
484
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Since the mandate of the courts in the decisions explained above
is constitutional, the decisions are applicable to both federal and
state courts. The rationale of Fauntleroy also has been held applicable
to many equity decrees such as divorce decrees and decrees not
involving payment of money.473 Equity decrees are considered as
equivalent to judgments and entitled to recognition and enforcement.
Generally, child custody and alimony decrees are not considered to
be final decrees because they are prospectively and retrospectively
modifiable by the rendering court or even the enforcing court. 474 Any
subsequent modification by the enforcing court is nevertheless con-
sistent with the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which demands that
the enforcing court give the same effect as the rendering court would
to that judgment. However, in Biewend v. Biewend475 it was held
that even though the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not obligate
the enforcement of alimony decrees for future payment of alimony,
California courts could still enforce such decrees on comity principles.
It was further held that such an enforcement would be subject to
the public policy exception. In other words, when the requirements
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause are not applicable, California
courts may reject the enforcement of foreign judgments on public
policy grounds .476
In the case of foreign penal and tax judgments, there are older
cases stating that the constitutional mandate of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not apply to them.477 The penal laws of any
country or state emanate from, and are generally believed to be
based on, its fundamental public policies. 478 This position was induced
473. See ScoLs & HAY, supra note 84, at 514, 930; see also Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S.
77 (1944); Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1909); Note, Interstate Enforcement of Modifiable
Alimony and Child Support Decrees, 54 IowA L. REv. 597 (1969); Fox, The Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement Support Act, 4 Fm. L. REP. 4017 (1978).
474. Notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court decision in Yarborough v. Yarbor-
ough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933), denying South Carolina the right to modify a Georgia child support
judgment, a California court held in Elkind v. Byck, 68 Cal. 2d 453, 439 P.2d 316, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 404 (1968), that California could modify a Georgia award and grant additional support
to a New York child. Subsequent to the Yarborough decision, Georgia had adopted the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act which made modification possible. See also
Halvey v. Halvey, 390 U.S. 610 (1947), where the court held that a Florida custody decree
was modifiable by a New York court because it was modifiable where rendered. See also
Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604
(1958).
475. 17 Cal. 2d 108, 109 P.2d 701 (1941).
476. Id. at 113.
477. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888); State of Oklahoma ex
rel. West v. Gulf Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 220 U.S. 290 (1935).
478. See Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement, supra note 448.
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by a statement made by Chief Justice Marshall that "the courts of
no country execute the penal laws of another." 479 This statement was
first applied to penal judgments, then to tax judgments. However,
in modern times, the situation is slightly different. The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that a foreign judgment is not to be denied enforce-
ment merely because it is for the collection of taxes .480 This opinion
has been extended to administrative tax decisions. 48 1
In the case of penal judgments, the U.S. Supreme Court is still to
decide whether a foreign money judgment should be denied full faith
and credit because it arose from a penal cause of action. In one
case, the Court said that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not
affect the rule that one state cannot enforce the penalties of another
state.48 2 However, various authorities suggest that the modern trend
is to accord recognition and enforcement to penal judgments similarly
to tax judgments. 483 The test for determining enforceability of penal
judgments was provided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Huntington
v. Atrill.48 According to the Court, the test is "whether it appears,
to the tribunal which is called upon to enforce it, to be, in its
essential charter and effect, a punishment of an offense against the
public or a grant of a civil right to a private person." 45 The crucial
point in the test is whether the claim originated from a penal statute.
However, it is argued that with an increase in business and other
economic regulations, foreign penal judgments based on such regu-
latory penalties, like tax judgments, might be enforceable. 4 6 It should
be stressed that the subject is still unsettled and it will require an
opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court to clarify the full faith and
credit concerns in penal judgments.
B. California Foreign Judgment Enforcement Statutes
Foreign judgments have no automatic or direct effect in Califor-
nia. 487 A judgment creditor must bring an action on the judgment to
obtain a new California judgment on which execution and enforce-
479. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (20 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825).
480. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White & Co., 296 U.S. 268, 279 (1935).
481. ScoLEs AND HAY, supra note 84, at 948.
482. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888).
483. ScoLEs AND HAY, supra note 84, at 949.
484. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
485. Id. at 668.
486. ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 84, at 950.
487. Id. at 925.
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ment may lie. 418 There are two ways in which the enforcement of a
foreign judgment may be sought. Recognition may arise where the
foreign judgment is pleaded as a defense to a suit by one of the
parties. 4 9 In that case, the recognition is almost automatic, provided
the rendering court had jurisdiction, since courts routinely accept
evidence of the foreign judgment as terminating the defendant's
obligations. The second type is an affirmative enforcement, where
the judgment creditor wants to execute a foreign judgment against
the local assets of the judgment debtor. 490 In that case, traditionally,
an action had to be brought before the local court. In 1974, California
adopted the Sister State Money Judgments Act, 491 which was designed
to provide a simpler and more efficient method of enforcing such
judgments. It provided a registration procedure that would avoid the
necessity for pleadings and save time, while retaining all available
defenses for the judgment debtor.
4 92
A money judgment under section 1710.10 of the Act is that part
of "any judgment, decree or order of a court of a state of the United
States which requires the payment of money. ' 493 This section has
been construed to include delinquent alimony payments reduced into
a judgment. 494 Judgments that fall outside the definition of money
judgments must be enforced in the traditional way. Section 1710.55
of the statute provides exceptions to the enforcement of sister state
money judgments. 495 The grounds for non-enforcement include ex-
trinsic fraud,496 lack of jurisdiction, and others generally available to
488. Little v. Stevens, 23 Cal. App. 3d 112, 99 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1972). RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CONIUCT OF LAWS §§ 99-100 comment b (1971); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
JuDomENTS § 18 comment e (1982); Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 72
A.L.R.2d 1255 (1960).
489. Scoles & Aarnas, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Nation Judgments:
California, Oregon, and Washington, 57 OR. L. REv. 377 (1978) [hereinafter Scoles & Aarnas].
490. Id.
491. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1710.10-.65 (Vest 1982 & Supp. 1989).
492. See Liebow v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 573, 575, 175 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1981).
493. CAL. Crv. PROc. CODE §§ 1710.10-.65 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989).
494. Liebow, 120 Cal. App. 3d at 579.
495. CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE, §§ 1710.10-.65 (West 1982 & Supp 1989).
496. See Estate of Sanders, 40 Cal. 3d 607, 710 P.2d 232, 221 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1985); In
re Marriage of Modnick, 33 Cal. 3d 897, 905, 663 P.2d 187, 191 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1983);
Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, 476, 23 P.2d 758 (1933); Davi v. Belfiore, 153 Cal. App.
2d 325, 327, 314 P.2d 596 (1957); Comment, Equitable Relief from Judgments, Orders and
Decrees Obtained by Fraud, 23 CALw. L. REv. 79 (1934), all discussing that extrinsic fraud is
a broad concept encompassing situations in which the fraud has the effect of preventing a fair
adversary hearing, the aggrieved party being deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or
proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.
The Second Restatement of Judgments has abandoned the distinction between extrinsic and
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judgment debtors. 47 Conspicuously absent in the list of defenses is
the public policy exception. Unlike some equity judgments, where
state courts may find some escape from the grip of Fauntleroy,
money judgments seem to fall squarely within the ambit of that case
and that of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution.
In 1977, California amended its Sister State Money Judgments
Statute to include the Enforcement of Foreign Country Money Judg-
ments. Under section 1713.1, a foreign country money judgment is
defined as "any judgment of a foreign state granting or denying
recovery of a sum of money, other than a judgment for taxes, a
fine or other penalty or a judgment for support in material or family
matters. ' 498 Foreign country money judgments are entitled to the
simplified enforcement procedure discussed earlier. They are, how-
ever, also subject to their own category of defenses. 4" Of importance
to our discussion is section 1713.4, which provides that such judg-
ments may not be enforced on public policy grounds if the underlying
cause of action or defense is repugnant to the public policy of
California. The public policy exception recognized by this section is
similar to that applied by California Courts under the comity principle
in sister state cases where the Full Faith and Credit Clause is not
applicable. 500
intrinsic fraud, as have the federal courts in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), stressing
the uncertainty and lack of consistency in its application. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTs § 70 (1982). See also Comment, Seeking More Equitable Relief from Fraudulent
Judgments: Abolishing the Extrinsic - Intrinsic Distinction, 12 PAC. L.J. 1013 (1981) (urging
abolition of the distinction in California); Tom Thumb Glove Co., Inc. v. Kwang-Wei Han,
78 Cal. App. 3d 1, 144 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1978).
497. See Bierl v. McMahon, 270 Cal. App. 2d 97, 101, 75 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969); 7 B.
WVirKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, JUDOMENT § 194 (1985); 2 B. WXrrKN, CALIFORNIA PROCE-
DURE, JUISDICTION § 231-41 (1985 & Supp. 1989); Farmers & Merchants Trust Co. v. Madeira,
261 Cal. App. 2d 503, 508, 68 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1968); 2 B. WnrsIN, SuWvARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW, PARENT AND CHILD § 45 (1985 & Supp. 1989); 2 B. VrmcN, SumMARY OF CALnoaRNIA
LAW, JURISDICTION § 298 (1985 & Supp. 1989). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws § 120 comment d (1971). See also Kubon v. Kubon, 51 Cal. 2d 229, 232, 331 P.2d 636
(1958) (plaintiff seeking to enforce foreign support order violated local custody and restraining
orders).
498. CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE §§ 710.10-.65 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989).
499. Id. at § 1713.4 which contains at least six grounds for non-enforcement. Id.
500. See Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 109 P.2d 701 (1941), where Justice
Traynor stated that comity principles would apply subject to the public policy exception. See
also Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. California Development Co., 171 Cal. 173, 152 P. 542 (1915),
in which the California Supreme Court was presented with complex litigation concerning the
enforcement of a Mexican judgment in California. The original dispute was over the rights of
various parties in an irrigation project designed to divert the waters of the Colorado River
through California and portions of Mexico for the irrigation of the Imperial County of
California and a tract of land in Mexico. By design the canal was to run through Mexican
territory. Under Mexican law a foreign corporation could not own the tract of land without
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The enforcement of foreign country judgments in the United States
is a complex subject which cannot be fully pursued here. 01 It is
sufficient to mention that the only U.S. Supreme Court decision on
the subject was in the 1898 case of Hilton v. Guyot.502 In that case,
the Court denied the enforcement of a French judgment because,
under French law, a similar U.S. judgment would have been denied
recognition and the merits of the claim would have been tried de
novo. Thus, the Court recognized reciprocity as the basis for the
enforcement of foreign country judgments. 03 Reciprocity under the
ruling of Hilton does not bind state courts. Indeed, most courts have
rejected the reciprocity doctrine.
The California Supreme Court in Scott v. Scott5 4 decided that in
the case of foreign country judgments state law is controlling unless
there is some treaty or federal statute to the contrary. In Scott, an
action was brought for declaratory judgment to determine the rights
of the parties pursuant to two successive Mexican divorce decrees
obtained by the husband. In a concurring opinion, Justice Traynor
argued that foreign country judgments should be respected in Cali-
fornia unless they were contrary to its public policy 05 A foreign
divorce decree may be contrary to California public policy "when
the foreign jurisdiction has no legitimate interest in the marital status
of the parties, when the sole purpose of seeking the divorce in a
foreign court is to evade the laws of this state.
' 5 6
governmental consent. A Mexican company was set up for this purpose. In a dispute between
the California development company and the Mexican corporation, two judgments were
obtained allegedly through fraud. The judgments were obtained by confessions of the general
manager of the Mexican corporation. As to whether the enforcement of the judgments in
California should be resisted, the California Supreme Court employed equitable principles to
resist enforcement. According to the Court:
it would be to the last degree inequitable to permit the appellant to profit by the
judgments thus obtained .... [M]e are of the opinion that the court below was
authorized to go behind these proceedings and compel the parties seeking to benefit
by them to make an equitable application of the assets which they had improperly
acquired .... [H]aving jurisdiction of all the parties, the court acts upon them in
personam, and restrains them from using their legal rights in a manner which would
be contrary to equity and good conscience.
Id. at 207-08. While the Court did not explicitly employ the public policy exception, its
discussion paralleled the use of public policy as equity and good conscience. Id.
501. See sources cited supra note 447.
502. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
503. Id. at 163-64. But see the views of commentators Reese, supra note 448; Smit, supra
note 448; and von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 447.
504. 51 Cal. 2d 249, 331 P.2d 641 (1958).
505. Id. at 256.
506. Id.
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It is worthy of note that the public policy exception, as applied in
foreign judgment cases, is similar to its use by the California courts
in other conflict of laws cases discussed above. Essentially, the
applicable California public policy test is similar to that suggested
by von Mehren and Patterson. 50 That is, where the underlining cause
of action is so contrary to the laws of California as to make the
enforcement of the judgment terribly offensive to the fundamental
policies of fairness, justice, and sound policy, California courts
generally reject an enforcement request.0 8 Thus, it has been held that
mere difference in the law or the procedures of the two states would
not be sufficient to trigger the public policy exception. °9 It must be
stressed in conclusion that foreign country judgments, in addition to
the public policy exception, face the same available defenses to
enforcement as exist in other enforcement cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Public policy has been mostly described in many pejorative meta-
phors. According to Justice Burrough, it is an unruly horse which
will take its rider to where he knows not. To others it is more like
Balaam's ass which is unlikely to take its rider anywhere. Judge
Goodrich likened it to the ghost of Banquo that will unexpectedly
make its appearance. These negative epiteths suggest that the concept
is inherently uncontrollable by the courts and potentially a "danger-
ous" instrument for subverting the reasonable expectations of liti-
gants. The impression is sometimes created that public policy is not
just an unruly horse, but indeed an unbridled galloping steed. The
objective of this study was to determine the true character of public
policy in California conflict of laws and arbitration. It sought to
investigate how the state of California, with its long history of liberal
traditions, would define and use the concept in the judicial resolution
of disputes.
From the analysis of the concept in California, a few concluding
remarks can be made. It should be stressed immediately that contrary
to some of the pejorative metaphors, public policy as used in Cali-
507. von Mehren and Patterson, supra note 447, at 61.
508. Id.
509. Commentators take the view that the above difference between a state of the United
States and a foreign jurisdiction is not likely to be considered a sufficient basis for the public
policy exception to be used. See, e.g., Scoles & Aarnas, supra note 489, at 385. See also Pentz
v. Kuppinger, 31 Cal. App. 3d 590, 107 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1973) (rejection of public policy
exception similar to rejection in choice of law cases in California).
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fornia conflict of laws and arbitration disputes has neither been an
unruly horse, an unbridled galloping steed, nor a flying Pegasus. It
has been more like a chameleon which takes its colors from its
environment, and infrequently like the ghost of Banquo. Defining
the concept narrowly, the California Supreme Court has for decades
tried to control the use of public policy to defeat the legal rights of
litigants. The fluidity of the concept, however, has made its use by
lower courts less restrained and predictable. In most conflict of laws
disputes, the role of the public policy in the higher courts has been
more restrained than one would have expected.
Traditionally, under the comity doctrine, the public policy excep-
tion was available to defeat foreign created rights. However, by
adopting a narrow definition of public policy, requiring some threat
to fundamental principles of justice, some prevalent conception of
good, or deeply rooted traditions, California courts tended to reject
the public policy defense where the enforcement of a foreign legal
right would not undermine any fundamental values of society. Thus,
in the choice of law area, the mere difference in law would not be
sufficient for the use of the public policy exception. While public
policy may play some role in the comparative impairment approach,
that role is neither direct nor visible. Nonetheless, public policy may
be embodied in the policy of the law which is taken into account in
the comparative impairment approach. The recent public policy de-
cision by the California Supreme Court in Wong v. Tenneco may be
an aberration, but it signifies the elusiveness of the concept even in
the hands of the highest court of the state.
In the areas of choice of law, forum selection clauses, and arbi-
tration agreements, the situation is not entirely clear. In choice of
law and choice of forum cases, the courts seem pulled in two
directions. On the one hand, they continue to subscribe to the narrow
definition of public policy, while at the same time adhering to the
Bremen rationale that party autonomy should be respected. On the
other hand, they are concerned about statutory rights and the evasive
conduct of litigants. Without any federal controlling law, California
is more likely to invoke the public policy exception to defeat a choice
of law or forum clause if the choice was evasive of Californian
substantive obligations, rights, or forum. Deliberate evasiveness may
be viewed as not the proper exercise of party autonomy and, there-
fore, contrary to public policy.
The situation is vastly different and still controversial in the case
of arbitration agreements. The FAA controls pre-dispute arbitration
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agreements in maritime and interstate commercial transactions. All
other arbitration agreements not covered in any other federal statute
are governed by state law. State law public policy defenses would
then control the challenges to enforcement of non-FAA agreements.
With regard to arbitration agreements subject to the FAA, the
existence of the public policy defense depends on the interpretation
of section 2 of the FAA. Section 2 might be interpreted to be
receptive of the public policy exception, but only under federal law.
It has been demonstrated that such an interpretation would be
inconsistent with the primary goals of Congress and the legislative
history of the Act.
Congress intended to achieve two primary goals: (1) to remove the
existing judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements; and (2) to
provide equality of treatment between arbitration agreements and
other contracts. To achieve these goals, Congress made arbitration
agreements subject to the general defenses of other contracts. One
of these defenses is the public policy defense. However, the basic
defenses to contracts are questions of state law and not of federal
common law. Given the limited goals of the FAA and equality of
treatment objective, it is submitted that the public policy defense is
a matter of state law. It must be stressed, however, that the governing
state law must be neutral, non-discrimintory, or non-contradictory
toward arbitration agreements. Furthermore, in view of the equality
of treatment goals, party autonomy should exist in arbitration agree-
ments similar to other contracts. Chosen state law, if non-discrimi-
nary, should govern subject to the state's basic and general public
policy exception. This conclusion flows from the recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Volt Information Sciences and the congressional
intent behind the FAA.
In the case of international arbitration disputes, two important
points need to be emphasized. First, the New York Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards does
not explicitly provide for the public policy defense against the en-
forcement of arbitration agreements. Notwithstanding this, it is
doubtful whether the public policy exception cannot be invoked in
good faith in matters relating to the formation of an agreement to
arbitrate. Second, the Convention provides in Article V (2)(b) for
the public policy defense in the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards. U.S. courts have consistently held that the public policy
defense under Article V (2)(b) must be narrowly construed. Federal
courts have adopted the same definition of public policy in Article
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V (2)(b) cases as has the California Supreme Court in other cases.
The U.S. Supreme Court, without denying the public policy defense
in challenges to arbitration agreements, has held that American courts
should enforce international arbitration agreements under the terms
of Prima Paint. If they have any concerns, they may review the
awards subsequently for violations of public policy.
Public policy is less available as a defense in the enforcement of
foreign judgments, particularly sister state judgments. In a line of
cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a state court cannot
rely on its public policy to refuse the enforcement of a valid and
final sister state judgment. This rule is not applicable to equity and
foreign country judgments. Thus, public policy is available to defeat
their recognition and enforcement. The courts of California appear
to exercise some judicial restraint in the use of public policy against
foreign country and equity judgments similar to what they do in the
choice of law area.
Finally, these summary remarks should not be read to suggest that
public policy is completely-under the control of the courts of Cali-
fornia. In its domestic use, public policy was, perhaps until the recent
Foley decision, an unruly horse in the wrongful termination area.
Also, it tends to surprise us ever so often in the conflict of laws
area. Thus, its unpredictability suggests that it continues to be like
the ghost of Banquo, appearing when least expected or sometimes
becoming a galloping steed in the hands of an eager or overzealous
rider. Besides, public policy is often used to fill in the gaps in the
law and to protect society from the negative impact of individual
conduct. The variety of cases in which it might be used suggests that
it will continue to be more like a chameleon, taking on different
colors and meanings depending on the circumstances of its use.

